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INTRODUCTION

Only twice in the last century, in 1919 with the Treaty of Versailles,
and two years ago with the comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty,1
has the Senate rejected a significant treaty sought by the President. In
both cases, the international agreement received support from a ma
jority of the Senators, but failed to reach the two-thirds supermajority
required by Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution.2 The failure of
the Versailles Treaty resulted in a shattering defeat for President
Wilson's vision of a new world order, based on collective security and
led by the United States. Rejection of the Test-Ban Treaty amounted
to a major setback for the Clinton administration's arms control poli
cies and its efforts to promote American participation in international
efforts at regulatory cooperation. In both cases, presidents raised the
concern that a minority of the Senate could frustrate an international
ist American foreign policy and thereby turn the nation toward isola
tionism.
According to most international law scholars and authorities, how
ever, both presidents easily could have evaded the Treaty Clause by
submitting their international agreements as statutes. Instead of navi
gating Article H's advice-and-consent process, presidents have sent
many international agreements to both houses of Congress for simple
majority approval. Known as congressional-executive agreements,
these instruments are indistinguishable under international law from
treaties in their ability to bind the United States to international obli
gations. Several recent agreements of significance, such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")3 and the World Trade

1. See Sen. Jon Kyl, Maintaining "Peace Through Strength": A Rejection of the Compre
hensive Test Ban Treaty, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 325 (2000).
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President "shall have Power, by and with the Ad
vice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators pres
ent concur.").
3. See North American Free Trade Agreement, done Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32

I.L.M. 289.
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Organization ("WTO") agreement,4 have undergone this statutory
process. Not surprisingly, presidents have favored this easier route to
making international agreements. While in the first fifty years of
American history, the nation concluded twice as many treaties as non
treaty agreements, since World War II the nation has concluded more
than ninety percent of its international agreements through a non
treaty mechanism.5
Despite the fact that the constitutional text includes a specific
Treaty Clause but no other means to enter into international agree
ments, a broad intellectual consensus exists that congressional
executive agreements may serve as full substitutes for treaties. As Pro
fessor Louis Henkin, the dean of American foreign relations law
scholars, writes, "it is now widely accepted that the Congressional
Executive agreement is available for wide use, even general use, and is
a complete alternative to a treaty."6 Declares the Restatement (Third)
of United States Foreign Relations Law: "The prevailing view is that
the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative
to the treaty method in every instance."7 Under this theory of "inter
changeability," congressional-executive agreements and treaties are
indistinguishable from one another, with the result that the former
may enjoy all of the benefits that accrue to the latter, despite the eas
ier method for enacting statutes. Rather than a supermajoritarian bar
rier to international agreement-making, the Treaty Clause becomes
merely an alternative method for making contracts with other nations.
According to this logic, President Bush could now resubmit the Test
Ban Treaty to Congress for approval by majority vote, and President
Wilson could have brought the United States into the League of Na
tions through a statute, even after the defeat of both agreements in the
Senate. Few constitutional provisions seem so easily evaded.

4. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 33 1.L.M. 1 125.
5. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 103D CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 15 (Comm. Print 1993) [herein
after SENATE 1993 REPORT]. While these nontreaty numbers include both congressional
executive agreements and sole executive agreements, most of these agreements appear to
have undergone approval by both houses of Congress. See id. at 16.
6. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 217
(2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS]; see also MICHAEL J. GLENNON,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); Philip R.
Trimble & Jack S. Weiss, The Role of the President, the Senate and Congress with Respect to
Arms Control Treaties Concluded by the United States, 67 CHJ.-KENT L. REV. 645 (1991).
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 303 cmt. e (1987).
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This striking divergence between the constitutional text and prac
tice is not just a matter of intellectual curiosity. International agree
ments today are assuming center stage in efforts to regulate areas such
as national security, the environment, trade and finance, and human
rights.8 In order to establish effective global solutions, treaties have
come to resemble domestic legislation in directly mandating norms of
public and private conduct.9 As international agreements increasingly
assume the function of statutes, the treaty power - an executive
power that excludes the House of Representatives - threatens to
supplant the domestic lawmaking process, even in areas within Con
gress's Article I, Section 8 competencies.10 At the same time, inter
changeability raises the prospect that statutes could fully replace trea
ties, which raises the mirror-image problem that Congress could come
to exercise executive powers in areas where treaties have force beyond
domestic statutes. While this may not have presented much of a prac
tical problem in an era when the Commerce Clause's reach was
thought to be virtually limitless, the Supreme Court's recent federal
ism decisions - which, for example, have limited Congress's authority
to expand civil rights protections11 - make clear that significant areas
still exist where treaties provide the sole constitutional source for na
tional regulatory power. Interchangeability would permit statutes to
evade the restrictions on Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers, just as
globalization threatens to allow the executive treaty power to invade
the domestic lawmaking process.
Explaining the constitutionality of the congressional-executive
agreement is a matter not just of intellectual coherence, but of practi
cal economic and political importance. Today, about one-quarter of
the gross national product arises from international trade, whose rules
are set by the NAFfA and WTO agreements.12 If all international
agreements must undergo the supermajority treaty process, it is likely
8. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and
the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1956-57 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo,
Globalism].
9. See id. at 1967-69.
10. In other work, I have argued that, for textual and structural reasons, treaties which
seek to regulate areas within Article I, Section 8 subject matters should be deemed non-self
executing, so as to preserve Congress's monopoly over domestic legislation. See generally
John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self
Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2233-57 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Non-Self-Execution].
1 1. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); College Sav. Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). For criticism of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in
validating civil rights statutes as beyond congressional power, see, e.g., Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After
Morrison and Kimel, 1 10 YALE L.J. 441 (2000).
12. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 105-176, at 216 (2d
Sess. 1998).
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that America's ability to participate in a new world of international
cooperation will be hampered. On the other hand, use of a constitu
tionally illegitimate method would throw America's participation in
the world trading system into doubt. Not only would constitutional
questions undermine the validity of current congressional-executive
agreements, they also would raise problems for America's ability to
engage in ever more intensive efforts at international cooperation.
Uncertainty about the constitutionality of the congressional-executive
agreement may inhibit the ability of the public lawmaking system to
embrace novel efforts to craft international solutions in response to
the effects of globalization on areas such as international finance and
economics, security, the environment, and human rights.
Resolving the looming conflict between globalization and the
American public lawmaking process requires us to consider carefully
the scope of treaties, the reach of statutes, and how to reconcile the
two. Within the context of the debate over the constitutionality of the
congressional-executive agreement, this Article will develop a theory
that allows us to understand the difference between treaties and stat
utes and the subject matter appropriate for each - a difference that
permits us to maintain important distinctions between international
lawmaking and domestic lawmaking in an age of rapid globalization.
This distinction provides the foundation for determining when con
gressional-executive agreements are a constitutional mode of interna
tional agreement. Unfortunately, our leading constitutional scholars
have failed to understand that the debate over the congressional
executive agreement actually embodies deeper structural questions
concerning the proper relationship between the treatymaking and the
domestic lawmaking processes.
Instead of seeking to harmonize the respective scopes of treaties
and statutes, many in the academy have embraced extreme positions
that eviscerate either the treaty or the congressional-executive agree
ment. Traditional international law scholars, for example, too willingly
embrace complete interchangeability while brushing aside severe tex
tual and structural problems with eliding statutes and treaties. Profes
sors Bruce Ackerman and David Golove also defend full interchange
ability, but only on the basis of their provocative and idiosyncratic
theory of unwritten constitutional amendments.13 Professor Laurence
Tribe, on the other hand, argues that congressional-executive agree-

13. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional, 108 HARV. L.
799 (1995). For more complete articulations of the "constitutional moments" theory,
see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANS
FORMATIONS).
REv.
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ments like NAFTA and the WTO violate the Constitution.14 Because
the Constitution only addresses international agreements in the Treaty
Clause, Tribe concludes that all significant international agreements
must undergo a supermajority vote in the Senate - a theory of treaty
exclusivity. Ackerman, Golove, and Tribe fail to see that the question
of the congressional-executive agreement actually turns on the proper
line between the executive treaty power and Congress's legislative
power, and on the changes globalization has wrought upon the domes
tic lawmaking process.15 Because of this, they fail to see that adopting
either interchangeability or treaty exclusivity would lead to unaccept
able distortions of the constitutional structure and would require the
rejection of more than a half century of practice by the political
branches.
This Article will provide a constitutional justification for the con
gressional-executive agreement, one consistent with the text, struc
ture, and history of the Constitution. It will provide a clear dividing
line that demarcates the situations in which treaties must be the sole
instrument of national policy, and those that can be dealt with by the
congressional-executive agreement. This Article is the first to base its
theory of treaties upon the record of practice by the political branches,
rather than making normative claims derived simply from different

14. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
15. Recently, two articles have addressed the debate over interchangeability with dif
fering results. Compare Peter J. Spiro, Constitutional Method and the Great Treaty Debate,
79 TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming 2001), with Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Ex
ecutive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1998). Although Pro
fessor Spiro's article shares several of this Article's methodological doubts about both the
Ackerman/Golove and Tribe approaches, he does not attempt to develop a theory about the
differences between treaties and congressional-executive agreements or about the constitu
tional principles that should govern international agreements. Rather, Professor Spiro seeks
to use the issue as the springboard for a general theory of constitutional change. Professor
Paul claims in part that that congressional-executive agreements resulted from the expansion
in executive power due to the increased geopolitical demands on the Constitution after
World War II. He argues that now that these problems have receded with the end of the
Cold War (itself a debatable proposition), we should return to constitutional practices that
comport more closely to the original Constitution. Paul's conclusions are quite similar to
those of Professors Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Jules Lobel, who have argued that the Cold
War period led to an emergency powers model of the Constitution that improperly ex
panded the presidential authority in foreign affairs. See generally ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and
the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989). Paul would conclude, as would
Schlesinger and Lobel, that treaties should be the only method for making international
agreements. I find Professor Paul's analysis lacking, however, in its failure to examine the
relationship between treaties and statutes in light of the distribution of authority between
the legislative and executive branches in Articles I and II, and in its haste to discard the sig
nificant practice of international agreement-making by the political branches. See infra text
accompanying notes 142-311.
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theories of constitutional interpretation.16 Practice suggests that com
plete interchangeability ought to be rejected because it creates severe
distortions in the American public lawmaking system. Allowing stat
utes completely to replace treaties eliminates the restrictions upon
Congress's enumerated powers and undermines the separation of
powers in foreign affairs. Nor is treaty exclusivity an acceptable alter
native. Congressional-executive agreements still have a legitimate
place in the constitutional conduct of foreign policy, because their use
preserves Congress's constitutional powers over matters such as inter
national commerce.17
This Article will also demonstrate that a proper place still exists for
the operation of treaties, even in a world of expanded congressional
powers, and it will seek to define that place. Treaties, for example, still
remain an indispensable instrument for regulating subjects that rest
outside of Congress's Article I powers. Recent federalism decisions by
the Supreme Court make clear that several areas rest outside of Con
gress's enumerated authority: areas beyond the reach of the Com
merce Clause,18 the commandeering of the executive or legislative
branches of the state govemments,19 overriding state sovereign immu
nity in either federal or state court (when the Reconstruction
Amendments are not involved),20 and expanding the constitutional
definition of civil rights that may apply against the states.21 While the
lawmakers run into their constitutional boundaries in these areas, the
treatymakers may still use their powers to reach beyond the limits of
the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment. Treaties also are
required for the national government to act in areas that are the sub
ject of the concurrent powers of the executive and legislative branches.

16. As far as I can tell, no legal scholar has attempted to conduct an empirical survey of
the use of treaties versus congressional-executive agreements to regulate different subjects.
17. Thus, treaties cannot be self-executing in such areas, because to allow the treaty
makers to regulate such matters would infringe the Constitution's vesting of the federal leg
islative power in Congress alone. I have provided a fuller account of the doctrine of non
self-executing treaties elsewhere. See generally Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8 (arguing that
original understanding supports doctrine of non-self-executing treaties); Yoo, Non
Self-Execution, supra note 10 (arguing that text and structure justify non-self-execution).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down federal civil
cause of action for gender-motivated violence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(invalidating federal law banning handgun possession in school zones).
1 9. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
20. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996).
21. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); College Sav. Bank v. Flor
ida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
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Congressional-executive agreements present a way for the political
branches to maintain the distinction between treatymaking and law
making. This Article argues that the normal statutory mode must be
used to approve international agreements that regulate matters within
Congress's Article I powers. The device of the congressional-executive
agreement ensures that the same public lawmaking process will apply
to the same subjects, regardless of whether an international agreement
is involved or not. This approach leaves ample room for treaties,
which still must be used if the nation seeks to make agreements out
side of Congress's competence or bind itself in areas where both
President and Congress exercise competing, overlapping powers.
Maintaining this line - which, unlike the Ackerman-Golove, Tribe, or
traditional international law approaches, comports with the practice of
the political branches - ensures that the spheres of the executive for
eign affairs power and of domestic public lawmaking do not intrude
into one another.
The Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will describe the im
portance of congressional-executive agreements, their lack of support
in the constitutional text, and scholarly efforts to justify their use. It
also will discuss and critique the recent, contending academic theories
concerning the interchangeability of treaties and statutes. Part II will
argue against complete interchangeability by identifying its severe tex
tual and structural problems. Part III proposes a new approach to the
congressional-executive agreement and explains its superiority to the
theory that treaties must be used to make all international agreements.
I.

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND THE
INTERNATIONALIST VISION

This Part will provide the necessary context for a discussion of
congressional-executive agreements. Section A describes the status of
congressional-executive agreements today and reviews the doctrine of
interchangeability. Section B discusses and critiques the different con
stitutional theories that have arisen to justify the use of statutes to
make international agreements. It finds that even as congressional
executive agreements have assumed a significant role in American
foreign policy, academic theories defending this instrument have been
lacking. If these scholars are right, significant elements of America's
participation in the postwar world order apparently rest on founda
tions of dubious constitutionality.
A.

The Current Importance of Congressional-Executive Agreements

During the postwar period, the political branches have come to
rely upon congressional-executive agreements as one of the primary
instruments of American foreign policy. Several of the nation's most
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important international obligations, such as the international financial
order established by the Bretton Woods agreement, the world trading
system created by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") and WTO, and our regional trading regime established by
NAFfA, have been enacted by a simple majority vote in both houses
of Congress. This Section will first describe the increasing use of con
gressional-executive agreements to make international agreements. It
will then discuss the lack of support in the constitutional text for the
use of such instruments. It will conclude by reviewing the doctrine of
interchangeability, by which international law authorities argue that
congressional-executive agreements may serve as a perfect substitute
for treaties.
1.

The Explosion of Congressional-Executive Agreements

Before examining the constitutionality of congressional-executive
agreements, some definitions are in order. When using the phrase
"congressional-executive agreement," some do not distinguish be
tween two analytically distinct methods of agreement - congres
sional-executive agreements, which require participation by both
houses of Congress, and sole executive agreements, in which the
President unilaterally reaches an agreement with another nation in ar
eas of his plenary executive authority.22 This Article will address only
the former; the latter do not raise the same constitutional problems, as
they are not considered to be interchangeable with treaties. Within the
category of congressional-executive agreements, there are three types.
First, Congress may provide ex ante authorization to the President to
reach agreements with other nations on certain discrete subjects. In
1792, for example, Congress authorized the Postmaster General to
reach arrangements for the exchange of mail.23 Second, Congress may
legislate on a foreign relations matter, in which the President must de
termine the existence of certain facts before a statute can take effect.
In the area of reciprocal trade agreements, for example, Congress will
mandate the reduction of tariffs on a country's goods, but only when
the President reports that the other country will drop its tariffs on

22. President Franklin Roosevelt's negotiation of the Litvinov assignment, which was
part of the recognition of the Soviet Union, is an example of a sole executive agreement.
Since the agreement involved the President's powers over recognition and his power to set
tle claims, it could preempt inconsistent state law. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). If the President had sought to reach
agreements outside of his plenary constitutional powers, the agreement could not have exer
cised such domestic legal effects. See Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the
(Non) Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133 (1998).
23. See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239.
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American products. While facially domestic in nature, this arrange
ment produces international agreements because Presidents may ne
gotiate with other nations to ensure reciprocal tariff reductions.24 This
Article will focus only on a third type. This arises when the President
has negotiated an international agreement and seeks ex post approval
from Congress, which is usually bundled with provisions implementing
the agreement in domestic law. Unlike the first two types of agree
ments, this third type does not involve the delegation of authority
from Congress to the President, but instead seeks to replace the treaty
process with a statutory one.
Congressional-executive agreements of the third type have become
one of the central tools in the exercise of American foreign policy. In
the early period of the nation's history, the treaty process held a vir
tual monopoly on the making of agreements.25 During the 1789-1839
period, the nation entered into sixty treaties and only twenty-seven
nontreaty international agreements.26 Many of the early nation's most
significant international commitments, such as the Jay and Pinckney
Treaties and the Louisiana Purchase, were concluded as treaties. As
the nation entered World War II, however, statutory devices or even
unilateral executive action came to overwhelm the treaty process as
the preferred method for making international agreements. From
1939-1989, for example, the nation entered into 11,698 nontreaty
agreements but only 702 treaties.27 A congressional study has found
that between 1946 and 1972, 88.3 percent of all international agree
ments made by the United States took a statutory form, only 6.2 per
cent were treaties, and the remaining 5.5 percent were sole executive
agreements.28 The following charts illustrate the heavy use of the
congressional-executive agreement as an alternative to the treaty pro
cess since 1939.

24. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 682-92 (1892).
25. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign
Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 9-21 (1999) (explaining the historical development of treaty
power jurisprudence).
26. See SENATE 1993 REPORT, supra note 5, at 14 tbl. 2.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 16.
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EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES CONCLUDED BY THE
UNITED STATES,

1930-1992

Source: CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 103D CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE (Comm. Print 1993).

TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY THE
UNITED STATES,

1789-1989

Source: CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 103D CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE (Comm. Print 1993)
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These numbers cannot be explained merely by the use of the con
gressional-executive agreement to engage in large numbers of minor
international agreements. Rather, the political branches have resorted
to the statutory process to make some of the nation's most important
international commitments. In 1945, Congress approved by statute the
Bretton Woods Agreement, which established two pillars of the post
war international economic system, the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank.29 Congress also approved by statute negotiating
rounds of the GAIT and the United States-Canadian Free Trade
Agreement.30 Under the Clinton administration, approval of both
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round that established the World Trade
Organization took the same form.31 These agreements control matters
that have effects on the United States as direct and as important as
any treaty: they regulate the prices of goods, the operations of mar
kets, and the conduct of governments and businesses. GAIT and
NAFTA do not just commit the United States to certain political or
military courses of action; they primarily regulate economic activity of
great importance to many private citizens. Expanding free trade has
been one of the central themes of postwar American foreign policy,
and the congressional-executive agreement has been its servant.32
2.

The Lack of Textual Support

Given the important role played by the congressional-executive
agreement, its lack of convincing textual or structural support ought to
be a matter of great concern. The Constitution explicitly grants the
federal government the power to make international agreements only
in Article II, Section 2's Treaty Clause, and it refers to treaties only
three other times.33 International legal scholars such as Professor
Myres McDougal read an implicit authorization for nontreaty, interna
tional agreements in Article I, Section lO's prohibition upon states
from entering into any "agreement or compact" with a foreign power.
From this, they suggest that the Constitution recognizes a broader
29. Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 79-171, 59 Stat. 512 (1945).
30. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1994)).
31. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182,
107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301 et seq. (1994)); Uruguay Round Agree
ments Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq.
(1994)).
32. For a recent discussion of the benefits of the expansion of free trade, see John 0.
McGinnis & Mark C. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 1 14 HARV. L. REV. 511
(2000).
33. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (giving treaties supremacy over inconsistent state
law); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that jurisdiction of federal courts may include treaties);
id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from entering into treaties).
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class of international agreements than just "treaties." Why would the
Framers preclude the states from exercising the power to make an
"agreement or compact," but then not give it to the federal govern
ment?34
Constitutional silence, however, can cut both ways. The canon of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, by which the presence of one term
implies the exclusion of others, suggests that the Framers understood
all of the federal government's power to make international agree
ments to rest in the Treaty Clause. If the presence of the words
"agreement or compact" in the text demonstrates that the Framers
understood international agreements to take forms other than the
treaty, then we can expect them to have used those words in Article II
if they meant to grant a broader power to the national government.
An examination of the original understanding shows no support for
the idea that the Framers believed that the federal government pos
sessed some free-floating, non-textual power to make international
agreements. Rather, the attentions of both Federalists and Anti
Federalists during the ratification debates focused exclusively on the
Treaty Clause.35 Instead of worrying about whether statutes could do
the job of treaties, the Framers argued over whether treaties might in
vade the province of statutes.36
Further, reading prohibitions on the states as empowering the fed
eral government to do the opposite is an unpersuasive and ultimately
dangerous interpretive technique. Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, for example, prohibits states from denying citizens the
equal protection of the laws. Adopting a McDougal-like approach
would require us to infer the lack of a similar prohibition on the fed
eral government as an implicit constitutional authorization to do oth
erwise. A similar interpretive approach would read the Fifteenth
Amendment's prohibition on state efforts to block access to the ballot
based on race as confirming the federal government's power to so dis
criminate. It does not appear that the Court would agree with these
propositions,37 nor would most constitutional theorists today.
One might suggest, as Professors Ackerman and Golove have, that
the Necessary and Proper Clause provides Congress with the authority
to make international agreements in aid of its other powers.38 In one of
34. See Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181,
203-06 (1945).

35. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2021-69.
36. See id.
37. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
38. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 811. Professor Golove provides a more
complete exegesis of this idea in his individual response to Professor Tribe. See David M.
Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998).
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their rhetorical moments, they characterize this as a "Marshallian"
reading of the Constitution because it builds upon the approach of
Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.39 As all law students
learn, McCulloch upheld the constitutionality of a national bank, even
though it was nowhere mentioned in the constitutional text, because it
was an appropriate means to achieve Congress's powers to regulate
commerce, establish the treasury and currency, and fund government
operations. Claiming to follow the same logic, defenders of the con
gressional-executive agreement claim that so long as Congress has de
cided that a congressional-executive agreement is "appropriate" to
achieve the full use of a constitutional power, and so long as the "end
[is) legitimate,"40 then the congressional-executive agreement is consti
tutional. While this argument better engages the textual problem, it
suffers from several flaws. It incorrectly identifies constitutional
meaning with Supreme Court decisions that limit the Court's own dis
cretion in reviewing the constitutionality of legislation. McCulloch's
language about the link between ends and means serves the purpose
of removing the Court from the job of reviewing legislative judg
ments.41 It does not relieve the President or Congress from determin
ing whether certain means actually are constitutional, and it was on
precisely this ground that President Jackson vetoed the bill chartering
the Second Bank of the United States.42
A greater problem for this approach is that it misreads the feder
alism implications of McCulloch as authorization to alter the separa
tion of powers. McCulloch's reading of the Necessary and Proper
Clause only countenances expansions in federal powers, vis-a-vis the
states, when necessary to achieve some legitimate federal aim. Recent
cases, such as United States v. Printz, even indicate that state sover
eignty may impose some limit upon the reach of the Clause.43 What is
important to recognize, however, is that McCulloch does not allow
Congress to deploy the Necessary and Proper Clause so as to rear
range the separation of powers. Reading the Necessary and Proper
Clause to justify congressional-executive agreements causes separa39. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
40. Id. at 421.
41. Indeed, in McCulloch, the Court never really explains the fit between the national
bank and the great constitutional ends it cites early in the opinion. See John Yoo, McCulloch
v. Maryland, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 241, 244
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998). For a narrow reading of the
Clause, see Gary Lawson & Patricia 8. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993).
42. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, July 10, 1832, in 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENT 1139, 1145 (James D. Richardson ed., Bureau of Nat'l Literature 1917)
(1897).
43. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating federal law that comman
deered state executives to carry out federal regulatory scheme).
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tion of powers problems because it transfers the power to make inter
national agreements from the executive branch (made up of President
and Senate) to the legislature. If this reading were correct, a variety of
other congressional efforts to restructure government should have
been equally constitutional. Congress, for example, could have used
the Necessary and Proper Clause not just to condition the removal of
an independent counsel so as to protect against interference in the in
vestigation of high executive officials, but to shield completely the of
fice from presidential control altogether. Congress could have relied
upon the Clause to justify the creation of the legislative veto, or the
vesting of budget reduction authority in the Comptroller General. Just
as the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot infringe on the sovereignty
of the states, so too it cannot be read to interfere with the core powers
of the three branches.44 While it may be very well to read the Clause as
allowing a power to establish a national bank where none had been
granted to the federal government, it is quite a different matter to read
the Clause as allowing Congress to seize from the President and Sen
ate the power to make international agreements.
3.

Interchangeability with Treaties

Despite the paucity of textual support, the congressional-executive
agreement has come to provide for many a complete alternative to the
treaty. According to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, "[t]he prevailing view is that the Congres
sional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty
method in every instance."45 As the Restatement explains, the govern
ment has resorted to the statutory method to make agreements on a
wide variety of subjects. None has ever been successfully challenged in
court on constitutional grounds. Since there is no line between the two
instruments, " [w]hich procedure should be used is a political judg
ment, made in the first instance by the President."46 Although he rec
ognizes the difficult constitutional issues surrounding interchangeabil
ity, Professor Henkin accepts that the· congressional-executive
agreement may serve as a complete substitute for a treaty. He even
encourages their expanded use should the Senate oppose internation
alism: such agreements, he advises, "remain[] available to Presidents
for wide, even general use should the treaty process again provide dif
ficult. "47 In other words, any matter upon which the President and
Senate can make a treaty is fair game for a congressional-executive
44. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 590-92, 622-26 (1994).
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 303 cmt. e.
46. Id.
47. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAI RS, supra note 6, at 218.
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agreement.48 Most scholars in foreign relations law to write on the
subject,49 as well as members of the executive branch,50 and even ad
visers to Congress,51 seem to agree with this conclusion.
Under this doctrine of interchangeability, congressional-executive
agreements apparently receive all of the benefits that accrue to trea
ties. Congressional-executive agreements, for example, are not re
stricted by any subject matter limitations. According to standard in
ternationalist thought, the President and Senate may resort to the
treaty process to address any matter, so long as it is "an agreement be
tween two or more states or international organizations that is in
tended to be legally binding and is governed by international law."52 If
treaties enjoy this broad scope, then, so too, must congressional
executive agreements. Similar logic suggests that congressional
executive agreements will not encounter the same separation of pow
ers and federalism restrictions that apply to statutes, because treaties
are exempt from many of these limitations. Both treaties and congres
sional-executive agreements bind the United States in the same way
and with the same permanence under international law. President
Truman summarized the consensus view in discussing whether to use a
treaty or a statute for the agreement for the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands. "I am satisfied that either method is constitutionally
permissible and that the agreement resulting will be of the same effect
internationally and under the supremacy clause of the Constitution
48. While the Restatement (Third) appears to limit congressional-executive agreements
to "any matter that falls within the powers of Congress and of the President under the Con
stitution," RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 303(2), it is unclear how far this re
straint goes, given that foreign relations scholars believe that the federal foreign affairs
power includes the power to legislate on any subject that could arise between the United
States and a foreign nation. See Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The
Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 905 (1959).
49. See, e.g., Solomon Slonim, Congressional-Executive Agreements, 14 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 434 (1975); Philip R. Trimble & Alexander W. Koff, All Fall Down: The
Treaty Power in the Clinton Administration, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 55 (1998); Trimble &
Weiss, supra note 6, at 650-53; Armen R. Vartian, Approval of SAL T Agreements by Joint
Resolution of Congress, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421 (1980).
50. See, e.g., Monroe Leigh, Department of State Legal Adviser's Reply to Senate Of
fice of Legislative Counsel Memorandum on Certain Middle East Agreements, 121 CONG.
REC. 36,718 (1975).
51. See SENATE 1993 REPORT, supra 5, at 58-59.
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 301(a); see also Lori F. Damrosch, The
Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing"
Treaties, 67 CHJ.-KENT L. REV. 515, 530 (1991); see also HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra
note 6, at 197; Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimensions of RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENT.

33, 34, 46-47 (1997). According to Henkin, "[i]f there are reasons in foreign policy why the
United States seeks an agreement with a foreign country, it does not matter that the subject
is otherwise 'internal', that the treaty 'makes laws for the people of the United States in their
internal concerns', or that - apart from treaty - the matter is 'normally and appropri
ately . . . within the local jurisdictions of the States." HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note
6, at 197.
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whether advised and consented to by the Senate or whether approval
is authorized by a joint resolution."53
B.

The Defects of Interchangeability

The increasing use of the congressional-executive agreement is
ironic. Just as it has assumed a central role in the conduct of American
foreign policy, the justification for its constitutionality appears to rest
on increasingly shaky foundations. Prominent constitutional scholars
recently have attacked this alternative method for making interna
tional agreements. Indeed, the leading defense of the constitutionality
of the NAFfA and WTO agreements expressly relies upon a theory of
non-textual constitutional amendments. This Part will begin by dis
cussing and evaluating the internationalist defense of the statutory
procedure, and then detailing recent scholarly controversy over its
constitutionality as a substitute for the treaty. It will describe the new
defense of congressional-executive agreements offered by Professors
Ackerman and Golove, and Professor Tribe's response to their views.
It will explain why neither approach proves satisfactory and why each
is subject to crippling doubts.
1.

The Internationalist View and Its Defects

As Professors Ackerman and Golove document in their detailed
history of the intellectual origins of the congressional-executive
agreement, the idea of using ex post congressional approval of presi
dentially negotiated international agreements did not take firm root
until the World War II period. At that time, several prominent schol
ars, among them Edwin Corwin,54 Quincy Wright,55 and Myres
McDougal and Asher Lans,56 argued that such a procedure might sub
stitute for the treaty process. Without adopting the notion that these
legal intellectuals helped spark a constitutional moment, much in the
same way that one always needs the intelligentsia to help along the
Russian Revolution, it is worth examining their arguments because
they still have currency today. Their views are also worth further con
sideration because they continue to form the basis for the acceptance
of congressional-executive agreements by leading authorities such as
Professor Henkin and the Restatement.

53. Message of the President of the United States to Congress, H.R. Doc. No. 80-378, at 2
(1947).
54. EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION (1944).
55. Quincy Wright, The United States and International Agreements, 38 AM. J. INT'L L.
341 (1944).
56. McDougal & Lans, supra note 34.
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Initially, internationalist scholars built their case on precedent.
They pointed to a long line of examples, beginning with the first con
gressional authorization of international postal agreements, continuing
through the annexations of Hawaii and Texas, and including various
reciprocal trade laws, that allegedly demonstrated almost 200 years of
interchangeability. Part II will examine the practice of the political
branches, but suffice it to say at this point that none of these prece
dents evidenced a decision to replace the treaty with a statutory proc
ess in which Congress gives its ex post consent to a presidentially ne
gotiated agreement. Rather, many of these examples fall within the
other types of interbranch cooperation - sometimes erroneously con
flated with the distinct type of congressional-executive agreement ad
dressed here - in which Congress essentially delegates factfinding or
rulemaking authority to the President.57
Defenders of the constitutionality of congressional-executive
agreements have claimed that two Supreme Court cases, Field v.
Clark58 and B. Altman & Co. v. United States,59 provide legitimacy for
the practice of interchangeability. Closer examination of these cases,
however, demonstrates that they lend little support for the idea that
statutes could substitute for treaties.60 In Field v. Clark, the plaintiff
argued that Congress could not delegate to the President factfinding
authority for a reciprocal tariff law. As mentioned earlier, however,
this type of arrangement is a very different creature from the ex post
congressional-executive agreement of today, and, in fact, it does not
even require an agreement with another nation.61 Field v. Clark only
rejected the claim that the reciprocal tariff statute violated the non
delegation doctrine, and nothing more. It could not find that the ex
post congressional-executive agreement was constitutional because
there was no such congressional-executive agreement involved.62
B. Altman similarly did not call upon the Court to review the con
stitutionality of a statutory method for making international agree
ments. The case involved a different kind of mechanism, in which
Congress provided the President with ex ante authorization to reach
trade agreements, within specified criteria, with different nations. Fur
ther, B. Altman did not raise the question of the constitutionality of
the use of this procedure in place of the treaty. Instead, it asked only

57. See supra text accompanying note 24.
58. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
59. 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
60. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 830-32.
61. See supra text accompanying note 24.
62. The Court also rejected, in one sentence, the argument that the tariff statute had
unconstitutionally vested the President alone with the treaty power. See Field, 143 U.S. at
694.
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whether a statute that provided the Court with appellate review over
claims based upon "treaties," could be read to include this novel form
of executive and legislative cooperation. The Court read the statute
broadly to include not just a "treaty possessing the dignity of one re
quiring ratification by the Senate of the United States,"63 but also a
congressionally authorized executive agreement that rose to the level
of an "international compact."64 As others have recognized, B. Altman
did not come close to passing on the question of the interchangeability
of congressional-executive agreements and treaties for constitutional
purposes.65
Once we dispel the notion that the congressional-executive agree
ment has received the approval of historical practice or judicial deci
sion, the genuine reason for its modern use comes into focus. Congres
sional-executive agreements represented an effort to replace what was
seen as an outmoded method for dealing with international affairs,
one established in a world of sailing ships, horse-borne couriers, and
muskets, with a more efficient, democratic process. New Deal legal
scholars and their progeny believed that providing the Senate with a
checking role in making international agreements had been a dismal
failure. Functionally, the Senate had never assumed the co-equal role
in international negotiations that the Framers had hoped for.66 The
Senate's formal role in treatymaking had become one of after-the-fact
consent, while the President assumed primary responsibility for setting
foreign policy and conducting diplomatic negotiations. Vesting the
treaty power partially in the Senate to achieve secrecy and speed no
longer seemed compelling, due to the large size of the Senate, the role
of the House in foreign affairs, and the nature of modern treaties,
which no longer demanded such secrecy.
Defects in the Senate's role did not rest just in process. Giving the
states a checking role in foreign affairs had led to results that harmed
the national interest. With only a small minority needed to block an
international agreement, the treaty process allowed isolationism to
reign over American foreign policy.67 Some even suspected that states
63. B. A ltman, 224 U.S. at 601.
64. Id.
65. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 831.
66. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 55-58 (1993)
(describing President Washington's failed attempt to consult with the first Senate on trea
ties). Apparently, when President Washington appeared in the Senate, the noise and confu
sion led to the treaty matter being deferred to another day. President Washington left in a
huff and, according to one story, declared that "he would be damned if he ever went there
again." Id. at 55.
67. As Professor Henkin has written, "By permitting approval of an agreement by sim
ple majority of both houses, it eliminates the 'veto' by one-third-plus-one of the Senators
present which in past had effectively buried important treaties." HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 217.
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would use their voice in the treaty process to win regional or sectional
advantages. Sectional controversy, they asserted, originally had forced
the Framers to create the two-thirds requirement for senatorial ap
proval in the first place.68 While some might argue that the constitu
tional difficulty in making treaties expressed the Framers' bias against
international entanglements, the New Deal authors believed that iso
lationism was simply a disease that threatened to cripple America in a
new, interdependent world. Isolationist Senators, after all, had
blocked American participation in the League of Nations, to which
they attributed the failure of the peace, the rise of Hitler, and the re
turn of world war. New Deal scholars believed that a small minority of
Senators should not be able to use the Constitution to foist their isola
tionist preferences upon the majority's desire for more engagement in
the world. Adopting a congressional procedure, without a superma
jority, would rid isolationism of its chokehold over American foreign
policy.
Building on this previous point, internationalist scholars believed
that the congressional-executive agreement substituted a more demo
cratic mechanism for a state-dominated process. As Professor Henkin
has suggested, " [o]ne way of rendering treaty making more demo
cratic without constitutional amendment might be to have agreements
made by the President if authorized or approved by both houses of
Congress," which would serve "the cause of greater democracy."69
International agreements reached through a statutory process reflect
the will of the majoritarian President and of both houses of Congress.
Internationalist scholars believe approval by the most democratic
branches to be particularly important for new types of international
agreements. These agreements were just as significant to the nation's
welfare as any domestic legislation, and with national economies and
societies becoming more interdependent, they would have a direct im
pact on the everyday domestic lives of Americans.70 The congres
sional-executive agreement better promotes democratic government
by requiring the consent of the most democratic part of the govern
ment, the House of Representatives, before the nation undertakes in
ternational obligations that so directly affect the people.

68. For a discussion of the historical roots of this argument, see Yoo, Globalism, supra
note 8, at 2061-64. See also FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 259, 268, 366-67 (1958); Charles Warren, The Mississippi
River and the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 271, 282-85, 296-97
(1934).
69. LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 60
(1990) [hereinafter HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM].
70. Congressional-executive agreements also simplified the process of making interna
tional agreements by combining the international agreement with the implementing legisla
tion that usually is required to bring it into effect in domestic law.
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These criticisms of the treaty process no doubt have substantial
truth to them. It is clear from the historical evidence that the Framers
understood that the treaty process would be anti-democratic.71 A de
sire for greater democracy, however, standing alone does not provide
sufficient reason for reading a clear textual provision out of the Con
stitution. The same arguments that internationalist scholars levied
against the Senate's role in treatymaking easily could be repeated
against many other features of the Constitution. Take the Senate's in
stitutional role generally. States representing a minority of the popula
tion can block treaties; states representing a minority of the popula
tion can block normal legislation as well.72 Senators representing a
minority of the population can block the appointment of cabinet offi
cers and federal judges. Senators representing a minority of the states
can block constitutional amendments, as can an even smaller minority
of state legislatures. Or take the Supreme Court's power of judicial re
view, which is not even explicitly granted in the Constitution. Every
time the Court invalidates a federal law, a small number of unelected
officials have prevented the majority from acting. Do these anti
democratic features demand that the political branches devise non
text-based methods for their evasion?73
Indeed, the weakness of the internationalist defense of congres
sional-executive agreements is further revealed by an unwillingness to
take the pro-majoritarian case to its logical conclusion. If the objective
is to increase the democratic nature of making international agree
ments, internationalists provide no reason to stop with a statutory pro
cess. Even the constitutionally prescribed method for making laws suf
fers from antimajoritarian features.74 Senators from the least populous
states can block a statute supported by the majority; an even smaller
number can use the filibuster to prevent even a majority of Senators
from voting; committee chairs and majority leaders can impose their
wishes at variance with that of the majority; interest groups may suc
ceed in manipulating the legislative process to engage in rent-seeking.
If internationalist scholars pursued their quest for democracy full
bore, they ought to seek to centralize all international agreement
making in the President alone, who (along with the Vice-President) is
71. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2024-74.
72. See Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 10, at 2240 n.79 ("According to 1998
population estimates, two-thirds of the Senate can represent as little as 32 percent of the
population.").
73. Cf Henry P. Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitu
tional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 165-173 (1996) (criticizing recent theories of

majoritarian amendments to the Constitution for ignoring antidemocratic features of the
Constitution).

74. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS: A FuNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 1225 (1980) (describing the "defective character" of Congress's majoritarianism).
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the only federal official elected by the entire electorate.75 Instead,
leading international law academics have criticized the expansion in
presidential power that has allowed for sole executive agreements.76
While Presidents currently enjoy the authority to make sole executive
agreements in areas within their plenary constitutional powers, and
while those agreements may even trump inconsistent state law,77 their
executive power in foreign affairs has never been read to include the
authority to make any and all international agreements, regardless of
their subject matter or nature.
Such an argument obviously conflicts with the text and structure of
the Constitution. This approach not only would read the text of the
Treaty Clause out of the Constitution, it also would allow the Presi
dent to encroach on Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers in foreign
affairs, such as the regulation of international commerce. Internation
alists have sharply criticized such theories of executive dominance in
foreign affairs when they have arisen elsewhere in cases such as United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 78 If it were acceptable, however,
to allow statutes to replace the Treaty Clause as a method for making
international agreements, despite the Constitution's sole mention .of
the federal government's power to do so in Article II, Section 2, then
it would be equally legitimate to allow unilateral presidential decree to
replace the congressional-executive agreement. Perhaps, in the inter
nationalists' defense, one might say that the statutory process still en
sures that some form of checks and balances exists in the making of
international agreements. Maintaining checks and balances, though,
does not explain why the congressional-executive agreement is to be
preferred to the treaty process; the treaty process itself contains both
checks and balances and a majoritarian element through the participa
tion of the President. Making the Constitution more majoritarian in
cludes no principle to limit its application.

75. In fact, one of the earliest defenders of the congressional-executive agreement,
Wallace McClure, made precisely this argument. McClure believed that the President on his
sole authority could make any international agreement, so long as it was not disapproved by
Congress. See WALLACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS:
DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 363 (AMS
Press 1967) (1941).
76. See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 221-24; KOH, supra note 6, at 4445.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937).
78. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 69, at 17-43;
KOH, supra note 6, at 134-46, 208-12.
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The Transformationist Effort at Rehabilitation and Its Faults

While internationalists prefer to see a gradual evolution from the
treaty to the congressional-executive agreement, another group of
academics arrive at the same destination by a different, jagged path. In
order for treaties and statutes to have the same status, they argue that
in 1945 the American people rejected the legitimacy of the Senate's
supermajority role in favor of a statutory process for making interna
tional agreements. I call this the transformationist school because its
theorists, Professors Ackerman and Golove, maintain that "We the
People" have amended the Constitution - even though no formal
constitutional amendment ever underwent the ratification process so as to allow the United States to incur any international obligation
by congressional-executive agreement. In their minds, political strug
gle over the treaty power during the birth of the postwar world order
amounted to a non-textual constitutional change that eliminated the
exclusivity of the Treaty Clause. This Section will discuss several
problems - textual, interpretive, and historical - that afflict the
transformationist account and undermine its defense of interchange
ability.
Transformationists rely upon practice to support their conclusion
that such instruments should enjoy the same status as treaties. They
emphasize the use of the congressional-executive agreement in the
construction of the international financial and trade systems, and they
seek justification in the manner in which use of the congressional
executive agreement has outpaced the treaty. As the numbers suggest,
the congressional-executive agreement did not appear by accident. In
stead, Professors Ackerman and Golove argue that a group of profes
sors and government officials, scarred by the Senate's refusal to ap
prove the Versailles Treaty, waged an intellectual campaign before
and during World War II to make congressional-executive agreements
interchangeable with treaties.79 Transformationists believe, however,
that neither scholarly opinion nor political practice before World War
II supported the interchangeability of statutes and treaties. Rather,
they conclude that the New Deal scholars misread precedent and
made blatant appeals to policy in order to set the stage for the moth
balling of the treaty process. Building on elite opinion, the centrally
important event in legitimating the congressional-executive agreement
occurred in the 1944 elections, in which the American people allegedly
lent their overwhelming approval to the re-election of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and his postwar plans for intensive participa
tion in international institutions. Opinion polls and newspaper editori
als at the time, according to Ackerman and Golove, indicate that the

79. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 861-73.
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electorate supported the elimination of the Senate's chokehold over
treaties as part of a groundswell against isolationism.
The most nagging flaw with the transformationist position, as with
the internationalist approach, is that it essentially reads the Treaty
Clause out of the Constitution. If congressional-executive agreements
are fully interchangeable with treaties, and if congressional-executive
agreements are not mentioned in the Constitution while treaties are,
then the New Deal internationalists are guilty of amending the Consti
tution without resort to the Article V process. Responding to this
challenge, made most forcefully by Professor Laurence Tribe against
the constitutionality of the congressional-executive agreements ap
proving NAFfA and the Uruguay Round,80 Ackerman and Golove
invoke Ackerman's controversial theory of amending the Constitution
outside of Article V.81 Ackerman and Golove believe that the Consti
tution provides for two types of lawmaking: higher/constitutional
lawmaking and ordinary/political lawmaking. The latter occurs most of
the time, when people make ordinary policy through regular elections.
The former occurs at revolutionary "moments," when the citizenry
becomes consumed with more profound constitutional and political
issues, debates them, and resolves them in ways that fundamentally al
ter the nature of constitutional government.82
Ackerman and Golove view the adoption of the congressional
executive agreement as another episode in one of these moments, the
New Deal. As the end of World War II neared, intellectual and politi
cal leaders sought to avoid a repeat of Versailles by engaging in an end
run around the treaty's supermajoritarian requirement. According to
Ackerman and Golove, overwhelming popular majorities agreed with
elite internationalist opinion to replace the treaty with a more demo
cratic process. Transformationists view the 1944 triumph of Roosevelt
and the Democratic Party as legitimating the substitution of the pro
internationalist congressional-executive agreement for the treaty.
With public opinion polls in favor of a two-house process for interna
tional agreements,83 and in the face of proposed constitutional
amendments in the House to strip the Senate of its monopoly over the
treaty power, the Senate backed down. Its agreement to the statutes
approving the Bretton Woods agreements, according to Ackerman
and Golove, signified the Senate's acquiescence to a new constitu80. See generally Tribe, supra note 14.
81. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 873-75.
82. For a fuller elaboration of the thesis, see ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13; ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS, supra
note 13.
83. In May 1944, 60% of the public favored an ordinary two-house process for inter
national agreements, while only 19% continued to support the traditional treaty method. See
Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 863.
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tional settlement.84 By 1947, " [i]nterchangeability had become part of
the living Constitution,"85 and it was firmly "codified" in the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s. This became part of the larger constitutional change
wrought by the New Deal, which transferred power from the states to
the national government and from Congress to the administrative
state. Similarly, the internationalist victory produced more populist
lawmaking in foreign affairs by removing the anachronistic ability of a
minority of the states, through their votes in the Senate, to keep the
nation on an isolationist path.86 Rather than evolution, the move to the
congressional-executive agreement was a sharp, and quite conscious,
break from the past.
While certainly colorful and provocative, the transformationist ar
gument suffers from a number of terminal defects. First, it -bears the
same defects that afflict Ackerman's general theory of constitutional
interpretation.87 While this is not the place to engage in a full-scale cri
tique of the "constitutional moments" theory, some of the main points
may be summarized here. There is little doubt that the Framers con
ceived of constitutional lawmaking as distinct from ordinary lawmak
ing, but Ackerman provides little evidence that the Framers believed
higher lawmaking could occur outside of Article V, but within the
normal constitutional framework. If the people were to act outside of
Article V, they would be altering and abolishing their previous form of
government completely, rather than making minor adjustments.88 To
84. See id. at 890-93.
85. Id. at 896.
86. Ackerman and Golove are worth quoting in detail on this point.
Just as New Deal scholars attacked the antimajoritarian character of the Old Court, now the
New Internationalists attacked the antidemocratic veto granted the malapportioned Senate.
Just as New Deal scholars mined the history of the Marshall Court to create a pedigree for a
newly expanded Commerce Clause, now the New Internationalists scavenged for precedents
that helped expand the scope of Article I yet further to support congressional-executive
agreements. The point of both exercises was the same: to convince legalists that the constitu
tional tradition applauded the collective effort to correct the anachronistic formalisms of the
past when modern Americans were demanding fundamental change.
Id. at 911.
87. For penetrating criticism of the Ackerman thesis and its variants, see, for example,
Tribe, supra note 14, at 1228-49; Michael J. Gerhardt, Ackermania: The Quest for a Common
Law of Higher Lawmaking, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1731 (1999) (book review); Michael
Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitution Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of
Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992) (book review); Suzanna Sherry, The
Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918 (1992) (book review).
Ackerman's thesis has received praise from some scholars. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson,
Accounting for Constitutional Change, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 409, 429 (1991); James Gray
Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitu
tional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 304 (1990); Mark Tushnet, The Flag-Burning Episode:
An Essay on the Constitution, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 39, 48-53 (1990).
88. I have argued elsewhere that the Framers understood the right to abolish and alter
government as one of the unenumerated majoritarian rights. See John Choon Yoo, Our De
claratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967, 970-99 (1993).
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act within the framework of the Constitution, amenders must include a
text that can identify exactly what supermajorities of the people have
agreed to change in the Constitution, and whether permanent super
majorities on the question indeed exist. Both the Framing and Recon
struction are distinct from 1944 in that the first two constitutional
moments resulted in formal amendments that embodied the revolu
tions that occurred, while the New Deal and the 1944 moment did not.
If popular support were indeed as overwhelming as transformationists
believe for the congressional-executive agreement, its supporters
should have guaranteed its future legitimacy by ratifying a constitu
tional amendment. Legal instruments, such as statutes or constitu
tional amendments, allow the polity itself to judge whether large, in
choate majorities will translate into concrete changes in social and
political norms. Indeed, without the text of an amendment, it is diffi
cult if not impossible for later interpreters to determine what changes
the majority actually understood it was making in the governing struc
ture and how long-lasting they would be.
Second, even accepting that constitutional change may legitimately
occur outside the context of a formal amendment, Ackerman provides
no sure way to identify when an amendment-less constitutional mo
ment has occurred.89 If periodic elections are the product of lesser,
sordid, ordinary political lawmaking, it seems contradictory to assert
that they also can reflect higher lawmaking, unless accompanied by a
constitutional amendment. To take the 1944 elections, for example,
Ackerman and Golove are forced to assume that voters actually had
the congressional-executive agreement issue in mind when they voted
for the Democratic Party or for President Franklin D. Roosevelt for
the fourth time. But voters had any number of issues on their minds
during the 1944 elections: Roosevelt's enormous personal popularity,
maintaining political stability during the endgame of the war, dislike of
the Republican presidential candidate, Governor Thomas Dewey
(who was so uninspiring a candidate that contemporaries compared
him to "the bridegroom on the wedding cake, the only man who could
strut sitting down, a man you really had to know to dislike, the Boy
Orator of the Platitude"),90 and approval of the Democratic admini
stration's wartime policies.
Ackerman and Golove's defense of interchangeability, in other
words, suffers from a level-of-generality problem. FDR and the
Democrats certainly won the 1944 elections, and it seems safe to con
clude that the Democrats' more internationalist approach to the post
war order had something to do with it. Ackerman and Golove, how
ever, provide no compelling reason why we must interpret general
89. See Sherry, supra note 87, at 929-34.
90. JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE SOLDIER OF FREEDOM 502 (1970).
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political approval for the Democrats and distaste for the Republicans
to be the mandate for a constitutional amendment on the far narrower
issue of congressional-executive agreements. They fail to point to any
significant campaign speeches or statements where FDR or Dewey
mentioned interchangeability, congressional-executive agreements, or
the Senate's constitutional role in treatymaking; they do not identify
any facts that show that the electorate was conscious of the constitu
tional difficulties created by the Senate's supermajoritarian check; nor
do they demonstrate that party leaders believed this to be a significant
issue in the campaign. Instead, Ackerman and Golove are left to infer
that, because the electorate wanted a more secure, internationalist
postwar order, they would have agreed to lesser-included measures to
achieve that goal, such as interchangeability. Historians of the period
have reviewed the same evidence and have not reached similar con
clusions. Indeed, while a recent work by historians Townsend Hoopes
and Douglas Brinkley recognizes the 1944 electoral results as "a clear
cut mandate for American participation in the United Nations and for
a large American role in the postwar world,'' they also point out that
Roosevelt had won by only three million votes, the tightest margin of
victory since 1916 and a reflection of concerns about FDR's health and
long term in office.91 The 1944 elections provided a vague mandate for
internationalism, but nothing more concrete or defined.
To be sure, Ackerman and Golove raise several historical facts
that they believe show this link between the 1944 elections and the al
leged constitutional moment. They point, for example, to 1944 opinion
polls, newspaper editorials, and proposed constitutional amendments
in the House that all supported stripping the Senate of its exclusive
power over international agreements. They then claim that the House
withdrew proposals to achieve this result in exchange for approval of
the Bretton Woods agreements by statute. Yet, Ackerman and Golove
encounter severe difficulties in showing the necessary linkages that
would indicate a constitutional moment: a) party leaders chose to
make the 1944 elections a referendum on the Senate's treatymaking
role; b) the electorate understood the 1944 elections to embody this
choice; c) the President and the House intended to force the Senate to
give up its role; d) the Senate understood itself to be accepting inter
changeability in allowing the Bretton Woods agreements.
In order to show that these events all occurred and were inter
linked, Ackerman and Golove are forced to rest their argument upon
some very slim reeds indeed. One glaring example is that they make
much hay out of small differences in the wordings of the platforms of
the political parties (one mentions "treaty or agreement,'' the other
only "agreements and arrangements"), in order to claim a real differ91. TOWNSEND HOOPES & DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, FDR AND THE CREATION OF THE
U.N. 164 (1997).
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ence between the parties concerning the interchangeability of congres
sional-executive agreements and treaties.92 Only by finding a differ
ence between the parties can they claim that the 1944 elections dem
onstrated any choice of constitutional instruments. Yet they do not
show that political leaders or the voters understood this difference in
language to signify sharply divergent positions, if any, on interchange
ability. Similarly, Ackerman and Golove believe that the timing of the
passage of the Bretton Woods agreement by statute, coming as it did
after the House considered a proposal to amend the treaty power, evi
denced the Senate's acceptance of the "deal" for interchangeability.93
Yet they can show no historical evidence that any significant actor in
the passage of Bretton Woods or of the United Nations Charter,
which came shortly thereafter, understood these agreements to repre
sent a constitutional settlement of any sort.
As an interpretive matter, none of these facts standing alone pro
vides historical support for the notion that the voters in 1944 or their
elected representatives undertook to engage the nation in a constitu
tional revolution on a par with the Framing or Reconstruction. News
papers editorialize and popular opinion polls register on any number
of issues that never translate into constitutional amendments. Any
number of proposed amendments never make it into the Constitution.
One can never be sure whether these imperfect, and temporary, sig
nals of popular preferences actually amount to the permanent support
for a change in the written Constitution unless they actually meet the
test for one: approval by two-thirds of the House and Senate and
three-quarters of the states. Indeed, Ackerman and Golove cannot
show that proposals to eliminate the Senate's monopoly over the
treaty power ever had this support, because none ever came to a vote
in both houses of Congress.94
The transformationist account further stumbles upon the very pri
mary source history from which it draws its strength. It is dubious, for
example, whether the 1944 elections and the passage of the Bretton
Woods agreements serve as convincing evidence of a constitutional
moment. While the 1944 elections may have provided support for a
more internationalist foreign policy, it does not appear that any of the
major political leaders viewed the election results as a mandate to do
away with the treaty. Neither Roosevelt nor Dewey engaged in any se-

92. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 884-85.
93. See id. at 891-92.
94. While one amendment to strip the Senate of its exclusive treaty powers passed the
House by 288 to 88, 91 CONG. REC. 4367-68 (1945), these proposals never came to a vote in
the Senate. Ackerman and Golove present no explanation concerning the votes in the
House; were the Members of the House serious? Was this part of a concerted campaign to
strip the Senate of its authority? Or was this vote symbolic, meant only to show that the
House was doing something about international agreements?
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rious debate or discussion during the campaign about the shape of the
postwar world or the United Nations - in fact, the presidential candi
dates had negotiated a truce to keep the question of international or
ganization out of the wartime elections.95 Franklin Roosevelt's cam
paign activity during the summer and fall of 1944 shows no mention of
the Senate's treaty role or of congressional-executive agreements.96 In
his most significant speech concerning foreign affairs during the elec
tion, President Roosevelt only saw fit to discuss broad policy differ
ences with the Republican Party - namely his claims that Republi
cans had always championed isolationism - rather than process issues
like the Senate's power over treaties.97
Evidence is similarly absent concerning the approval of the Bret
ton Woods and U.N. Charter agreements. President Truman's mem
oirs do not discuss any constitutional deal, nor even the issue of the in
terchangeability of congressional-executive agreements. Dean
Acheson, who at the time was Assistant Secretary of State for con
gressional relations, never mentions the issue in his detailed account of
the period.98 It does not appear that either Senators or Members of the
House understood the passage of Bretton Woods to impart any
meanings of constitutional significance. While Ackerman and Golove
rely upon statements in the congressional record, committee reports,
and the occasional campaign speech or party platform, they do not
place these records in the context provided by numerous available
primary sources, such as the Foreign Relations of the United States se
ries, presidential library materials, memoirs, and oral histories - all
standard sources for diplomatic and presidential historians of the ori
gins of the Cold War.
Ackerman and Golove further fail to rely upon, or even cite, any
secondary historical and political science works about the period. Such
sources reveal that their reading of the construction of the postwar
world has little support in the mainstream historical accounts. Stan
dard biographies of FDR, both old and new, do not mention inter
changeability, congressional-executive agreements, or the Senate's
95. See HOOPES & BRINKLEY, supra note 91, at 162.
96. See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at Dinner of International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Sept. 23, 1944), in THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1944-45 VOLUME:
VICTORY AND THE THRESHOLD OF PEACE 284 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950); Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Radio Address at Dinner of Foreign Policy Association (Oct. 21, 1944), in id. at
342 [hereinafter Roosevelt, Radio Address at Dinner of Foreign Policy Association).
96.

97. See Roosevelt, Radio Address at Dinner of Foreign Policy Association, supra note

98. See DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE
DEPARTMENT 104-15 (1969). Secondary sources on Acheson's role likewise are silent about
interchangeability and congressional-executive agreements. See, e.g., JAMES CHACE,
ACHESON: THE SECRETARY OF STATE WHO CREATED THE AMERICAN WORLD 97-109
(1998).

786

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:757

role in treatymaking in the context of the 1944 elections.99 More spe
cialized works on Franklin Roosevelt and foreign policy, such as
Robert Dallek's standard Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign
Policy, 1932 1945 ,100 and more recent studies,101 make no mention of
interchangeability - indicating again that neither Roosevelt nor the
voters in the 1944 elections thought much about the issue. If anything,
the secondary works indicate that FDR respected the Senate's treaty
role and sought ways to work with leading Senators on important in
ternational agreements, such as the U.N. Charter, rather than avoiding
the Senate through new constitutional loopholes.102 Leading histories
of President Truman's establishment of the Cold War national security
state and of the policy of containment, such as John Lewis Gaddis's
Strategies of Containment, 103 Melvyn Leffler's A Preponderance of
Power104 or Michael Hogan's Cross of Iron,105 are similarly silent further confirming that no one of any political significance believed
that passage of the Bretton Woods or the U.N. agreements signified
the acceptance of interchangeability.
It seems unlikely that modern historians have utterly missed a de
velopment of such significance, one that would have removed a major
stumbling block to American participation in postwar international
organizations. The more likely explanation is simply that Ackerman
-

99. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 90, at 521-31; FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 556-76 (1990). The definitive biography of
FDR, by Kenneth S. Davis, has yet to reach the 1944 elections. See KENNETH S. DAVIS,
FDR: THE BECKONING OF DESTINY, 1882-1928 (1972); FDR: THE NEW YORK YEARS,
1928-1933 (1985); FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS, 1933-1937 (1986); FDR: INTO THE STORM,
1937-1940 (1993).
100. ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1932-1945 (1979); see also ROBERT A. DIVINE, ROOSEVELT AND WORLD WAR II (1969);
GADDIS SMITH, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1941-1945
(1965).
101. See, e.g. , WARREN F. KIMBALL, THE JUGGLER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AS
WARTIME STATESMAN (1991); FREDERICK W. MARKS III, WIND OVER SAND: THE
DIPLOMACY OF FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT (1988). Specialized historical works on the home
front and on wartime economic policy also show no evidence that interchangeability, the
congressional-executive agreement, or the Senate's treaty role was an important part of the
Roosevelt administration's thinking about the postwar world. See ALAN S. MILWARD, WAR,
ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY, 1939-1945 (1977).
102. See, e.g., FREIDEL, supra note 99, at 521-22 (describing Secretary of State Cordell
Hull's activities with the Senators of the Committee of Eight to develop a bipartisan policy
on international organizations).
103. JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
OF POSTWAR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (1982).
104. MELVYN LEFFLER, A PREPONDERANCE OF POWER: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE
TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, AND THE COLD WAR (1992).
105. MICHAEL J. HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE, 1945-1954 (1998); see also DANIEL YERGIN,
SHATTERED PEACE: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STATE (1977).
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and Golove have overreached in their use of the constitutional mo
ments theory, have ignored the great wealth of research on Roosevelt,
World War II and the origins of the Cold War, and have used primary
sources in a manner that is strikingly inconsistent with these broader
historical and political accounts.
These problems can be illustrated by another example involving
international agreements. In 1951, Senator Bricker promoted a consti
tutional amendment that would have made clear that treaties were
subject to the Constitution's limitations on the powers of the federal
government.106 In another form, the Bricker Amendment required that
congressional-executive agreements could not replace treaties, and yet
a different version added that international agreements required con
gressional legislation to become effective as internal law of the United
States.107 In other words, the Bricker Amendment would have allowed
the national government to make treaties that extended only so far as
Congress could legislate under Article I, Section 8, and it also would
have required legislation to implement all treaties. This final form of
the Bricker Amendment lost by only one vote in the Senate, and only
after the Eisenhower administration had publicly declared that it un
derstood the law governing treaties to correspond already to the pro
posal.108 The Bricker Amendment certainly came closer to passage
than proposals to strip the Senate of its treaty monopoly ever did. Un
der the Ackerman thesis, perhaps the Bricker Amendment was the
transformative moment, not Bretton Woods, as defeat of the trans
formative amendment required acquiescence by the President in a
new constitutional practice.
One last fault with the transformationist approach to treaties is
worth discussion. In order for the Ackerman thesis to work, it needs to
see as sharp a break as possible with the politics and law that prevailed
immediately before the constitutional moment allegedly occurred.
Evolution does not make for an exciting revolution. Ackerman and
Golove, therefore, must do all they can to discredit the arguments of
the internationalist New Deal scholars who preceded them - they
come very close to accusing these intellectuals of misrepresenting
precedent and of consciously making up their constitutional theories
out of whole cloth. They also must work hard to create as sharp a dis
tinction as possible between the practice of the political branches be
fore the constitutional moment and the practice afterwards. This is a
mistake. While there was no long tradition of the use of ex post con
gressional-executive agreements, the earlier examples of presidential
106. See DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST
OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988).
107. See S.J. Res. 102, 82d Cong. (1951); S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong. (1952); S.J. Res. 1, 83d
Cong. (1953).
108. See TANANBAUM, supra note 106, at 175-90.
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and legislative cooperation in foreign affairs showed the possibilities
that the constitutional text and structure might have permitted. While
the New Deal intellectuals and current-day internationalists may not
have settled on the right constitutional basis for the congressional
executive agreement, Ackerman and Golove err in reading their ar
guments as result-oriented justifications for their desired policies. We
are left with the conclusion that the transformationist account fails on
its own terms.
3.

The Response to the Transformationists: Treaty Exclusivity

While Ackerman and Golove defend the broad interchangeability
of congressional-executive agreements, other leading academics have
responded to this new instrument by articulating a theory of treaty ex
clusivity. Treaty exclusivity holds that the Treaty Clause provides the
only constitutional method for reaching significant international
agreements. Put simply, exclusivists argue that the Constitution men
tions only one method of making international agreements - the
treaty - and thus all other means are excluded. While this view has
received the approval of various academics over the years, including
Edwin Borchard109 and Raoul Berger,110 this Section will focus on Pro
fessor Laurence Tribe's recent espousal of treaty exclusivity and his
criticisms of the transformationist approach. It will conclude by ex
plaining why treaty exclusivity itself is ultimately an unsuccessful ef
fort to account for the relationship between treaties and statutes.
Replying to Professor Ackerman and Golove's defense of the con
gressional-executive agreement, Professor Tribe argues that the statu
tory process for making international agreements violates the Consti
tution. m Much of Tribe's argument hits home. What Tribe fails to do,
however, is provide an explanation for the constitutionality of the
congressional-executive agreement, or identify a distinction between
treaties and statutes for purposes of making international agreements.
Rather, Tribe is left arguing that the Treaty Clause is the exclusive
method for making significant international agreements, that the
WTO and NAFfA agreements are unconstitutional, and that Ameri
can presidents and congresses have built much of the postwar world
order on unconstitutional foundations.
Tribe effectively criticizes Ackerman's approach to constitutional
interpretation on several grounds. He accuses Ackerman and Golove
of ignoring the basic architecture of the Constitution, as expressed in
109. Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements - A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616
(1945).
1 10. Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1972).
1 1 1. See Tribe, supra note 14.
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the manner in which its text and structures fit together. Rather than
attempting to harmonize the Constitution's different provisions,
Ackerman and Golove read them only as "suggestions" or "illustra
tions" of many possible governmental structures.112 Any gap, there
fore, in the constitutional text - such as the absence of a provision
making clear the Treaty Clause's exclusivity - constitutes an oppor
tunity to provide for an extratextual means of lawmaking.113 The Nec
essary and Proper Clause notwithstanding, the Supreme Court's ap
proach to the separation of powers demonstrates the faults of the
Ackerman and Golove approach. In INS v. Chadha, 114 for example,
the Court did not infer any extra congressional power to provide for
the legislative veto, while in New York v. United States115 the Court did
not allow the Necessary and Proper Clause to permit for the comman
deering of state legislatures. In both cases, the Constitution's struc
tural guarantees for the protection of the other branches of the federal
government and of the states barred use of the Necessary and Proper
Clause to transform a constitutional gap into a new form of federal
lawmaking. As with the legislative veto and commandeering state
governments, Tribe concludes, so it is with the congressional-executive
agreement.116
Tribe makes several less abstract textual and structural arguments
that more directly undermine the transformationist approach. In per
haps his most insightful textual response to Ackerman and Golove,
Tribe claims that the transformationist reading conflicts with the
Court's understanding of the Appointments Clause.117 According to
the transformationist account, the Treaty Clause is nonexclusive be
cause it does not expressly prohibit any alternative methods for mak
ing international agreements. The Appointments Clause, however,
which sits adjacent to the Treaty Clause in Article II, expressly pro
vides for alternative methods: while it requires Senate approval of
principal officers of the United States, it allows Congress to vest the
appointment of inferior officers in the President, heads of depart
ments, or the federal courts. Thus, in Article II, Section 2 itself, the
Framers made exclusive senatorial advice and consent to the appoint
ment of principal officers, and then explicitly created an alternate pro1 12. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1245.
1 13. See id. at 1239-45.
114. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
115. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
1 16. Professor Golove has written a lengthy response to Professor Tribe that argues that
much of Tribe's criticisms contradict Tribe's own approach to constitutional interpretation.
See generally Golove, supra note 38. Golove argues, for example, that Tribe's arguments
would render unconstitutional much of the administrative state - a result that Tribe clearly
would not favor. See id. at 1831-32.
1 17. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1272-75.
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cedure for inferior officers. Application of the canon of expressio
unius, Tribe argues, indicates that there is no alternate procedure for
the making of international agreements. If the Framers had wanted to
provide for other methods for making international agreements, they
knew how.
Tribe's second main point is based on the Constitution's provision
for a presidential veto over statutesY8 According to most authorities,
the President has the plenary authority to refuse to ratify a treaty,
even after the Senate has consented to it.119 Under Article II, it is the
President who "makes " the treaty, subject only to Senate advice and
consent. But if congressional-executive agreements serve as a valid al
ternative to treaties, the President has only a conditional veto over
statutes that Congress may override by a two-thirds vote. Resort to a
statutory method for making international agreements allows Con
gress to make international agreements over presidential objection, a
result forbidden by the text of the Treaty Clause. If Congress can use
the Necessary and Proper Clause, Tribe asserts, in combination with
its enumerated powers to override presidential opposition, then it also
could use the same powers to appoint its own ambassadors and to
conduct its own negotiations with foreign powers. Use of the congres
sional-executive agreement thus has the effect of reducing the Presi
dent's constitutional prerogatives in foreign relations.
Tribe effectively identifies interpretive, textual, and structural
problems with the transformationist defense of interchangeability. He
fails, however, to develop a convincing theory to take its place. Tribe's
uncompromising reading of the text forces him to conclude that the
treaty power is the only method for making significant international
agreements, although he concedes that the President can make other
nontreaty agreements alone as sole executive agreements.12° For Tribe,
deciding whether an agreement must receive the consent of a Senate
supermajority depends upon whether the "agreement constrains fed
eral or state sovereignty and submits United States citizens or political
entities to the authority of bodies wholly or partially separate from the
ordinary arms of federal or state government. "12 1 To support this
proposition, Tribe relies solely upon a letter written by his colleague,
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, to a Senator during the Senate's
consideration of the WT0.122 Absent from Tribe's analysis is any ex1 18. See id. at 1252-57.
1 19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 303 cmt. d; HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 184.
120. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1268-69.
121. See id. at 1268.
122. See id. at 1267 n .15 7 While I have the greatest respect for Professor Slaughter's
work, to my knowledge she has never written a scholarly work about the nature of treaties
.

February 2001]

Laws as Treaties?

791

amination of the treaty power in light of the Constitution's allocation
of powers to other branches of the government, of the historical con
troversies concerning the treaty power's scope, or of the work of pre
vious scholars who have sought answers to these questions.
More troubling still, the distinction Tribe pursues in defining the
Treaty Clause is both too broad and too narrow. Tribe believes that
the nation must use treaties whenever it constrains its sovereignty or
subjects its citizens to another sovereign power, but he fails to define
sovereignty and whether the political branches can delegate it. Tribe
fails to understand the difference between international obligations on
the one hand, and their implementation according to domestic consti
tutional processes on the other. This leads him to confuse sovereignty
in its international sense and sovereignty in its domestic constitutional
sense. Any international obligation, whether assumed by the President
alone, by the President and the Senate, or by the Congress as a whole,
constrains the sovereignty of the people of the United States. That is
the very nature of an international obligation. If Tribe believes that
any international agreement that constrains federal or state sover
eignty must undergo the treaty process, then all such pacts must be
executed as treaties. Tribe himself, however, refuses to go that far, as
he acknowledges the constitutionality of sole executive agreements.
Tribe's effort to develop an exclusivist theory fails to understand
sovereignty in its domestic sense. The difficult question is not whether
an international agreement constrains or delegates national sover
eignty, but whether the branches of government will live up to it.
While a treaty creates an international obligation, it is the Constitu
tion's allocation of powers to the three branches that provides the
powers to fulfill it - no treaty can constrain the lawmaking authority
of the federal government. According to the last-in-time rule, for ex
ample, Congress is free at any time to override a treaty simply by
passing a statute.123 Even the President, acting alone, can effectively
terminate a treaty.124 A treaty cannot permanently alter the sover
eignty of the United States or of the American people; it cannot
change the allocation of authority between federal and state govern
ments as established by the Constitution. Only a constitutional
amendment could achieve that result.
under the American constitutional system, and I am sure that she herself would not hold out
her letter as an authoritative examination of the question. While Professor Spiro does not
scrutinize the merits of Tribe's distinctions, he likewise expresses surprise that Tribe would
rest a critical part of his argument on a letter from a colleague. See Spiro, supra note 15.
123. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (The Chinese
Exclusion Case); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Edye v. Robertson, 112
U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (The Head Money Cases).
124. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 708-09 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot, 444
U.S. 996 (1979); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 339; HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAI RS, supra note 6, at 214.
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A constitutional amendment, not a treaty, would also be required
to achieve the second class of actions envisioned by Tribe: subjecting
American citizens directly to international rules and organizations.
The Constitution makes no explicit provision that would allow for the
transfer of federal power to entities - outside of the American gov
ernmental system - that are not directly responsible to the American
people. In a different context, I have outlined the constitutional diffi
culties with delegating public power outside of the national govern
ment.125 Placing American citizens under the direct regulation of in
ternational law and organizations seems inconsistent with the very
Appointments Clause that provides Tribe with such ammunition
against Ackerman and Golove. While much recent scholarship on the
Clause has focused on the relative roles of the President and Senate in
appointing judges,126 the Court has articulated the Clause's broader
function in ensuring that only federal officers accountable to the peo
ple's elected representatives may exercise federal power.127 As first
stated by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, the Appointments Clause re
quires that those exercising substantial authority under federal law
must undergo appointment according to the Clause's terms.128 As sub
sequent cases explain, this rule prevents Congress from transferring
executive law enforcement authority to individuals not responsible to
the President or his subordinates.129
Read in this manner, the Appointments Clause plays more than a
separation of powers role in maintaining the balance between the
Congress, the treatymakers, and the President. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist has written for the Court, "The Clause is a bulwark against
one branch aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch,
but it is more: it 'preserves another aspect of the Constitution's struc
tural integrity by preventing the diffusion of the appointment
power.' "130 According to the Chief Justice, the Clause prevents the
125. See John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1673, 1708-20 (2000) [hereinafter Yoo, Kosovo]; John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty
and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause,
15 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 116 (1998) (hereinafter Yoo, New Sovereignty].

126. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the
Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 63839 (1993); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Con
firmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1502-12 (1992); John C. Yoo, Criticizing Judges, 1
GREEN BAG 20 277, 278 (1998).
127. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997); Ryder v. United
States, 515 U.S. 177, 180-84 (1995); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 169-76 (1994);
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 135 (1976)
(per curiam).
128. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132.
129. See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922-23
(1997).
130. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878).
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diffusion of federal power by limiting its exercise only to those who
undergo the appointment process.131 The Framers, the Court con
cluded, centralized the appointment power because they feared the
vesting of power in officeholders who were not accountable to the
electorate, as had occurred during the colonial period. A centralized
appointment process prevents the national government, as a whole,
from concealing or confusing the lines of governmental authority and
responsibility so that the people may hold the actions of the govern
ment accountable.
Other constitutional structures limit the treatymakers' ability to
transfer lawmaking and law enforcement power outside the United
States. Whether one agrees with the formalist or functionalist side in
the debate over the separation of powers,132 transferring power outside
of the federal government fundamentally conflicts with the concept of
unified executive power. For formalists, any exercise of federal
authority by an individual who is not a member of the executive
branch, and thus is not removable by the President, unconstitutionally
prevents the President from directing the implementation of federal
law.133 While functionalists may be willing to accept some conditions
on the removal power, they have not endorsed the delegation of fed
eral power to those who are completely insulated from the Chief Ex
ecutive.134 Functionalists further would object to such delegation be
cause it would undermine accountability in government. Voters
cannot hold either the President or Congress accountable if govern
ment actions result from the decisions of officials who do not belong
to either branch. The nondelegation doctrine, which has begun to re
ceive renewed attention,135 lends added support to this notion. As for
mulated by the Court, this doctrine prohibits Congress from delegat
ing its enumerated power to another branch unless it has stated an
objective, prescribed methods to achieve it, and articulated intelligible
131. See id. at 182-84 (noting that the Clause prevents diffusion of the appointment
power).
132. Compare, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 44 (formalist), with Martin S. Fla
herty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) (functionalist), and Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1994) (functionalist).
133. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 44, at 593-99.
134. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-92 (1988) (noting that "good cause"
removal of the independent counsel still allows the President to retain authority over the
counsel's duties); see also Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 106-16 (claiming that al
though there are numerous independent agencies, complete independence from the Presi
dent would still raise constitutional problems).
135. See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 442-47 (1998) (striking down the
President's use of the Line Item Veto Act where its effect was to amend acts of Congress,
thus violating the Presentment Clause); American Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027,
1033 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), rev'd, Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 121 S. Ct.
903 (2001).
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standards to guide administrative discretion.136 These standards pro
vide the courts, Congress, and the public with some objective factors
to review whether the power is being exercised within the limits of the
delegation. Delegating lawmaking or law enforcement authority to
foreign or international officials threatens the purposes of this rule. If
the political branches transfer such authority over American citizens
entirely outside of the federal government, neither Congress nor the
public can determine whether foreign or international officials exer
cise their authority according to American standards, nor can they en
force their policy wishes through the usual legal or political methods
available when power is delegated within the executive branch.137
Transferring sovereign lawmaking and law enforcement authority
to international organizations - by which I mean imposing rules di
rectly upon American citizens within the United States without any
intervening participation by domestic governmental organs - threat
ens these structures. International officials do not undergo the execu
tive, congressional, and public scrutiny that accompanies federal ap
pointments. They are not responsible to the American political
system: they are not bound by federal statutory or administrative
guidelines, they cannot be removed or disciplined by the President,
they need not obey presidential orders, their funding cannot be cut off
by Congress, they have no obligation to obey congressional summons
to testify, they cannot be sued in American courts for their official ac
tions, and they need not respond to press inquiries. If Congress or the
people disagree with the policies established by an international or
ganization, they have no resort to the usual political channels that al
low the national political system to control elected officials and the
administrative state. Every other exercise of governmental sovereignty
- the power to make and enforce laws that directly regulate the con
duct of individual citizens - is strictly regulated by the Constitution
and subject to the delicate and difficult procedures of the Article I,
Section 8 statutory process. It would seem that to allow the federal
government to restructure the public lawmaking process to include a
significant actor that is independent of the political process would re
quire, at the very least, a constitutional amendment. Neither a treaty
nor a congressional-executive agreement will suffice.
An examination of the congressional-executive agreement marking
American entry into the new WTO demonstrates the dual faults of

136. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989) (approving a congres
sional delegation of power where the goals were clearly set out, the purposes asserted, and
the scope of the delegation was definitively confined).
137. Elsewhere, I have argued that the original understanding of the Constitution sup
ports this reading of the Constitution and its structures in favor of governmental account
ability. See Yoo, Kosovo, supra note 125, at 1717; Yoo, New Sovereignty, supra note 125, at
109.
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Tribe's approach to sovereignty. Tribe believes that the Uruguay
Round agreements, which established the WTO, constrains American
national or state sovereignty sufficiently to require the use of a
treaty.138 In one sense, Tribe correctly observes that the WTO limits
American sovereignty by committing the United States to a system of
rules that constrain its ability to engage in trade-related measures,
such as raising tariffs, enacting discriminatory import restrictions, or
barring foreign corporations from certain markets. Every international
agreement, however, imposes some type of obligation upon the
United States - some limit on American sovereignty - for which it
receives some benefit. Unless Tribe believes that every single interna
tional agreement requires a treaty, his definition of sovereignty at this
level is far too broad. This is an extreme position that even Tribe does
not espouse,139 and one that is at odds with two centuries of national
practice.
Along the domestic dimension of sovereignty, Tribe's account of
the WTO similarly misses the mark. Even though the WTO may place
international obligations upon the United States' trade practices, it
places no binding restrictions on American sovereignty or power in
the constitutional sense.140 Upon agreeing to the new WTO system, the
United States agreed to live up to certain substantive trade provisions,
but the agreement itself does not directly act upon American citizens.
It remains within the purview of the federal government whether to,
and how to, live up to the WTO's requirements, consistent with do
mestic constitutional procedures. For example, the WTO creates a
dispute settlement procedure, in which other nations may bring ac
tions to protest American violations of the WTO's terms. A decision
by a WTO dispute settlement panel, however, has no binding legal ef
fect within the United States, nor does it have any constitutional im
pact on the branches of the national government. A WTO body could
not order the State of California, for example, to cease discriminatory
import restrictions on computer equipment imports from abroad, nor
could it legally force the United States to treat South American agri
cultural imports on an equal footing with American produce. The
United States can choose to ignore the WTO decision and keep its
laws and policies intact; there is no supranational body that can com
pel the United States to obey. While aggrieved nations might receive
permission from the WTO to impose compensatory sanctions on
138. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1267 n.156.
139. See, e.g., id. at 1268-69 (arguing that the President po�sesses an "unenumerated
power to enter non-treaty agreements").
140. See, e.g., Whether Uruguay Round Agreements Required Ratification as a Treaty,
Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, to Ambassador Michael
Kantor, United States Trade Representative, at 18-21 (Nov. 22, 1994), at http://www.usdoj.
gov/olc/gatt.htm.
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American imports, there is no direct regulation of American citizens
or parties by any international organization. Tribe's definition of the
scope of treaties, therefore, provides little help on this score because
neither GATT, NAFTA, nor any international agreement can restrict
American sovereignty - the Constitution itself gives to the political
branches the discretion whether to comply or to ignore any inter
national obligation. If an international agreement did call for a trans
fer of sovereignty beyond the limits of the federal government, a con
stitutional amendment would be required to make the agreement en
forceable.
Professor Tribe's conclusion that all congressional-executive
agreements violate the Constitution sweeps too far. If Tribe were cor
rect, about ninety percent of all of the international agreements made
by the United States since World War II would be invalid.141 These
agreements include not just postal exchange agreements, but many of
the foundations of the postwar economic order, such as Bretton
Woods and GATT, and America's recent efforts to expand free trade
after the end of the Cold War, such as NAFTA and the WTO. Fur
ther, the exclusivist view ignores competing constitutional structures
and texts that cut against it. Tribe argues, for example, that the Neces
sary and Proper Clause cannot justify the congressional-executive
agreement, but he provides no explanation for the reach of Congress's
plenary power over international commerce. Even if Congress cannot .
send its own ambassadors or ratify its own international agreements,
Tribe's interpretation of the Treaty Clause does not bar Congress
from passing statutes involving international commerce that unilater
ally accept international obligations.
While Tribe's view reduces the problems created by interchange
ability by granting the Treaty Clause a broad scope, it creates its own
structural distortions. In order to expand the reach of treaties, the ex
clusivist view must engage in a corresponding reduction in Congress's
constitutional powers. If Tribe concludes that treaties are the exclusive
method for entering into international agreements, and if he believes
that treaties can be self-executing in the domestic legal system, then
his approach leads to the conclusion that the treatymakers can legis
late on almost any subject, so long as it is addressed by an interna
tional agreement. This would allow the treatymakers to exercise Con
gress's Article I, Section 8 powers to regulate domestic and
international commerce by treaty. To take but one example, if the na
tion wanted to change the length of time for patents, it generally
141. Professor Golove also has taken Professor Tribe to task for this reason. See
Golove, supra note 38, at 1804-05. While Tribe attempts to escape from the results of his ar
guments by pointing out that some congressional-executive agreements were approved by
two-thirds of the Senate anyway, Tribe, supra note 14, at 1227, or that the President could
have unilaterally made many such agreements without congressional consent, id. at 1269,
these tentative justifications do not seem convincing.
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would use a statute due to Congress's Article I, Section 8 authority to
regulate intellectual property. If an international agreement is in
volved, however, authority over this subject suddenly would transfer
to the treatymakers. Tribe's exclusivist approach would deprive the
House of its constitutional function over certain classes of domestic
legislation merely because an international agreement became in
volved.
Tribe might escape this dilemma if he were to accept the view that
most treaties are non-self-executing; in other words, that they do not
exert a domestic legal effect unless Congress implements their terms
by statute. As I will explain in further detail later in this Article, treaty
non-self-execution permits a harmonization of the treaty power and
the legislative power by precluding treaties from exercising any power
granted to the legislature in Article I, Section 8. Tribe might argue, as
I have, that treaties could form the primary method for international
agreement-making because all domestic implementation would re
main in the hands of Congress, thereby avoiding structural contradic
tions created by the potential overlap of the treaty and legislative
powers. Tribe, however, does not appear to take this view in his criti
cism of the transformationist school.142 Indeed, he appears to take the
opposite position, because his criticism is that the WTO - enacted as
a statute - enjoys the powers of a treaty without its form. If Tribe ac
cepted that treaties were non-self-executing, then the WTO's passage
as a statute would be of little concern, because the government would
still need to pass a statute to implement its terms. Even if Tribe were
to adopt a general non-self-execution view, his approach to interna
tional agreements does not explain why some treaties may immedi
ately take effect domestically, while others must await congressional
implementation.
Finally, Tribe's exclusivist reading fails to take account of the
changing nature of international law and organizations. As is becom
ing clear, many areas of life that were once considered wholly domes
tic have become international in scope.143 International agreements
now regulate issues such as crime, national security, the environment,
economic regulation, and individual rights - issues that used to be
governed primarily by domestic legislation. These agreements seek to
mimic domestic legislation in directly regulating the conduct of private
individuals and in creating their own independent means of lawmaking
and law enforcement. If the exclusivist reading were correct, then we
should expect the Treaty Clause to have expanded in recent years,
rather than retracted, as international agreements have come to play a
more important role in domestic regulation. Tribe's approach would
142. Tribe, supra note 14, at 1261 n.133; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 644 (3d ed. 2000).
143. See, e.g., Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 1967-69.
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shift the locus for domestic regulation from the normal legislative pro
cess to the supermajority Treaty Clause process, which excludes the
House. These and other issues will be the subject of Parts II and III,
which will explain why both full interchangeability and the exclusivist
reading of the Treaty Clause are flawed and incomplete, and then pre
sent a new theory of treaties and congressional-executive agreements.
II.

PRACTICE, PUBLIC LAWMAKING, AND THE CONGRESSIONAL
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT

A starting point for a durable theory of international agreements
must recognize that the practice of the political branches roughly de
lineates separate spheres for treaties and statutes. Not only ought the
ory explain this record, but it also should provide a satisfying account
of how international agreement-making interacts with our general
public lawmaking system. Theories that create anomalies and contra
dictions in the manner in which the branches participate in making
laws ought to be rejected in favor of a theory that accounts for practice
in a manner consistent with the text, structure, and original under
standing of the Constitution.
Judged by these standards, the internationalist, transformationist,
and exclusivist approaches fail. As an initial matter, the sweeping con
clusions of all three camps cannot account for the practice of the po
litical branches during the postwar period. If the internationalists or
transformationists were right, one would expect to see the nation use
congressional-executive agreements in almost every instance. If the
exclusivist theory were correct, the branches should have used treaties
to make all international agreements. Yet, as will become clear, the
political branches continue to use both instruments of foreign policy.
Further, they do so in a way that maintains a subject matter distinction
between the two, something that none of the academic theories on in
ternational agreements can explain. In my view, this record of practice
not only represents a practical way to work out the conflict between
treaties and statutes, but also shows how deeper structural imperatives
in the Constitution have led the branches to interact in a way that
harmonizes their potentially conflicting powers. As such, practice can
provide a true reflection of a correct reading of the Constitution.
An even more significant defect in these theories is their creation
of severe conflicts within the constitutional text and structure. Advo
cates of full interchangeability ignore the fundamental problems that
emerge when statutes take the place of treaties. Under the current
consensus view, for example, treaties enjoy a substantial amount of
freedom from the normal constitutional limitations that apply to stat
utes. Allowing statutes to replace treaties would permit Congress to
expand its Article I powers beyond their current boundaries. Nor do
those who believe that the treaty power is exclusive avoid structural
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difficulties. As domestic affairs become more international, and hence
increasingly subject to international regulation, international agree
ments will assume a greater role in imposing rules of conduct on pri
vate citizens. Treaties could potentially replace statutes as a method
for domestic legislation. Because of the expansive sweep of the Treaty
Power, regulation through international agreement could reach well
beyond the limits on Congress's statutory powers.
This Part will begin to construct a theory that addresses these prac
tical, textual and structural problems. First, it will discuss the practice
of making international agreements in the postwar period, with the
goal of identifying the line between statutes and treaties. Second, it
will argue that statutes and treaties must remain distinct due to the
constitutional contradictions that arise when one replaces the other.
Part III will then propose a different way to conceptualize congres
sional-executive agreements, and the manner in which they can be dis
tinguished from the treaty process, to solve these problems.
A.

The Record of Practice

Practice is of particular importance in foreign affairs law. Due to
the lack of authoritative judicial precedent, many of the issues involv
ing the Constitution and international relations do not have clear an
swers. In such circumstances, the executive and legislative branches
often have taken the lead in interpreting the Constitution, and this
practice can provide us with guidance as to a realistic, workable con
struction of its terms. As Justice Frankfurter observed in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube, "The Constitution is a framework for government.
Therefore the way the framework has consistently operated fairly es
tablishes that it has operated according to its true nature. "144 In domes
tic areas, judicial precedent represents the experience of courts in
working out the Constitution's text and structure within different prac
tical contexts; in the absence of case law, practice by the political
branches provides a similar record in foreign affairs. Recognizing this,
the Supreme Court often has deferred on foreign affairs questions to
the practical construction of a constitutional provision by the political
branches.145 Prominent foreign affairs scholars, such as Professors
Harold Koh and Gerhard Casper, often have followed suit.146

144. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990); Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981).
146. KOH, supra note 6, at 70-71 (discussing quasi-constitutional custom as a source of
law in foreign affairs); Gerhard Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign
and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 478 (1976).
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No scholar has yet conducted an empirical survey upon which to
test his or her theory of treaties and congressional-executive agree
ments. This Article will be the first to show that customary practice
indicates that the political branches have observed discernable lines in
the use of these instruments of national policy.147 Viewed in this light,
the practice of the political branches in making international agree
ments strikes at the heart of both the internationalist and the trans
formationist approaches. Traditional explanations for the congres
sional-executive agreement maintain that congressional-executive
agreements have always served as a perfect substitute for the treaty. A
demonstration that ex post congressional-executive agreements are of
relatively recent vintage, and that even today they have not achieved
full interchangeability with treaties, undermines internationalist
claims. Without the pedigree provided by the consistent practice of the
political branches and by the imprimatur of the courts, international
ists are left only with the textual arguments that they have developed
to justify the substitution of statutes for treaties. As argued above,
these arguments leave the congressional-executive agreement with
very weak foundations indeed.
Practice also deals a fatal blow to the transformationists. Their case
depends not only on the notion that the defenders of the ancient re
gime capitulated to the changes wrought by the constitutional mo
ment, but also that the old guard, as it were, itself observes the new
constitutional settlement.148 It is not much of a constitutional moment
if no one remembers it. A history of consistent practice that distin
guishes between treaties and congressional-executive agreements con147. In his forthcoming article, Professor Spiro takes note of the consistent use of trea
ties in some areas, such as arms control and human rights. Spiro, supra note 15. Spiro, how
ever, does not seek to identify systematically what areas have consistently been subject to
treaties or congressional-executive agreements, nor is it his object to develop a theory that
explains the line between the two instruments. Id. Rather, Spiro seeks to establish a new
theory of interpretation that depends upon historical developments and political practice to
legitimate constitutional change. While this Article is not the place to conduct a thorough
examination of Spiro's theory, it seems to me that his approach - while critical of
Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments - is equally flawed by allowing politics to
trump the text and structure of the Constitution. In regard to interchangeability, for exam
ple, Spiro can supply no coherent line between treaties and congressional-executive agree
ments aside from the fact that the political branches simply have acted differently in differ
ent areas, without reference to the constitutional text and structure. Spiro's approach is a
constitutional theory of political fiat - if the political branches follow a certain practice, it
becomes constitutional. The problems with this theory are clear - Spiro would be forced to
accept, for example, the constitutionality of Plessy v. Ferguson and the entrenchment of Jim
Crow between 1877 and 1954. He provides no normative guide to judge the constitutionality
of government action, beyond whether the people of that time approve of its constitutional
ity. Cf. John C. Yoo, Choosing Justices: A Political Appointments Process and the Wages of
Judicial Supremacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1436, 1449 (2000) (book review) (criticizing a related
theory that constitutional outcomes are legitimate based on the political support they re
ceive).
148. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 48-49 (dis
cussing "the period of ratification").
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tradicts the Ackerman and Golove theory, because no definitive
"codification" of the constitutional moment into formal legal doctrine
ever took place - a critical stage of the general transformationist the
ory of constitutional change.149 Even after the alleged constitutional
moment, the political branches appear to have observed subject mat
ter distinctions between treaties and congressional-executive agree
ments. This leads to two possible conclusions: either none of the
branches understood the decision to approve the Bretton Woods
agreement by statute as a significant metamorphosis in constitutional
doctrine, or the 1944 transformation was a stillborn constitutional
moment because it failed to stick over time.
Let us first examine how practice undermines the standard account
of congressional-executive agreements. The doctrine of interchange
ability has not been with us always, nor has it ever held full sway. As
Professors Ackerman and Golove have argued in their exhaustive ex
amination of international agreement-making during the interwar era,
the nation does not appear to have used, before 1945, the ex post con
gressional-executive instrument to substitute for the treaty process.150
To be sure, some precedents came close. As mentioned earlier, Con
gress had provided ex ante authorizations to the President to engage
in reciprocal tariff reduction or other trade measures. These measures,
however, involved congressional delegation of factfinding powers to
the President, in which certain trade restrictions were reduced once
the President had found that another nation had ended its discrimina
tion against American goods. These laws can be characterized as in
ternational agreements only because the President could negotiate, if
he wished, with foreign countries to secure for them the benefits of the
statute; the statute's provisions themselves do not require an interna
tional agreement in order to take effect.
To the extent that traditional defenders of the congressional
executive agreement can rely upon practice, it is only the practice of
the postwar world.151 Since 1945, Presidents and Congress have used
149. See id. at 288-90 (discussing the codification stage of transformation).
150. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 813-61.
151. Traditional accounts of the congressional-executive agreement sometimes rely
upon the annexations of Texas and Hawaii to show historical support for interchangeability.
In both cases, Congress decided to annex these territories by statute after treaties to do the
same had been withdrawn due to Senate opposition. While the annexations of Texas and
Hawaii appear similar to the subjects that ordinarily would fall within the treaty power, the
unique facts of those cases seem to permit use of the statutory process. Both Texas and
Hawaii were independent nations at the time of the annexations. Their absorption into the
United States did not involve an agreement with another sovereign nation, as occurred, for
example, with the Louisiana Purchase or with the transfer of territory at the end of the
Mexican-American or Spanish-American wars. See id. at 832-36. One could view the annexa
tions as the voluntary request of another nation to join the United States. A treaty would be
unnecessary because the other party would no longer exist once the agreement was exe
cuted. A statutory process may have been further appropriate due to Congress's plenary
authority to govern territories and admit new states.
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the statutory method to enter the nation into sweeping agreements,
such as NAFfA and the WTO, which have established America's
place in the world trading system. Presidents and Congress have re
sorted to congressional-executive agreements, rather than treaties, to
join international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank.
Certain statutes, such as the Atomic Energy Act of 1946152 and the
Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961,153 explicitly allow the
President to submit international agreements in specified areas to
statutory approval rather than as treaties. Congressional-executive
agreements, which now appear to outnumber treaties by about four
teen to one, have included such diverse subject matter areas as intel
lectual property rights, foreign assistance, and fishery rights.154 Even
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which one would expect to
maintain the Senate's prerogatives in the making of international
agreements, has issued a report that admits that "it is now well-settled
that the treaty mode is not an exclusive means of agreement-making
for the United States and that (congressional-]executive agreements
may validly co-exist with treaties under the Constitution. "155
Despite this statement against interest, however, complete inter
changeability has not been borne out in practice. A review of Ameri
can postwar international agreements indicates that the political
branches have reserved certain areas, specifically national security and
arms control, for the treaty process. The political branches' consistent
maintenance of subject matter distinctions between treaties and con
gressional-executive agreements not only directly contradicts the in
terchangeability thesis (whether of the internationalist or transforma
tionist variety), but also shows that deeper separation of powers

Professor Spiro, however, raises doubts about the transformationist account of pre
World War II practice on international agreements. He argues that some early precedents,
such as agreements joining the International Labor Organization and addressing World War
I British war debts lend more support for the use of statutes to make international agree
ments. As Spiro claims, these "earlier examples of other forms of non-treaty agreements,
combined with some instances in which international agreements were subjected to ex post
bicameral approval, in fact laid a tenable basis for a more extended use of the congressional
executive agreement." Spiro, supra note 15. If true, Spiro's point further undermines the
Ackerman and Golove defense of a constitutional moment in the 1944-45 period.
152. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, § 8(a)-(b), 60 Stat. 755, 765 (codi
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1994)) (providing that any treaty approved by the Sen
ate or other international agreement approved by Congress supercedes inconsistent provi
sions of statute).
153. Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-297, § 33, 75 Stat. 631,
634 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2551-2595 (1994)). For the particular provision
permitting the President to commit the nation to arms control agreements only pursuant to a
treaty or legislation passed by Congress, see 22 U.S.C. § 2753(c).
154. See SENATE 1993 REPORT, supra note 5, at 53.
155. Id. at 52.
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principles are afoot. This Section will now survey the subjects for
which the political branches have reserved the treaty process.156
Political Agreements. In the early postwar period, significant
agreements such as the peace treaties with Japan and Italy, the entry
of the United States into the United Nations ("U.N.") and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO"), and the current web of U.S.
mutual defense agreements, such as bilateral agreements with South
Korea,157 the Philippines,158 Japan,159 and Taiwan (terminated in
1978),160 and multilateral security arrangements, such as the Southeast
Asian Treaty Organization, the Australian-New Zealand-U.S. agree
ment, and the Rio Treaty, occurred by treaty.161 With one exception,
subsequent, less-intensive security agreements, such as promises to de
fend against threats, training of local forces, or pre-positioning of
equipment, have resulted from unilateral executive declarations or
sole executive agreements, and none of those rose to the level of seri
ousness of America's entry into the U.N. or NAT0.162 Perhaps the
most significant international security arrangements to arise from the
end of the Cold War also were formalized by treaty - the final set
tlement with regard to Germany163 and expansion of NATO to include
some of the nations of the formerly communist Eastern Europe.164
While some exceptions exist, they do not seem to undermine the gen
eral subject matter trend.165
156. I conducted this survey by relying upon the U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN
FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2000 (2000), which groups agreements by subject-matter
and by party. I then used the Statutes at Large and the United States Treaty Series to verify
whether an agreement had undergone the treaty process or the statutory process.
157. Mutual Defense Treaty, Oct. 1, 1953, U.S.-S. Korea, 5 U.S.T. 2368.
158. Mutual Defense Treaty, Aug. 30, 1951, U.S.-Phil., 3 U.S.T. 3947.
159. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Jan. 19, 1960, U.S.-Japan, 1 1 U.S.T.
1632.
160. Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S.-Taiwan (China), Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433.
161. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Sept. 8, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 81, 209 U.N.T.S.
28; Security Treaty (ANZUS Pact), Sept. 1, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3420, 131 U.N.T.S. 83; Inter
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), Sept. 2, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21
U.N.T.S. 77. See also Spiro, supra note 15.
162. See SENATE 1993 REPORT, supra note 5, at 206-07.
163. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany and a Related Agreed
Minute, Sept. 12, 1990, s. TREATY Doc. No. 101-20 (1990), 29 I.L.M. 1 1 86.
164. See Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, Dec. 16, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-36 (1998).
165. The three significant exceptions appear to be the 1973 Paris agreement ending the
Vietnam War, the 1988 agreement settling the Afghanistan conflict, and the 1991 agreement
ending the Cambodian conflict. The latter two agreements did not involve use of American
troops in combat. While the first did, it was not submitted for approval to Congress, but in
stead constituted a sole executive agreement that President Nixon appears to have under
taken pursuant to his sole executive powers. See Act of the International Conference on
Viet-Nam, Mar. 2, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 485, 935 U.N.T.S. 405.
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Standing alone, even the ratification of the United Nations Charter
by the normal treaty process strikes a deadly blow to the transforma
tionist and internationalist defense of interchangeability. If the
Ackerman/Golove account is to be believed, the political controversy
that surrounded the alleged 1944-45 constitutional moment focused on
America's entrance into a permanent international body to guarantee
the peace. Concern over whether the Senate would oppose entry into
the United Nations prompted an earlier generation of internationalist
scholars in 1944-45 to create the theory of interchangeability. These
scholars blamed America's failure to join the U.N.'s predecessor, the
League of Nations, for the coming of the Second World War. If the
transformationists were correct, the constitutional moment should
have allowed Truman to seek entry into the U.N. by congressional
executive agreement. If today's internationalists were right, the Con
stitution's textual permission for interchangeability likewise should
have led Truman to seek a congressional-executive agreement for the
U.N., if only to avoid the potential political obstacles looming in the
Senate. Despite all of these concerns, the United States entered the
United Nations through the treaty form. It does not appear that there
was any serious effort to enact this most significant of all postwar trea
ties by the statutory method.
Arms Control. Recent experience with arms control cuts even
more sharply against interchangeability. Since the end of World War
II, Presidents submitted almost every significant arms control agree
ment, such as the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,166 the Threshold
Test Ban Treaty,167 the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,168 the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty,169 the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty,170 and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,171
to the Senate as treaties.172 These agreements established the policy of

166. Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28, 1976,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 15 l.L.M. 891; Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space, and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 131, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
167. Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, July 3, 1974,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 13 1.L.M. 906.
168. Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435.
169. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
170. Treaty between the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. on the Elimination
of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27
l.L.M. 90.
171. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, done Nov. 19, 1990, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 102-8 (1991), 30 l.L.M. 1 .
172. See SENATE 1993 REPORT, supra note 5, a t 209-10 (observing that most arms con
trol agreements have been submitted to the Senate as treaties); see also Treaty on the Prohi
bition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on
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nuclear deterrence through mutually assured destruction, sought to
restrict the spread of nuclear weapons, and began the de-militarization
of Europe. There appears to have been only one exception to this con
sistent pattern: approval by statute of the first round of the Strategic
Arms Limitations Talks ("SALT I") between the United States and
the Soviet Union, which imposed limits upon the nuclear warheads
and delivery vehicles possessed by the superpowers.173 Approval of
SALT I by statute, however, cannot serve as a firm precedent for in
terchangeability. SALT I had a limited duration of only five years;
both sides understood that SALT I would be replaced by a permanent
pact, SALT II.174 Indeed, the agreement was formally known as the
SALT I Interim Agreement. And when negotiation of SALT II was
finally completed, President Carter initially sent the agreement to the
Senate for approval as a treaty, but then did not press for its approval
in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.175 Presidents
Reagan and Bush never asked the Senate to approve the agreement.
Experience since the Cold War has only reaffirmed the consistent
use of the treaty to make arms control agreements. Presidents have
submitted to the Senate bilateral agreements between the United
States and Russia, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
("START") I and II agreements, which have reduced the level of nu
clear warheads and restricted the use of certain delivery systems.176
Presidents have sent to the Senate agreements with our former Cold
War adversary that have reduced the positioning of conventional
weapons in the European theater of operations, and that have allowed
unimpeded over-flights to verify compliance with arms control pacts.177
The political branches have also chosen to use the treaty process to
approve controversial multilateral arms control agreements, such as
the Chemical Weapons Convention, even when they faced significant
opposition in the Senate.178 Agreements that the United States has not

the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, done Feb. 1 1 , 1971, 23 U.S.T.
701, 955 U.N.T.S. 155. See also Spiro, supra note 15.
173. Strategic Arms Limitation I Agreement, Pub. L. No. 79-448, 86 Stat. 746.
174. See Trimble & Weiss, supra note 6, at 657-60.
175. See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 179.
176. See Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Jan.
3, 1993, U.S.-USSR, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 103-1 (1993) [hereinafter The START II Treaty];
Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.
USSR, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-20 (1991) [hereinafter The START I Treaty].
177. See Treaty on Armed Conventional Forces in Europe, supra note 171; Flank
Document Agreement to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, adopted May
31, 1996, s. TREATY Doc. No. 105-5 (1997), 36 1.L.M. 866.
178. Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-21
(1993).
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yet signed, such as the Land Mines Convention,179 and agreements still
in development, such as the strengthening of the Biological Weapons
Convention,180 would take the form of treaties, rather than of congres
sional-executive agreements.
In part, this consistent treaty practice seems to have resulted from
Senate efforts to defend its prerogatives. During ratification of the last
round of arms control agreements, for example, the Senate included in
the resolution of advice and consent a condition that all future agree
ments involving military, security, or arms control issues must be sub
mitted to the Senate as treaties rather than as congressional-executive
agreements.181 To be sure, the Senate's ability to create binding consti
tutional law through the attachment of reservations, understandings
and declarations to treaty ratification documents may be open to
doubt.182 Nonetheless, the Senate's attachment of this condition ex
presses its own intention not to accept the theory of interchangeabil
ity, and indicates that it will enforce this understanding of the Consti
tution by refusing to approve any international agreements that do not
take the treaty form. Indeed, the Clinton administration so understood
the condition and agreed to abide by it.183
Human Rights. In addition to political/military and arms control
agreements, one of the most significant areas of recent American for
eign policy is conducted primarily through treaties, rather than con
gressional-executive agreements: human rights. Historically, signifi
cant human rights agreements, such as the Hague conventions on the
rules of war and the Red Cross conventions, underwent the superma
jority Senate consent process.184 In more recent times, the Bush ad179. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, adopted Sept. 18, 1997, 36 1.L.M. 1507.
180. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for sig
nature Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
181. See Trimble & Koff, supra note 49, at 56.
182. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Condi
tional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (discussing constitutional validity of the Senate's use
of reservations, understandings, and declarations in the treaty process).
183. See Trimble & Koff, supra note 49, at 56.
184. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat
ment of Prisoners of War, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Con
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Conven
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention of July 27, 1929, Rela
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021; Convention Respect
ing the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2310; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277; Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803; see also Spiro, supra note 15.
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ministration used treaties to formalize American entry into the Inter
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), which
guarantees certain minimum individual rights in the political sphere,185
and the Genocide Convention, which makes genocide a crime against
humanity.186 President Clinton followed suit. The two important hu
man rights agreements approved during his presidency, the Conven
tion against Torture in 1994,187 and the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1994,188 took
the treaty form. Four other multilateral human rights agreements that
supporters once thought that the Clinton administration would seek to
join189 - the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimi
nation against Women,190 the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul
tural Rights,191 the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights,192
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child193 - also would take
treaty form, even in the face of likely Senate opposition. Indeed, it is
difficult to think of a human rights agreement that has gone through
two-house approval, rather than through the President and Senate
alone.
The history of these human rights treaties highlights the fact that
the political branches recognize a distinction between treaties and
congressional-executive agreements. Some human rights agreements
have languished in the Senate for up to 30 years. The ICCPR, for ex
ample, had been proposed first in 1966, but was not ratified until 1992.
The Genocide Convention was first presented for signature in 1948,
but was not ratified by the United States until 1989. Senate leaders
opposed several of these treaties because of the concern that they re-

185. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (providing for equal rights, a right against arbitrary arrest, a right to marriage, and re
stricted use of the death penalty, and establishing a Human Rights Committee).
186. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, S. EXEC. Doc. 0, 81-1, S. Exec. Doc. B, 91-2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force for
U.S., Feb. 23, 1989).
187. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, entered into force June 26, 1987 (for U.S., Nov. 20, 1994), S. TREATY Doc.
No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 1 13.
188. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina
tion, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (en
tered into force for U.S., Nov. 20, 1994).
1 89. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification ofHuman Rights Conventions: The Ghost
of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
190. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
191. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
192. American Convention on Human Rights, Aug. 27, 1979, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
193. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 28 1.L.M. 1448.
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quire more expansive individual rights than those in the Constitu
tion.194 To mention one disreputable example, southern Senators
feared that certain human rights treaty provisions would hasten the
dismantling of segregation.195 If treaties and congressional-executive
agreements truly were interchangeable, Presidents could have short
circuited this opposition by sending human rights agreements to both
houses of Congress for majority approval. This course of action would
have been all the more successful once much of the political opposi
tion to the goals of the treaties had disappeared in the wake of the
Civil Rights revolution. Yet it does not appear that Presidents have
ever attempted to use the alternate statutory procedure to avoid such
political opposition in the Senate.196
Extradition. Yet another area where the political branches gener
ally have resorted to treaties to reach international agreements has
been extradition. Under standard extradition agreements, one nation
agrees to surrender a person charged with or convicted of a crime un
der the law of another state, so that the latter state may try or punish
the individual.197 Although at one time it was thought that nations had
a duty to grant extradition freely, customary international law never
recognized a general duty to surrender fugitives.198 As a result, the
United States and other nations have entered into a web of bilateral
agreements that generally require a showing that there is cause to hold
a person, that the offense has been created by treaty or statute, that
the offense was within the jurisdiction of the requesting country, and
that double jeopardy would not be violated.199 Article 27 of the 1794
Jay Treaty with Great Britain contained the first American extradition
provision,200 and its implementation by President John Adams pro
duced one of the early Republic's great foreign policy crises.201
194. For a review of historical examples, see NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION (1990).
195. See TANANBAUM, supra note 106, at 15.
196. This information is all the more striking in light of the fact that several significant
treaties have yet to be approved by the Senate decades after they were submitted. The In
ternational Labor Organization Convention No. 87, for example, has been awaiting Senate
approval since 1949; the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
since 1978; the American Convention on Human Rights, since 1978; and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, since 1980.
197. See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840); Terlinden v. Ames, 184
U.S. 270 (1902); Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
198. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 474.
199. See generally id.
200. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat.
116 (signed at London, approved by the Senate June 24, 1795, ratified by the United States,
Aug. 14, 1795).
201. For a discussion of the constitutional issues arising from this early extradition con
troversy, see Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100
YALE L.J. 229 (1990).
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Extradition poses an interesting question in regard to federal
power, as Congress does not appear to possess any textual authority to
provide for the seizure of an individual on American soil and for his
delivery to a foreign nation for trial. Ever since the Jay Treaty, how
ever, the political branches have used Article II treaties to reach ex
tradition agreements with more than one-hundred nations.202 Only a
single recent example appears to have broken this record. In 1994 and
1995, the President entered into executive agreements with the Inter
national Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
to surrender persons within the United States charged or convicted by
those tribunals.203 Rather than approval by treaty, Congress imple
mented the agreements by statute by expanding federal extradition
laws - which until 1996 had implemented treaties - to include the
two international tribunals.204 In a 1999 challenge brought by a Rwan
dan citizen in the United States indicted by the Rwanda tribunal, a di
vided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld
the use of the congressional-executive agreement.205 Citing dicta from
previous extradition cases, the majority relied upon interchangeability
even though the plaintiff maintained that "the United States has never
surrendered a person except pursuant to an Article II treaty."206 In dis
sent, Judge DeMoss demonstrated that the majority's new exception
proves the rule. "Every extradition agreement ever entered into by the
United States (before the advent of the new Tribunals) has been ac
complished by treaty . . . . "207 Aside from this sole, rushed example, ex
tradition has stood as another example in which the treaty power has
provided the sole mechanism for reaching international agreements.
202. See SENATE 1993 REPORT, supra note 5, at 227.
203. Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citi
zens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States, Jan. 24, 1995, T.l.A.S. No. 12601; Agreement Between the United
States of America and the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Terri
tory of the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 5, 1994, T.I.A.S. No. 12570.
204. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106,
§ 1342, 1 10 Stat. 186, 486.
205. See Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5 th Cir. 1999).
206. Id. at 426. The majority cited, of all things, Tribe's AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW.
207. Id. at 436 (DeMoss, J., dissenting). Judge DeMoss also pointed out that the expan
sion of the extradition statute to include the Rwanda and former Yugoslavia tribunals had
occurred via a last-minute attachment to non-relevant legislation, without any hearings,
committee consideration, or floor debate of the provisions. For scholarly discussion of the
Ntakirutimana case, see Evan J. Wallach, Extradition to the Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal:
ls Another Treaty Required?, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 59 (1998); Panayiota
Alexandropoulos, Note, Enforceability of Executive-Congressional Agreements in Lieu of an
Article II Treaty for Purposes of Extradition: Elizaphan Ntakirutimana v. Janet Reno, 45
VILLA. L. REV. 107 (2000).
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Environment. In addition to extradition, the President and Senate
have used the treaty process for most of the nation's significant envi
ronmental agreements.208 While perhaps not as crucial to national se
curity as alliances or arms control, international environmental trea
ties may represent the most legislation-like agreements in their setting
of norms for domestic private conduct. The United States has entered
into agreements limiting pollution, such as the Montreal Protocol,
which accelerated the retirement of certain chemicals that harmed the
ozone layer,209 and the Convention on Transboundary Pollution,210
which seeks to reduce cross-border air pollution, all by the treaty pro
cess. Agreements that protect certain environments, such as the Ant
arctic region211 or outer space,212 or endangered species, such as
whales, polar bears, migratory birds, and seals,213 also have undergone
approval by a supermajority of the Senate. More ambitious regulatory
agreements, such as the U.N. Convention on Climate Change, also
have undergone the treaty process.214 As with human rights treaties,
Presidents have agreed to submit these pacts to the Senate even when
they could have avoided significant opposition by resorting to the two
house procedure.215 Presidents have delayed the submission of contro
versial environmental agreements, such as agreements that would re
quire the nation to protect biodiversity and to restrict its energy use
208. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done May 9, 1992,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), 31 1.L.M. 849; The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12
U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
209. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted June 29,
1990, 30 l.L.M. 537; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for
signature Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1516.
210. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 18 J.L.M.
1442.
211. See The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 208.
212. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
213. See Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, done Nov. 15, 1973, 27 U.S.T.
3918, 13 l.L.M. 13; Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29
U.S.T. 441, 11 l.L.M. 251; Benelux Convention Concerning Hunting and the Protection of
Birds, June 10, 1970, 847 U.N.T.S. 255; International Convention for the Protection of Birds,
Oct. 18, 1950, 638 U.N.T.S. 185; International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,
Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.
214. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 208.
215. President Reagan declined to sign the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, and hence prevented Congress from considering the agreement. If the

theory of interchangeability were correct, Congress could have enacted the Law of the Sea
Convention in the face of presidential opposition. International agreements involving the
oceans, however, seem to follow no clear principle. Some agreements involving the rules that
apply at sea have been done as statutes, see, e.g., Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules with Respect to Assistance and Salvage at Sea, Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658, 1 Bevans
780, while others have been done as treaties, see, e.g., Convention on the High Seas, done
Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
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and industrial pollution, because of likely Senate opposition.216 Al
though President Reagan decided against submitting to the Senate one
of the most significant international environmental agreements, the
Law of the Sea Convention, there is little doubt that the agreement
would have been formalized as a treaty, rather than a congressional
executive agreement.217
Examination of postwar practice by the political branches thus re
veals a manageable line between treaties and congressional-executive
agreements. The President and Senate have used the statutory process
to approve agreements that generally involve international trade and
economics. These subjects fall within Congress's Article I, Section 8
power over international commerce and often require modification of
existing statutory law to bring the United States into compliance. The
President and Senate, it appears, still reserve certain classes of subjects
for the treaty process, primarily national security, arms control, human
rights, and the environment. These areas bear important constitutional
differences from international economics and commerce.218 Subjects
such as national security and arms control, for example, fall primarily
within the President's plenary powers as Commander-in-Chief and
sole organ of the nation in its foreign relations.219 They also involve
concurrent powers on the part of Congress, such as those of appro
priations and of declaring war. After City of Boerne v. Flores,220 which
invalidated Congress's effort to extend broader protections for relig216. See Convention on Biological Diversity, done June 5, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No.
103-20 (1993), 31 l.L.M. 818; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
supra note 208.
217. President Clinton, for example, submitted the Convention follow-on agreements to
the Senate for approval as a treaty. See Bernard H. Oxman, The Law of the Sea Convention,
ASIL Newsletter (Nov.-Dec. 1994).
218. Tax treaties might seem to be the exception that disproves this rule. Tax is certainly
a matter of international economics and commerce, and yet our agreements with other na
tions on taxation usually assume the treaty form. It appears, however, that tax treaties do not
apply domestically of their own force - in other words, they are non-self-executing. Rather,
Congress has chosen to implement tax treaty obligations through provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. See l.R.C. §§ 894, 7852(d) (2000). Moreover, Congress regularly overrides
tax treaty obligations through its normal tax statutes. See generally David Sachs, ls the 19th
Century Doctrine of Treaty Override Good Law for Modern Day Tax Treaties?, 47 TAX
LAW. 867 (1994) (examining the tax-treaty-override doctrine and arguing for its termination
or modification). This practice indicates that the political branches have continued to use
legislation, rather than treaties alone, to regulate international economics and commerce
that would usually fall within Congress's Article I powers. For an examination of current
international tax treaty issues, see, for example, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of In
ternational Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1996); Julie Roin,
Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV.
1753 (1995).
219. See generally John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of the War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo,
War Powers].
220. 519 U.S. 1088 (1997) (finding Religious Freedom Restoration Act to lie outside of
Congress's enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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ious freedom beyond those established by the Constitution, the im
plementation of the substantive terms of human rights treaties may
rest outside of Congress's enumerated powers as well.221 It is unclear
what congressional power could justify extradition - the seizure of
persons because of their alleged acts in foreign countries, regardless of
their involvement in interstate or international commerce - due to
the lack of an explicit enumerated power. Environmental law strad
dles the line between treaties and congressional-executive agreements
- while some environmental matters rest within Congress's powers
over interstate commerce, others (especially more recent environ
mental agreements addressing energy use or biodiversity) might not,
in light of the recent restrictions on the Commerce Clause imposed by
the Supreme Court.222
Consistent use of the treaty process for certain classes of interna
tional agreements undercuts the most compelling justification for the
internationalist and transformationist accounts. Practice simply cannot
be explained by either theory. If the two instruments were utterly in
terchangeable, as both groups of scholars would have it, then one
would expect the President to send most international agreements
through the two-house procedure because of the easier chances of
passage. Instead, practice indicates that there was no constitutional
moment that removed the Senate from the role of making interna
tional agreements, that there was no consensus accepting "codifica
tion" of the ascendancy of the congressional-executive agreement, and
that something more complex is going on in the growing use of the
congressional-executive agreement. Rather than interchangeability,
the political branches have followed significant distinctions between
congressional-executive agreements and treaties.
The history of international agreement-making also undermines
the central claim of the internationalist camp. There has been neither
a long pedigree of complete interchangeability, nor a recent practice
of completely substituting statutes for treaties. President Wilson could
not have used a statute to enact the Treaty of Versailles because the
idea never would have occurred to him - the legislative method of
agreement-making did not exist. President Clinton could not have
submitted the failed comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a
congressional-executive agreement, because he would have violated
221. Indeed, one leading international law scholar has suggested that the only way to
achieve such goals is now through the Treaty Clause, which Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920), has indicated is not limited by the same federalism considerations that apply to
Congress. Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties, Revisited, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1630, 1644 (1999) ("Those treaties create international obligations that Congress has
the authority to implement under the Necessary and Proper Clause in conjunction with the
treaty power.").
222. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 528 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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the constitutional understanding that has reserved all arms control
agreements for supermajority approval in the Senate. Neither history
nor practice, however, provides refuge for the treaty exclusivist. Con
gressional-executive agreements, despite their relatively youthful
pedigree, have come to dominate international agreements covering a
wide variety of fields. Part III will explore the theoretical reasons why
the President, Senate, and Congress have reserved different subjects
for different instruments of agreement-making. For the moment, the
next Section completes the critique of existing scholarly theories by
illuminating the constitutional distortions created by interchangeabil
ity.
B.

StructuralProblems Created by Interchangeability

This Section will examine the textual and structural inconsistencies
created by interchangeability. First, interchangeability distorts the al
location of powers among the branches in the area of foreign affairs.
By transferring agreement-making power from the executive branch
(the President and Senate acting in their Article II capacity) to Con
gress, the President's authority in foreign affairs is diminished and
domestic regulation becomes unmoored from the Constitution's law
making processes. Second, interchangeability allows a class of statutes
to escape the structural limitations, such as the separation of powers
and federalism, that restrict congressional power. Because of its loca
tion in Article II, treaties have been free from the processes and re
strictions that govern statutes. If congressional-executive agreements
were fully interchangeable with treaties, statutes logically would as
sume the broader sweep of treaties. These points will become clear af
ter comparing the process of making statutes with the process of
making treaties.
1.

Congressional-Executive Agreements and the
Foreign Affairs Power

Interchangeability's most obvious distortion of the constitutional
structure lies in the weakening of the President's formal foreign affairs
powers. Article II, Section 2 declares that the President makes trea
ties, subject to the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. The
President, not the Senate, chooses to initiate the treaty process, and
the President can still refuse to make a treaty even after the Senate
has approved it.223 A statutory process for making international
agreements threatens to oust the President from this constitutionally
dominant position and effectively negates the President's absolute

223. See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 184.
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veto over foreign policy.224 If the agreement takes the form of a public
law, then Congress can initiate the process without presidential ap
proval, just as it can propose any statute without his consent. Even if
the President unequivocally opposes an agreement and vetoes it, Con
gress can choose to override the presidential veto by a two-thirds vote.
These structural implications of interchangeability conflict with the
Constitution's centralization of foreign affairs power in the executive
branch. Under United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. ,225 as well
as long executive and legislative practice reaching to the very begin
nings of the Republic,226 the President is constitutionally responsible
for the conduct of foreign policy. Creating an alternate process for
making international agreements, one that excludes the President,
would allow Congress to pursue its own foreign policy and interfere
with the executive's leadership role. This would radically alter the con
stitutional structure of the foreign affairs power.227
Interchangeability further warps the President's foreign affairs
powers after the public lawmaking process ends. Statutes require the
consent of both houses of Congress and the President, or two-thirds of
Congress without the President, before they can be repealed. Al
though the Constitution does not address the issue, today most com
mentators, courts, and government entities believe that the President
may terminate a treaty unilaterally.228 The President retains this
authority due to his dominant constitutional position in foreign af
fairs229 and his structural superiority in conducting international rela
tions. If the nation were to regulate certain domestic conduct by stat
ute, the President could not terminate the rules without congressional
approval. If the nation were to regulate the same conduct in concert
with a treaty, however, the President enjoys the power to terminate
224. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1253.
225. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
226. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson to Edward Charles Genet, Nov. 22, 1793, in 27 PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 414 (John Catanzariti ed. 1997) (stating that the President is the
"only channel of communication" between United States and foreign nations); John
Marshall, Speech Before House of Representatives, 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (ar
guing that the President is "sole organ" of nation in its communications with foreign na
tions).
227. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1255.
228. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 708-09 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot, 444 U.S.
996 (1979); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 339; HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
supra note 6, at 214. Some once thought that breaking treaties required the consent of two
thirds of the Senate. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in
International Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Cases, 25 CAL. L. REV. 643, 658-65
(1937).
229. The D.C. Circuit, for example, upheld President Carter's unilateral termination of
the Taiwan treaty due to both the President's role as the constitutional representative of the
nation in its foreign affairs and his plenary authority over recognition of foreign govern
ments. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 705-08.
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the regulation at will. Interchangeability, however, upsets this struc
ture in either one of two ways. On the one hand, it could mean that
Congress can bind the nation to an international agreement that the
President could not terminate unilaterally, which would represent a
serious curtailment of the executive's foreign affairs powers. On the
other hand, defenders of interchangeability might allow the President
the same ability to terminate congressional-executive agreements as to
terminate treaties. This, however, would provide the President with
the heretofore unknown power of executive termination of statutes.230
This would be tantamount to granting the President a direct share of
the legislative power - a result, as Professor Henry Monaghan has
argued, that is at odds with our understanding of the executive
power.231
Termination raises another problem for the interchangeability of
treaties and statutes. Under the "last in time" rule, the consensus view
is that treaties may trump earlier statutes, and that subsequent statutes
can override earlier treaties.232 Allowing treaties and statutes to termi
nate each other in this way runs counter to the formalist approach to
lawmaking articulated by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha.233 A
decision to repeal earlier legislation, as was the ca se with the use of
the legislative veto in Chadha, requires a new law. The last-in-time
rule seems to violate this principle by allowing the treatymakers to
counteract an earlier action by the President, Senate, and House. In
terchangeability allows international agreements to override previous
statutes. In discussing this possibility, Madison rejected it out of hand
during the Jay Treaty debates because "it involved the absurdity of an
Imperium in imperio; [or] of two powers both of them supreme, yet
each of them liable to be superseded by the other."234 Although
Madison admitted that the Roman constitution had operated similarly,
he believed that it was only a "political phenomenon, which had been
celebrated as a subject of curious speculation only, and not as a model
for the institutions of any other Country."235 In Madison's mind, vest230. Indeed, many believe that, at a minimum, the very purpose of the Take Care
Clause was to prevent the President from enjoying this power. See Calabresi & Prakash, su
pra note 44, at 549-50.
231. The constitutional text resists the notion that an "independent, free-standing presi
dential Jaw-making authority exists insofar as the rights of American citizens are con
cerned." Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
4 (1993).
232. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S.
580, 599 (1884) (The Head Money Cases); HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 20911.
233. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
234. Speech by James Madison on Jay's Treaty (Mar. 10, 1796), in 16 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 255, 257 (J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds. 1989) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS].
235. Id.
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ing the legislative power in two separate authorities that could "annul
the proceedings of the other" would produce only an unstable and ir
rational government.236
2.

Interchangeability and the Lack ofLimits on the Treaty Power

Interchangeability further undermines the Constitution's basic
structure by allowing Congress to escape the restrictions on its enu
merated powers. If the statutory process is a perfect substitute for the
Treaty Clause, then congressional-executive agreements must enjoy
the same constitutional benefits that accrue to the treaty form. This
result has important implications for both the separation of powers
and federalism, because most internationalist scholars argue that much
of the structural elements of the Constitution do not apply with the
same force to treaties as to domestic laws.
Under standard internationalist theories, interchangeability could
allow statutes to enjoy the less stringent application of the separation
of powers to treaties. This could happen in one of two ways. First,
treaties could transfer powers among the branches, or create hybrid
forms of government power, that would prove unconstitutional if un
dertaken solely by domestic law. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp. ,237 for example, the Court observed that the nondelega
tion doctrine would not apply with the same force in foreign affairs, a
proposition the Court recently re-affirmed in Clinton v. New York.238
Some have argued further that treaties are limited, at best, only by
"radiations" from the separation of powers.239 Second, the treatymak
ers could delegate authority that normally resides with the executive
or judicial branches to international organizations.240 Under standard
internationalist doctrine, a treaty could transfer authority from Con
gress to the executive branch or to an international organization, as
some argue that the U.N. Charter actually does,241 when a statute
could not. Theoretically, interchangeability allows statutes to enjoy
236. Id.
237. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
238. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
239. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 195.
240. Some scholars even maintain that a treaty could "bargain away" Congress's
authority to declare war by allowing war to be triggered automatically under certain events.
See id. at 196.
241. See Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old
Order Changeth," 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1991); but see Michael J. Glennon & Allison R.
Hayward, Collective Security and the Constitution: Can the Commander in Chief Power Be
Delegated to the United Nations?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1573 (1994) (arguing that UN. Security Coun
cil resolutions cannot provide domestic legal authorization for war). For a criticism of the
ability of the United States to delegate command authority over U.S. troops to U.N. or for
eign command, see Yoo, Kosovo, supra note 125, at 1708-20.
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the loosened restrictions that would apply to treaties in these situa
tions.
Used in these ways, congressional-executive agreements can un
dermine the separation of powers in both of its inter-branch aspects.
First, suppose that a statute required the transfer of law enforcement
or judicial power to an international agency or tribunal. Officials of
the international body would not generally be removable by the Presi
dent, because the very point of creating international regulatory insti
tutions often is to free them from the direct influence of different na
tion-states.242 Even under the loose standards of Morrison v. Olson243
or Mistretta v. United States,244 a domestic effort by Congress to com
pletely shield individuals who exercise executive authority from presi
dential removal would fall afoul of either the Appointments Clause,
the Article II vesting clause or the Take Care Clause, while efforts to
transfer the federal judicial power might violate Article Ill's vesting
clause. Yet, some international and constitutional law scholars argue
that such standards should not apply to international agreements be
cause they involve foreign affairs.245 Second, if statutes are to enjoy the
same status as treaties, and if treaties are not subject to the usual
structural constraints of the separation of powers, then presumably
Congress could restructure the separation of powers when acting
through the congressional-executive agreement, even though it could
not with an identical statute that concerned domestic affairs.
Interchangeability also threatens to allow Congress to exercise
powers that, if exercised domestically, would violate federalism limita
tions. Before the Rehnquist Court's reinvigoration of federalism, the
generous interpretation given to the Commerce Clause relieved the
government of relying upon the broad extent of the treaty power for
its actions. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has placed
new limits upon the extent of the federal government's powers. Fol
lowing up on United States v. Lopez,246 the Court last Term struck
down the Violence Against Women Act as beyond the Commerce
Clause because it regulated a noneconomic activity.247 In Alden v.

242. See Yoo, New Sovereignty, supra note 125, at 91-96 (discussing creation of Chemi
cal Weapons Convention Technical Secretariat); Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust But Verify":
The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agree
ments, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 57 (1993) (discussing benefits of neutral international or

ganizations).

243. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
244. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
245. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Can Buckley Clear Customs?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1309 (1992); William J. Davey, The Appointments Clause and International Dispute Settle
ment Mechanisms: A False Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1315 (1992).
246. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
247. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Maine, the Court concluded that Congress could not use its Article I,
Section 8 powers to override state sovereign immunity in either fed
eral or state court.248 In Printz v. United States249 and New York v.
United States,250 the Court held that Congress could not use its Com
merce Clause powers to "commandeer" state executives or legisla
tures. And in City of Boerne v. Flores,251 College Savings Bank of
Florida v. Florida,252 and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,253 the
Court invalidated federal statutes that had attempted to redefine indi
vidual rights at variance with the Court's own interpretation of the Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. In these cases, the Court
has sought both to place limits on Congress's enumerated powers and
to expand the protections for state sovereignty.
Interchangeability provides the lawmakers with a way to avoid
these recent restrictions on their powers. According to both standard
internationalist thought and Supreme Court case law, treaties are not
subject to the same federalism limitations that bind statutes. As a tex
tual matter, the Constitution locates treaties in Article II, which im
plies that they need not live within the same boundaries that contain
Article I. Leading commentators therefore assert that the treatymak
ers can make policy on any subject, even where the lawmakers would
be prevented from doing so by Article I, Section 8's enumeration of
limited congressional powers or the Tenth Amendment's reservation
of powers to the states.254 According to Professor Henkin, " [u]nlike
the delegations to Congress which give it authority over enumerated
substantive areas of national policy, the treaty power is authority to
make national policy (regardless of substantive content) by interna
tional means and process for an international purpose."255 Internation
alists read the Tenth Amendment as inapplicable to the treaty power,
because they view the broad scope of treaties as part of the powers
expressly delegated to the federal government by the Constitution.
Anything that the treaty power can extend to is, by definition, ex
cluded from the Tenth Amendment. Concludes Professor Henkin,
" [m]any matters, then, may appear to be 'reserved to the States' as re
gards domestic legislation if Congress does not have power to regulate
them; but they are not reserved to the states so as to exclude their
248. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
249. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
250. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
251. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
252. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
253. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
254. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at §§ 302-03; HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 190-93.
255. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 191.
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regulation by international agreement."256 This argument, we are told,
is "clear and indisputable,"257 although it has been the subject of a vig
orous debate recently between Professors Curtis Bradley and David
Golove in this Law Review over whether the same federalism limita
tions ought to apply to both statutes and treaties.258
In Missouri v. Holland,259 the Supreme Court expressed agreement
with the notion that the normal limits on the legislative power do not
apply to treaties. Holland raised the question of whether Congress had
authority to enact the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, which im
plemented a 1916 treaty between the United States and Great Britain
that protected certain birds flying between the United States and Can
ada. The treaty barred the hunting or capture of any of the birds pro
tected by the treaty, a substantive action that the federal courts at the
time had held lay outside Congress's Commerce Clause powers.260 In
an opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court rejected the idea that the
Tenth Amendment's limitations on Congress's powers also applied to
the treaty power. Conceding that the Commerce Clause did not in
�::lude the power to regulate migratory birds, Justice Holmes concluded
that the treaty did not violate "any prohibitory words to be found in
the Constitution," nor did it conflict with "some invisible radiation
from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment."261 The Treaty
Power, according to the Court, was not to be limited in the same man
ner as Congress's powers under Article I, Section 8, because the treaty
concerned "a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude," the
power over which had to be vested somewhere in the national gov
ernment.262 As the Court declared, " [i]t is obvious that there may be
matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act
of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an
act could."263 While the Court later limited Holland in the individual
rights context in Reid v. Covert,264 it has yet to identify restrictions
emanating from the separation of powers or federalism.
Holland's expansive reading of the treaty power suggests the struc
tural distortions caused by interchangeability. At least in regard to the
256. Id. at 191 (footnote omitted).
257. Id.
258. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 390, 394 (1998); David Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Founda
tions ofthe Nationalist Conception ofthe Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000).
259. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
260. See id. at 432 (citing lower court decisions).
261. Id. at 433-34.
262. Id. at 435.
263. Id. at 433.
264. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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Commerce Clause, Holland makes some sense, because the Treaty
Power is an executive one located in Article II, Section 2, which logi
cally is not subject to the limitations that apply to legislative power in
Article I. This clause becomes, however, a structural loophole if one
accepts the argument that congressional-executive agreements are
completely interchangeable with treaties. If such statutes can take the
place of treaties, and if treaties are not subject to the regular federal
ism limitations that apply to laws, then interchangeability exempts
congressional-executive agreements from the limitations imposed by
Article I, Section 8 and the Tenth Amendment. Interchangeability, in
other words, creates a subclass of statutory law that is somehow free
from the restrictions that apply to all other statutes.
Interchangeability provides yet a third way for statutes to escape
the normal limitations on their scope. Treaties, many believe, are not
subject to subject matter limitations in the same manner as statutes.
Under the internationalist approach, the United States can enter into
a treaty on any subject, so long as it is "an agreement between two or
more states or international organizations that is intended to be legally
binding and is governed by international law."265 Drawn from interna
tional law, this definition contains no subject-matter limitations. As
everyday life becomes more closely intertwined with international
events, systems, trends, and markets, and treaties involve not just mili
tary alliances, but individual rights, environment, finance and com
merce, and crime, it will become even more difficult to cordon off a
domestic sphere that shall remain immune from international agree
ment. If internationalists correctly argue that international agreements
can be made on virtually any subject, and if internationalists and trans
formationists are correct that congressional-executive agreements and
treaties are fully interchangeable, then statutes that embody interna
tional agreements can regulate virtually any subject. Lawmakers
would be able to enact statutes that are not limited in subject-matter,
are not limited by Article I, Section S's enumeration of powers, and
are not limited by the Tenth Amendment or federalism. Interchange
ability provides the lawmakers with an almost unrestricted authority
to legislate on any subject.266
265. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 301. Section 301 tracks the definition of
a treaty from Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the United
States has not ratified.
266. While complete interchangeability creates severe textual and structural distortions
in constitutional law, the alternate theory of treaty exclusivity is open to other significant
doubts. Treaty exclusivity proves as equally unable as interchangeability in accounting for
the practice of the political branches in making international agreements. If treaty exclusiv
ity were correct, the United States should never have entered into the Bretton Woods
agreements immediately after World War II, or the more recent string of free trade agree
ments such as NAFTA and the WTO. Further, if exclusivity is to be applied in the future,
America's entry into NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GAIT are unconstitutional and
could be successfully challenged by appropriate plaintiffs in federal court. Concluding that

February 2001)

Laws as Treaties?

821

III. TOWARD A THEORY OF C ONGRESSIONAL-E XECUTIVE
A GREEMENTS

As the previous Parts have shown, the leading academic theories
have failed to provide a satisfying account of the current American
practice toward international agreements. Defenders of interchange
ability sacrifice constitutional coherence - maintaining the structural
integrity of the Constitution while giving each of its provisions force in order to provide a limitless flexibility to the political branches.
Treaty exclusivists, on the other hand, seek a stricter adherence to the
constitutional text and structure, but at the price of rejecting recent
practice, including the legitimacy of the GATT and NAFTA agree
ments. These two approaches seem to set up a classic conflict between
the Constitution and expediency.
This Article will now develop an approach that preserves the con
stitutionality of significant international agreements that take the
statutory form, without causing interchangeability's severe textual and
structural distortions. We can reconcile constitutional text with mod
ern demands by recognizing the distinction drawn by the political
branches themselves. Congress can resort to congressional-executive
agreements in areas over which Congress already possesses plenary
constitutional authority, such as international trade and finance. Trea
ties, however, still remain the required instrument of national policy
when the federal government reaches international agreements on
matters outside of Article I, Section 8, or over which the President and
Congress possess concurrent and potentially conflicting powers. As I
have argued elsewhere, treaties may still be concluded in areas of
Congressional authority, but such treaties must be non-self-executing,
in order to preserve the Constitution's separation of the executive and
legislative powers. The theory developed here is consistent with, and

the treaty constitutes the only method whereby the United States can enter into interna
tional agreements would require us to find that about 80 percent of all of the United States'
current international obligations are constitutionally invalid. Just as interchangeability can
not recognize the distinctions that the political branches apparently have drawn between
treaties and congressional-executive agreements, treaty exclusivity similarly would sweep
aside that line in favor of declaring that all agreements must undergo the treaty form.
Naturally, proponents of treaty exclusivity shy away from such revolutionary implica
tions. Professor Tribe, for example, seeks to save NAFTA and the WTO from the implica
tions of treaty exclusivity through a functional approach. NAFTA and the Uruguay Round
agreement, he argues, are still legitimate ex post because they received more than a two
thirds vote of approval in the Senate. Tribe, supra note 14, at 1227 n.18 & 1276. If a congres
sional-executive agreement received enough supermajoritarian political support to have sur
vived as a treaty, Tribe suggests, we should consider it as a constitutional treaty. This effort
to play fast-and-loose with the Constitution's categories for lawmaking suffers from clear
flaws. If agreements such as NAFTA and the WTO are to remain constitutional, American
foreign relations Jaw requires a different theory of congressional-executive agreements that
stands on firmer footing.

822

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:757

shares the main objectives of, my work defending the doctrine of non
self-executing treaties.
This approach conveys several advantages over interchangeability
and treaty exclusivity. It respects the constitutional text and structure
while also acknowledging recent practice and the importance of
agreements such as GATT and NAFfA. It maintains the Constitu
tion's principle of limited, enumerated powers and its protection for
the sovereignty of the states, as articulated by recent Supreme Court
opinions. It honors the Constitution's separation of powers, specifi
cally the distinction between the legislative and executive powers, by
reserving for legislation matters within Article I, Section 8, and for the
executive treaty power issues outside of those areas. Finally, this the
ory of international agreements makes sense of several apparent in
consistencies in the constitutional structure produced by treaties and
interchangeability: treaty initiation and termination, treaty implemen
tation and non-self-execution, and the scope of treaties and federal
ism.
Section A argues that congressional-executive agreements make
sense as an effort to preserve a clear line between the executive and
legislative powers. Section B draws support for this reading from the
Constitution's text, structure, and history. Section C suggests how this
theory of congressional-executive agreements and treaties works out
in practice.
A. A Theory of Congressional-Executive Agreements
A theory of congressional-executive agreements should take as its
starting point the distinction drawn by the political branches them
selves. As discussed earlier, the executive and legislative departments
have consistently used statutes to enter into international agreements
that address international economic affairs, such as trade agreements,
international financial institutions, and the like. Despite the alleged
constitutional moment in 1945, the President and Senate have re
served the treaty form for significant international obligations in sev
eral areas, such as political/military agreements, arms control, extradi
tion, the environment, and human rights. Examples where the political
branches have overstepped this line are rare.
In observing this distinction, the political branches appear to be
honoring the Constitution's basic division of the executive and legisla
tive powers. The treaty power is an executive power that rests in Arti
cle II, as distinguished from a legislative authority vested in Congress
in Article I, Section 8. Congressional-executive agreements may be
used in the arena of international economic affairs because Congress
has plenary authority over the area under the Foreign Commerce
Clause. If, for example, Congress were to adopt unilaterally the
changes in tariffs, customs laws, or national treatment required by
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NAFfA or the WTO, in the absence of an international agreement, it
would have ample authority to do so pursuant to Article I, Section 8.
Not only are congressional-executive agreements acceptable, but
in areas of Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers, they are - in a
sense - constitutionally required. In order to respect the Constitu
tion's grant of plenary power to Congress, the political branches must
use a statute to implement, at the domestic level, any international
agreement that involves economic affairs. Otherwise, the mere pres
ence of an international agreement would allow the treatymakers to
assume the legislative powers so carefully lodged in Article I for Con
gress. Because internationalists generally believe that most treaties
automatically become federal law without implementing legislation,267
interchangeability produces precisely this incongruity.268 Congres
sional-executive agreements preserve Congress's Article I, Section 8
authority over matters such as international and interstate commerce,
intellectual property, criminal law, and appropriations, by requiring
that regardless of the form of the international agreement, Congress's
participation is needed to implement obligations in those areas.
Intellectual property protections under recent international trade
agreements illustrate this point. Before the Uruguay Round of the
GATT, regulation of the length of patents was a matter of domestic
law. Congress established the period of patents under its plenary Arti
cle I, Section 8 power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."269 Under
an 1861 law, patent terms in the United States ran seventeen years
from the time a patent application received approval. Part of the
WTO agreement, Article 33 of the Agreement on Trade-Related As
pects of Intellectual Property Rights, altered that term of patent pro
tection to twenty years from the time of the filing of a patent applica
tion.270 Just as Congress would have used a statute to change the term

267. See generally, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Origi
nal Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land, " 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095
(1999) (defending the internationalist view); Carlos Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2154 ( 1999) (same).
268. I have argued elsewhere that the text, structure, and history of the Constitution
suggest that the better reading is that most treaties require congressional participation - via
implementing legislation - to take effect in domestic courts. Non-self-execution, as this doc
trine is known, respects - as does the theory of congressional-executive agreements pre
sented here - the distinctions between international agreements and domestic law, and be
tween the executive treaty power and the legislative power. See generally Yoo, Globalism,
supra note 8 (arguing that original understanding supports doctrine of non-self-executing
treaties); Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 10 (arguing that text and structure justify
non-self-execution).
269. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8
270. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, art. 33, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lC,
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of patent protection unilaterally, it used the same instrument to alter
domestic laws in accordance with our international obligations.271
Under a theory of treaty exclusivity, however, the only way for the
United States to have implemented this change was through a super
majority vote of the Senate. Indeed, exclusivity would require the use
of the treaty process even though Congress possesses ample authority
to alter patent terms under its plenary constitutional powers. Congress
could even adopt the twenty-year term unilaterally to bring the United
States into harmony with an international agreement that it has not
joined. But, according to exclusivists, if the nation were to enter into a
formal agreement that achieved the exact same result in substantive
law, the federal government must use the treaty form. Further, if one
adheres to the doctrine of self-executing treaties, treaty exclusivity re
quires that such a treaty be able to override Congress's power to set
the length of patents. As treaties are an executive power under Article
II, this result allows the executive branch to exercise legislative powers
vested by the Constitution in Congress alone.
Using congressional-executive agreements in areas of plenary con
gressional authority avoids this constitutional conflict. Whether Con
gress adopts the new twenty-year period as part of an international
agreement or as merely a change in domestic policy, the instrument is
the same: a statute that receives the support of simple majorities in
both houses of Congress and the signature of the President. This ap
proach, which follows the doctrine of treaty non-self-execution, im
plies that the treatymakers could choose to make a treaty on a subject
within Congress's Article I powers. This theory, however, also re
quires that such a treaty be without domestic effect until implemented
by Congress. In the end, both the treaty and congressional-executive
route would still require a statute to make changes in domestic law
within areas under Congress's Article I competence, thereby preserv
ing congressional authority under Article I.
Viewing congressional-executive agreements in this way helps
clarify the line that separates statutes from treaties. Allowing treaties
to expand into areas regulated by Article I, Section 8 would under
mine the constitutional structure by excluding the most direct popular
representatives in the national government from exercising their con
trol over areas given specifically to Congress. On the other hand, as
Part II argued, allowing congressional-executive agreements to reach
areas outside of Article I, Section 8's enumeration of powers would
undermine the Constitution's vesting of a limited legislative power in
the federal government. With the growing internationalization of doLEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 l.L.M. 81, 96
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
271. Congress created an alternative method for calculating patent terms under in the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
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mestic affairs, merely asserting a foreign relations link or the need to
comply with a multilateral international agreement would prove too
large a loophole for expansive congressional powers. Allowing treaties
directly to regulate subjects outside of congressional powers, while
limiting congressional-executive agreements to matters given to the
legislature alone by Article I, Section 8, would prevent international
agreements from distorting the Constitution's public lawmaking sys
tem.
Following this approach would avoid the severe federalism con
cerns raised by interchangeability. Due to the special role of the Sen
ate, which has a unique interest in defending state prerogatives, the
treaty process provides greater political safeguards for the states than
the regular statutory process.272 Even though the Court's reinvigora
tion of federalism in the last decade has substantially undermined (if
not overruled) Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author
ity,213 the idea that the structure of the national government provides
significant protection for state sovereignty has special force with the
Treaty Clause. Unlike the statutory process, which some scholars be
lieve already provides sufficient political safeguards for federalism,274
the treaty process requires a supermajority vote in the Senate. Only a
constitutional amendment or the override of a presidential veto de
mand as high a degree of consensus in the Senate. This requirement
presumably provides federalism interests with even greater protection
with regard to a treaty than a statute, not only because one-third plus
one of the Senate can stop a treaty, but also because these Senators
can represent an even smaller percentage of the population. Protec
tion of state institutional interests was one of the very reasons why the
Framers preserved the Articles of Confederation's supermajority re
quirement for treaties.275 It seems that practice has borne out these in
tentions, as the Senate has proceeded to attach "federalism" reserva
tions to several recent treaties, limiting their reach to that already
possessed by the national government.276
Treaties usually involve matters of foreign affairs that are of great
national importance, over which the Constitution already centralizes
power in the national government. Putting to one side the serious
272. See CHOPER, supra note 74, at 174-84. While I have criticized the political safe
guards of federalism argument, it was on the ground that the theory erred in claiming that
the safeguards excluded judicial review, not on the notion that the structure of the national
political process itself protects federalism. John Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism,
70 S. CAL. L. REV . 1311, 1380-81 (1997).
273. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
274. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 74, at 176; Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back
into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 233-78 (2000) (arguing

that history supports this view).

275. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2009-13, 2029-32.
276. See id. at 1973-76.
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doubts of legal scholars,277 the Court has observed in cases such as
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. ,278 United States v.
Belmont,279 and United States v. Pink,280 that the Constitution's transfer
of all of the foreign affairs power to the federal government may have
relieved the states of any cognizable interests when international rela
tions are involved.281 National sovereignty in international relations
may allow the federal government to exercise broader powers, vis-a
vis the states, than it could domestically. Even in foreign affairs areas
not specifically delegated to the federal government by the Constitu
tion, as Justice Sutherland asserted in Curtiss-Wright, the states may
have been completely ousted because of the need to unify national
sovereignty in the federal government. As Justice Sutherland later
wrote in Belmont, " [g]overnmental power over internal affairs is dis
tributed between the national government and the several states.
Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is
vested exclusively in the national government."282 While this national
ist view of the foreign affairs power is not free from doubt, the ap
proach developed here would allow such exercises of national sover
eignty to occur through the treaty power, whose supermajority
requirement in the Senate and the limitations of non-self-execution
would harmonize it with the constitutional structure.
This analysis finds that the domestic area open to control only by
treaty is the class of subjects that rests outside of Congress's Article I,
Section 8 powers. While the reach of the Commerce Clause has ex
panded enormously since the New Deal, United States v. Morrison
demonstrates that there are still some matters that Congress cannot

277. See Charles Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An
Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973); Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States
in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 341 (1999).
278. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
279. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
280. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
281 . The absence of constitutional federalism interests on the part of the states in for
eign affairs, however, does not answer the question of what presumption is to be applied in
the absence of an affirmative federal action by the political branches. When the political
branches have chosen not to use their foreign affairs powers, then general federalism consid
erations may re-emerge. Jack Goldsmith has argued that the underpinnings for a dormant
federal foreign affairs pre-emption doctrine are accordingly weak. See generally Jack L.
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617 (1997). He
also has claimed, with his co-author Curtis Bradley, that federal courts are also limited in
creating a federal common law that incorporates customary international law norms. See
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique ofthe Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2260 (1998).
282. 301 U.S. at 330.
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regulate under the Commerce Clause.283 City of Boerne v. Flores
makes clear that Congress's Section 5 enforcement powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment cannot expand definitions of individual con
stitutional rights.284 Printz285, New York286, Seminole Tribe287, and Al
den288 rule out use of the Commerce Clause to overcome certain as
pects of state sovereignty. Nevertheless, Missouri v. Holland indicates
that these areas may still be subject to Article H's treaty power, even if
Congress could not use its Article I powers to pass a domestic statute
on the matter.289 Commentators have been troubled by Holland's ex
pansive language because it seems to assert without any textual basis
that the federal government can act outside of its enumerated pow
ers. 290 In fact, Holland makes sense as an accommodation of the execu
tive treaty power and Article I's vesting of all of the federal legislative
power in Congress. While treaties should not be self-executing in areas
of plenary congressional authority, they should reach areas that lie
outside of congressional powers due to Article I or Tenth Amendment
limits.291 Giving treaties this scope prevents them from infringing upon
Congress's enumerated powers, while also respecting Article Vi's
grant of supremacy effect to treaties over state law.292
This theory explains why the political branches have refused to use
congressional-executive agreements to enter into international human
rights conventions. Interchangeability cannot prevail because of the
constitutional limitations on Congress's enumerated powers to expand
the definition of individual rights that apply against the states. Several
treaties that the United States has ratified alter the definition of cer
tain individual rights contrary to Supreme Court decisions. For exam
ple, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits
the death penalty for crimes committed when the criminal offender
was under the age of eighteen.293 Supreme Court precedent, however,
permits states to execute juvenile offenders for crimes committed as
young as sixteen years old.294 That same treaty sets international stan283. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
284. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
285. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
286. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
287. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
288. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
289. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
290. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 258, at 394 (arguing that federalism limits should be

placed on the "plenary" treaty power).

·

291. See Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 10, at 2249-57.
292. See id. at 2244.
293. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 185, at art. 6(5).
294. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 321 (1978).
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dards against cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment while in prison
that go beyond the Court's reading of the Eighth Amendment.295
Other agreements, such as the International Convention on the Elimi
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which prohibits racial
hate speech,296 similarly would expand individual rights beyond the
Court's interpretation of the Bill of Rights.297
It was once thought that Congress had some authority under Sec
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to participate in the definition of
the substance of individual constitutional rights.298 City of Boerne,
however, made clear that Congress could not use its Section 5 powers
to pursue a definition of constitutional rights at variance with the deci
sions of the Court.299 While we may live in an age when many impor
tant rights are guaranteed by statute, City of Boerne still forbids Con
gress from interfering in areas where the Court has refused to
recognize broader constitutional protections. At most, Congress may
enact only non-substantive, remedial statutes that bear a certain con
gruence and proportionality to violations of constitutional rights by
the states.300 As Professor Gerald Neuman has recently suggested,
however, this limitation on congressional authority may not apply to
the treaty power due to Missouri v. Holland.301 The treaty power,
Justice Holmes indicated, was not just a different procedure for the
exercise of Article l's enumerated power, but was an independent
source of substantive power.
295. See Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United States Ratification
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The International Human Rights Conformity
Act of 1993, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1209, 1216-17 (1993).
296. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina
tion, supra note 188, art. 4, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2, at 1, 3-4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 218-220 (pro
hibiting hate speech). The Supreme Court has found racial hate speech to be protected by
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
297. Several other multilateral human rights treaties similarly would expand individual
rights beyond what the Court has permitted. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, su
pra note 193, would provide children with substantive and procedural rights that they cur
rently lack. The Court has held that family law remains the preserve of state regulation.
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979). Similarly, the Convention on the Elimi
nation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 190, which the United
States has signed but not ratified, also would extend gender discrimination rules to areas that
have been considered the preserve of the states. See Bradley, supra note 258, at 403.
298. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646-47 (1966). See generally Jesse H. Choper,
Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil
War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV. 299 (1982).
299. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Recent cases, such as United States v. Morrison's invalidation
of the Violence Against Women Act, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and College Savings Bank's limita
tion on federal remedies for intellectual property, College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999), demonstrate that City of Boerne was
no one-time event. See also Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
300. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529-36.
301. Neuman, supra note 221, at 1644-45.
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If Missouri v. Holland remains good law, then the political
branches theoretically can use the treaty power to reach the same re
sult as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), without
being limited by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Commerce Clause. Rather than altering the meaning of the Constitu
tion, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, Congress would merely be
implementing a treaty. Indeed, Professor Neuman has argued that
provisions of the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights already create the treaty hook necessary to pass another ver
sion of RFRA.302 Federal regulation of other areas may also require
the treaty form in order to benefit from Missouri v. Holland's sweep.
United States v. Lopez, for example, indicates that Congress can use its
Commerce Clause powers only to regulate activity that either is in in
terstate commerce, is an instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
substantially effects interstate commerce if commercial itself in na
ture.303 Last Term's United States v. Morrison re-emphasized this limit.
Some environmental protection measures thus might encounter con
stitutional difficulties if undertaken solely by Congress's Commerce
Clause power. Current treaties that protect endangered species might
fall outside the Court's current approach to the Commerce Clause,304
as might proposed treaties that would protect biodiversity and estab
lish national quotas for energy use. Only the Treaty Clause might sup
ply a certain source of power to regulate in these areas.305
Treaties also might be necessary in areas over which the executive
and legislative branches have concurrent or overlapping powers. Be
cause unilateral action by one branch cannot bind the other branch as
a constitutional matter, the nation may need to assume an interna
tional obligation by treaty in order to commit both branches. Not sur
prisingly, different elements of the foreign affairs powers may be the
area where treaties are most necessary. As Professor Koh has ob
served, the Constitution often delegates different powers over the
same foreign affairs issue to the two political branches, without speci
fying the relationship between those powers.306 War powers provide a
302. See Neuman, supra note 52, at 49-50. The Senate, however, declared the treaty non
self-executing when it gave its advice and consent, which might bar congressional efforts to
use the ICCPR as authority for a second-generation RFRA statute. This result would occur
not because of a constitutional defect in the scope of the treaty power, but because of the
manner in which the Senate approved the treaty.
303. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
304. See Bradley, supra note 258, at 408.
305. Cf. Gavin R. Villareal, Note, One Leg to Stand On: The Treaty Power and Congres
sional A uthority for the Endangered Species Act After United States v. Lopez, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1125 (1998) (suggesting that treaty power represents the best weapon for defenders of
congressional power to enact the Endangered Species Act).
306. See KOH, supra note 6, at 67 ("One cannot read the Constitution without being
struck by its astonishing brevity regarding the allocation of foreign affairs authority among
the branches.").

830

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 99:757

ready example. The Constitution gives the President the Commander
in-Chief power and the undefined executive power, while vesting in
Congress the sole power to declare war and to raise and fund the mili
tary. Yet, the constitutional text does not clearly state which branch
has the authority to initiate military hostilities. This gap has led me to
argue elsewhere that no constitutionally prescribed method exists for
going to war, but instead that the branches may use their plenary pow
ers either to cooperate or to compete for primacy.307 While the Presi
dent may use the Commander-in-Chief power to send troops into con
flict, Congress may deny him or her the operational or financial means
to engage in hostilities; Congress, however, cannot force the President
to send troops into certain conflicts or deploy them in certain ways.
Neither branch can engage in unilateral action that will result in the
sustained commitment of the United States to make war as part of a
political or military alliance. A treaty, in contrast, allows both
branches with a say to commit themselves to such long-term interna
tional obligations.
We may therefore expect treaties to be used in areas where the
branches possess concurrent powers that require cooperation rather than unilateral congressional or presidential action - for their
consistent exercise. Political/military alliances and arms control are ar
eas where the participation of both the President and a supermajority
of the Senate may be necessary because of the competing allocation of
foreign affairs power. The United States, for example, could not live
up to its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty alliance through
the unilateral actions of the executive or legislature alone. To be sure,
the President could station troops in Europe under the Commander
in-Chief power, and even order them into conflict on his own author
ity.308 Nonetheless, the President has required congressional participa
tion to guarantee that the nation could raise, properly equip, and fund
the large, permanent military forces that have guarded Europe for
more than fifty years. While Congress could pass a statute creating
those armies, it could not constitutionally force the President to de
ploy them to Europe.309 The treaty form provides the appropriate
means to fulfill the nation's obligations under the NATO treaty, be
cause it represents the promise of both the President and a superma
jority of the upper house of the legislature to meet demanding, long
term obligations.
307. Yoo, War Powers, supra note 219, at 296-02; see also John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The
Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1 171-73 (1999);
Yoo, Kosovo, supra note 125, at 1687.
308. See generally Yoo, War Powers, supra note 219. Even if one did not agree that
Presidents can send the military into hostilities without a declaration of war, one might be
lieve that they could do so pursuant to treaty or even international law obligations. See Yoo,
Kosovo, supra note 1 25, at 1719-28 (discussing and criticizing this argument).
309. See Yoo, War Powers, supra note 219.
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Or consider arms control agreements. In the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces treaty with the Soviet Union, the United States agreed
to remove an entire class of nuclear weapons from deployment and to
cease production and refrain from any future flight-testing of certain
missiles and launchers.310 Implementation of this treaty required both
branches to cooperate in the use of their constitutional authorities.
The Commander-in-Chief power controlled the placement and use of
existing missiles such as the Pershing II, which President Reagan had
deployed to Western Europe in the early 1980s, as well as the poten
tial conversion of other weapons systems into intermediate-range
weapons. Legislative participation was necessary to guarantee that
Congress would not authorize or fund the development of future in
termediate-range nuclear weapons. A similar analysis may be applied
to the START treaties, which require the elimination of some existing
nuclear weapons and the commitment to ceilings on American nuclear
force structures.311 Contrast these treaties with a trade agreement such
as NAFTA or the WTO. Congress could bring domestic law into com
pliance with NAFTA or the WTO in the absence of any agreement, or
even in the face of presidential opposition. For trade, a congressional
executive agreement, or statute, is all that is needed.312
B.

Solving the Conflict Between Articles I and II

This Article's analysis of international agreements does more than
explain the subject-matter-based distinction drawn by practice be
tween congressional-executive agreements and treaties. It also solves
many of the severe distortions in the constitutional text and structure
wrought by interchangeability and treaty exclusivity. On the one hand,
as we have seen, interchangeability allows the legislative power not
only to subsume executive functions, but also to escape the limitations
imposed by Article I, Section 8. Treaty exclusivity, on the other hand,
ultimately fails because it creates irreconcilable conflicts between the
treaty power and the legislative power. Although the treaty power
fundamentally remains an executive one, several developments such as the rise of globalization, the doctrine of self-execution, and
relaxed structural limits on treaties - threaten to give the treaty
power a sweeping legislative dimension. Executive assumption of leg
islative power assaults the Constitution's vesting of all legislative
power in Congress, and it undermines constitutional structures that
promote popular sovereignty.
310. Treaty between the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. on the Elimination
of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, supra note 170.
311. See The START II Treaty, supra note 176; The START I Treaty, supra note 176.
312. Other areas within the President's Article II powers may be handled by a sole ex
ecutive agreement, such as international claims settlement.
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Congressional-executive agreements avoid this conflict by con
tinuing to reserve to the legislature the power to regulate those areas
given to it under Article I, Section 8, but allowing ample room for
treaties to operate outside that field. This Part will develop this ap
proach by examining the original understanding of the treaty power
and its relationship to the legislative power, by demonstrating how the
congressional-executive agreement has actually served to defend the
federal legislative power from encroachment by the executive, and by
showing how this theory of international agreements harmonizes with
the American public lawmaking system.
1.

The Original Understanding

Maintaining a line between statutes and treaties finds support in
the original understanding of the Constitution. Separation of the leg
islative and executive powers underlay the Framers' general approach
to the constitutional allocation of the foreign affairs power. A century
of struggle between Crown and Parliament had taught the framing
generation that the power to legislate served as an important check
upon the executive's activities in foreign affairs.313 They continued this
distinction, established by the British constitution, during the revolu
tionary period, culminating in the division of the treaty and legislative
powers during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. While
this Article is not the place to conduct a thorough review of the consti
tutional history of foreign affairs during the British colonial and early
national periods,314 several episodes illustrate the Framers' under
standing that the legislative power and the treaty power were to oc
cupy separate spheres in domestic law.
First, by the middle of the eighteenth century, the British political
and constitutional system had established the norm that treatymaking
and domestic lawmaking were to remain distinct and separate. Famil
iar authorities on the British constitution, such as John Locke,
Montesquieu, and William Blackstone, envisioned a foreign affairs
power vested in the executive that could not exercise the authority to
establish domestic rules of conduct, which they considered the essence
of the legislative power.315 Both Locke's and Montesquieu's separation
313. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 1982-2091 (reviewing evidence from the origi
nal understanding regarding the difference between the legislative and treaty powers).
314. I have attempted such a study elsewhere, see id. , although in regard to the different
question of self-executing treaties. Professors Martin Flaherty and Carlos Vazquez have
criticized different aspects of this historical analysis, see generally Flaherty, supra note 267;
Vazquez, supra note 267, to which I have responded in Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note
10, at 2221-33.
315. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 143-47 (J.W.
Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1947) (1690); 1 M. DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU,
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. 11, ch. 6, at 196-210 (trans., 4th ed. 1768) (1748); 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160-*161, *252-*253, *257, *270.

February 2001]

Laws as Treaties?

833

of powers theories, which defined the function of representing the na
tion in its international relations as distinct from that of enacting rules
of conduct, and Blackstone's balanced government approach, which
saw the legislative power as a check on the executive, established that
the foreign affairs power was not to intrude upon the legislative
authority. Recent British political history reinforced these lessons.
During the struggles between Crown and Parliament in the seven
teenth century, the latter had successfully used its exclusive powers
over funding and legislation to control the King's efforts in treaty
making.316 By the time of the framing, the British political system had
reached a constitutional settlement in which the Crown's exclusive
prerogative over treatymaking was checked by Parliament's absolute
authority to make domestic law. This accommodation became a cen
tral element of the British Constitution's system of checks and bal
ances and of the rise of parliamentary government.
Second, experience during the colonial and revolutionary period
confirmed that the foreign affairs power and domestic legislation were
to remain separate spheres. Mirroring the division of powers between
King and Parliament, London unilaterally controlled the external
powers of war and treaty, while avoiding interference with the colonial
assemblies' management of internal affairs.317 From a constitutional
perspective, one can view the American Revolution as the colonies'
rejection of London's efforts to use its foreign affairs power to assume
more direct legislative power. With the Revolution, Americans trans
ferred the Crown's imperial powers to the Articles of Confederation
Congress, while the legislative power remained dispersed among the
states.318 Just as the Crown required Parliament's consent to fund and
implement treaties, so too the Continental Congress remained pow
erless to legislate directly without state cooperation. This division of
authority produced debilitating foreign affairs crises, such as the fail
ure by the states to honor the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain,
316. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 1997-04. Summarizing the British approach to
treaties and public lawmaking, English legal historian Frederick Maitland observed: "Sup
pose the queen contracts with France that English iron or coal shall not be exported to
France - until a statute has been passed forbidding exportation, one may export and laugh
at the treaty." F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 425 (H.A.L.
Fisher ed., 1961) (1908); see also id. at 424-25; 10 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 373-74 (1938); 11 id. at 253, 268.
317. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 217-29 (1967); JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITU
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT JN THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE
UNITED STATES 1607-1788, at 19-43 (1986); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE 126-41 (1991).
318. See JERRILYN GREENE MARSTON, KING AND CONGRESS: THE TRANSFER OF
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, 1774-1776, at 303-04 (1987); Eugene R. Sheridan & John M. Mur
rin, Introduction to CONGRESS AT PRINCETON: BEING THE LETTERS OF CHARLES
THOMSON TO HANNAH THOMSON JUNE-OCTOBER 1783, at xi, xxxiv-xxxviii (Eugene R.
Sheridan & John M. Murrin eds., 1985).
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which led many of the Framers to seek a stronger national govern
ment.319 While some, such as John Jay and Alexander Hamilton, be
lieved that the answer was to give all treaties self-executing effect as
domestic law, others such as James Madison sought to create a truly
national legislative power that could implement treaties directly.320 Be
cause "a unanimous and punctual obedience of thirteen independent
bodies, to the acts of the federal Government, ought not be calculated
on," Madison wrote in a memo just before the Philadelphia Conven
tion, the national government needed the power to operate directly
upon individuals without the intervention of the States.321
Evidence from the ratification of the Constitution further indicates
that the treaty power was not to intrude into Congress's legislative
authority. When the Constitution went to the States, Anti-Federalists
initially seized on the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses for improperly
vesting legislative power in an aristocratic body like the Senate. 322
George Mason's influential Objections to the Constitution echoed the
claims of other widely publicized Anti-Federalists writers, such as the
"Federal Framer" and "Brutus": "By declaring all Treaties supreme
Laws of the Land, the Executive & the Senate have, in many Cases, an
exclusive Power of Legislation . . . ."323 In order to maintain the sepa
ration of lawmaking and treatymaking, Mason argued, the approval of
the House of Representatives ought to be necessary before any treaty
could have legislative effect. Anti-Federalists repeated similar claims
in significant ratification conventions in Pennsylvania and Virginia.324
Federalists responded throughout the ratification process that the
separation of the legislative power in Article I from the treaty power
in Article II would respect the traditional Anglo-American distinction
between treaties and laws. In Pennsylvania, James Wilson answered
the Anti-Federalist charges by referring to the Crown's need to seek
parliamentary cooperation in any treaties that changed domestic laws.

319. See FREDERICK w. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 52-95 (1973).
320. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2016-24.
321. See VICES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES (Apr. 1787), re
printed in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 345, 351 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975).
322. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2040-43; see, e.g., GEORGE MASON, MASON'S
OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT FORMED BY THE CONSTITUTION
(Oct. 7, 1787), reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 348, 350 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds. 1981) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY].
323. MASON, supra note 322, at 350; see also LETTER IV FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER
(Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 322, at 42, 43-44;
BRUTUS II (Nov. 1 , 1787), reprinted in 13 id. at 524, 529.
324. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2043-48, 2059-68.
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He then asked "And will not the same thing take place here?"325 In
New York, Alexander Hamilton as Publius argued that treaties were
not legislative in nature:
The essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws, or in other
words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society; while the exe
cution of the laws and the employment of the common strength, either
for this purpose or for the common defence, seem to comprise all the
functions of the executive magistrate. The power of making treaties is,

plainly, neither the one nor the other. It relates neither to the execution
of the subsisting laws nor to the enaction of new ones; and still less to an

exertion of the common strength. Its objects are CONTRACTS with for
eign nations which have the force of law, but derive it from the obliga
tions of good faith. They are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the
subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign. The power in
question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong
properly neither to the legislative nor to the executive.326

Hamilton's co-author followed a similar line in the all-important
Virginia ratifying convention. Managing the response to Anti
Federalist leaders Patrick Henry, Mason, and James Monroe, Madison
circulated talking points that urged Federalist delegates to emphasize
the House's control over domestic legislation. "It is true that this
branch is not of necessity to be consulted in the forming of Treaties,"
Madison admitted, but nonetheless its "approbation and co-operation
may often be necessary in carrying treaties into full effect."327 Because
of the House's monopoly over funding and legislation, Madison ar
gued, it would have the same check on treaties that Parliament en
joyed in Great Britain. " [A]s the support of the Government and of
the plans of the President & Senate in general must be drawn from the
purse which [the House of Representatives] hold[s],'' he explained,
"the sentiments of this body cannot fail to have very great weight,
even when the body itself may have no constitutional authority."328
Relying upon these arguments in the convention debates, Madison
and his Federalist colleague, George Nicholas, answered Anti
Federalist concerns by analogizing the practical workings of the na
tional government to the British system, in which the House of Com-

325. The Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 322, at 550, 563.

326. THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in id. at 481, 482.
327. Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in id. at 804, 808.
328. Id; see also id. at 809 ("[U]nder the new System every Treaty must be made by 1.
the authority of the Senate in which the States are to vote equally. 2. that of the President
who represents the people & the States in a compounded ratio. and 3. under the influence of
the H. of Reps. who represent the people alone.").
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mons' control over domestic law "gives them such influence that [it]
can dictate in what manner [treaties] shall be made."329
Two other pieces of evidence from the Framing period also suggest
that those who ratified the Constitution understood that the treaty
power could not infringe on Congress's legislative powers. First, to
ward the end of the ratification debates in the press, some leading
Anti-Federalists appeared to accept the arguments of Wilson, Hamil
ton, and Madison. One of the earliest critics of the Treaty Clause, the
Federal Farmer, moderated his public views later in the debate. "On a
fair construction of the constitution," he wrote in a subsequent set of
essays, "I think the legislature has a proper controul over the presi
dent and senate in settling commercial treaties."330 Recognizing that
the treaty power and Congress's power over international commerce
could come into conflict, the Federal Farmer observed that:
As to treaties of commerce, they do not generally require secrecy, they
almost always involve in them legislative powers, interfere with the laws
and internal police of the country, and operate immediately on persons
and property, especially in the commercial towns: (they have in Great
Britain usually been confirmed by Parliament;) they consist of rules and
regulations respecting commerce; and to regulate commerce, or to make
regulations respecting commerce, the federal legislature, by the constitu
tion, has the power. I do not see that any commercial regulations can be
made in treaties, that will not infringe upon this power in the legislature;
therefore, I infer, that the true construction is, that the president and
senate shall make treaties; but all commercial treaties shall be subject to
be confirmed by the legislature. This construction will render the clauses
consistent, and make the powers of the president and senate, respecting
treaties, much less exceptionable.331

Consensus between Federalists and Anti-Federalists on how to har
monize the Treaty Clause and Congress's plenary powers should not
be taken lightly. In accepting Federalist arguments about the limited
nature of the treaty power, the Federal Farmer essentially adopted the
same view that Federalists had used to prevail in the major ratifying
states. Because treaties could not exercise Congress's legislative pow
ers, the most populous branch enjoyed the means to check the designs
of the treatymakers.
Second, experience during the early years of the Republic suggests
that the political branches accepted this reading of the constitutional
structure. In 1795, the Senate approved the controversial Jay Treaty,
which settled several outstanding issues causing friction in Anglo329. George Nicholas, Debates - The Virginia Convention, June 13, 1788, in 10 id. at
1228, 1251; see Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2059-68 (recounting Virginia ratifying con
vention's debates on Treaty Clause).
330. LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XI, May 2, 1788, reprinted in 17
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 322, at 301, 309.
331. Id. at 309-10.
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American relations.332 Parts of the Jay Treaty involved appropriations
as well as the treatment of British shipping and goods.333 Federalists
argued that Congress had a constitutional duty to implement the
treaty; the treaty power, leaders such as Alexander Hamilton argued,
could exercise any power delegated to Congress in Article I. In the
"Defence," Hamilton claimed that " [e]ach house of Congress collec
tively as well as the members of it separately are under a constitu
tional obligation to observe the injunctions of a [treaty) and to give it
effect. "334 Assisted by the new Jeffersonian congressmen Albert
Gallatin, Madison reiterated the theory he had propounded during the
ratification - that the treaty power remained limited by Congress's
legislative authority - and turned to the original understanding itself
for support. Speaking before the House, Madison declared that he
would only appeal to the Committee [of the Whole] to decide whether it
did not appear, from a candid and collected view of the debates in those
Conventions, and particularly in that of Virginia, that the Treaty-making
power was a limited power; and that the powers in our Constitution, on
this subject bore an analogy to the powers on the same subject in the
Government of Great Britain. He wished, as little as any member could,
to extend the analogies between the two Governments; but it was clear
that the constituent parts of two Governments might be perfectly het
erogeneous, and yet the powers be similar.335

Following Madison's lead, the House resolved, fifty-seven to thirty
four, that "when a Treaty stipulates regulations on any of the subjects
submitted by the Constitution to the power of Congress, it must de
pend, for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a law or laws to be
passed by Congress. "336
To be sure, the Framers could not have anticipated the great ex
plosion in international agreements today, nor could they have fore
seen the leading role that America would take in world affairs. They
did, however, consider the potential conflict between making treaties
332. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 200. The policy and
politics of the Jay Treaty are discussed in SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY: A STUDY
IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY (rev. ed. 1962) (1923); JERALD A. COMBS, THE JAy
TREATY: POLITICAL BATTLEGROUND OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1970); and ELKINS &
MCKITRICK, supra note 66, at 375-449.
333. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD 1789-1801, at 210-17 (1997) (providing a description of the constitutional debates in
Congress over the Jay Treaty).
334. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE DEFENCE No. XXXVI (Jan. 2, 1976), reprinted in
20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 3, 4 (Harold c. Syrett ed., 1974) [hereinafter
THE HAMILTON PAPERS). Hamilton argued that reading the treaty power as limited by con
gressional authority would make it impossible for the nation to enter into treaties. See also
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE DEFENCE No. XXXVII (Jan. 6, 1796), reprinted in 20 id. at
13, 16-22.
335. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 777 (1796).
336. Id. at 771.
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binding upon the nation, in a way that they had not been under the
Articles of Confederation, and vesting the federal legislative power in
Congress alone. The Framers resolved this tension by returning to the
traditional Anglo-American separation between legislating and
treatymaking. Current practice by the political branches concerning
congressional-executive agreements honors this original understand
ing. While the branches continue to use treaties in areas of congres
sional incompetence or overlapping executive and legislative powers,
they have used the statutory process to enact international agreements
that involve Congress's core Article I, Section 8 powers. This ar
rangement maintains the balance between the executive and legisla
tive branches, and it ensures that the people's most direct representa
tives have the primary hand in enacting domestic rules of conduct.
2.

Congressional-Executive Agreements as a Defense of the
Legislative Power

Reserving areas within Article I, Section S's ambit for approval by
congressional-executive agreement, rather than by treaty, preserves
textual and structural elements of the Constitution and promotes the
original understanding. Consider the ramifications of an alternate ap
proach that would make treaties the exclusive method for making in
ternational agreements. First, treaties remain an executive power that
excludes the branch most directly accountable to the people, the
House of Representatives. Second, unlike statutes, treaties have no
defined subject matter, which means that the treatymakers can enter
into an international agreement on any matter, regardless of whether
the Constitution grants control over it to another branch. Third, most
internationalist legal scholars believe that treaties are generally self
executing - if their terms are clear, treaties do not require imple
menting legislation by Congress, but instead are to be automatically
enforced by the courts.337 Congressional-executive agreements, on the
other hand, promote democracy by infusing foreign policymaking with
House participation. Their use guarantees that the same lawmaking
process will apply to laws that have the same effect in regulating do
mestic conduct.

337. See, e.g., HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 201; Lori Fisler Damrosch,
The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing"
Treaties, in PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION IN THE MAKING AND OPERATION OF

TREATIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 205, 217-18 (Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M.
Abbott eds., 1994); Flaherty, supra note 267; Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM.
J. INT'L L. 760, 760 (1988); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and
U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, 896-901 (1980); Carlos Manuel
Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 111314, 1 121-22 (1992).
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Because of its placement in Article II, the treaty power remains an
executive power. Some have read Article II to constitute a broad grant
of power because of Article Ill's parallel vesting clause and Article I's
narrower, enumerated vesting clause.338 In keeping with this observa
tion, the powers enumerated in Article II, Section 2, such as the pow
ers to command the military, to issue pardons, and to execute the laws,
must be (and traditionally have been considered to be), executive in
nature. When Article II includes the Senate in the operation of these
functions, such as the making of treaties or the appointment of federal
judges and officers, it does not transform these clauses into legislative
powers.
The Senate's inclusion in treatymaking and appointments - pow
ers held exclusively by the British Crown - represents instead an ef
fort to dilute the unitary nature of the executive branch.339 In this re
spect, the treaty power's division between President and Senate
reflected the practice of the Revolution-era state constitutions, which
had sought to control executive power not by re-allocating to the leg
islature the powers of war, peace, and appointment, but by disrupting
the unity and independence of the executive branch.340 While the Con
stitution may reduce executive power in favor of the legislature when
compared with the British constitution, it nowhere transfers what were
considered legislative powers to Article II.
This is not to say that the executive branch does not enjoy some
legislative power. When the Constitution, however, grants the Presi
dent a power that is legislative in nature, it does so in Article I, not Ar
ticle II. Thus, the Constitution grants the President a conditional veto
over legislation in Article I, Section 7, not Article II, Section 2. While
no one can deny that the executive branch also makes law through
administrative regulations, this lawmaking occurs due to the delega
tion of authority by Congress, subject to clear and manageable stan
dards.341 Similarly, when the federal courts exercise lawmaking
authority, under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp kins,342 this interstitial gap338. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 44, at 570-71 (claiming that the vesting clause
creates a reservoir of unenumerated executive power). But see Lessig & Sunstein, supra note
132 (taking a contrary view); Flaherty, supra note 132 (same).
339. This point was first made by Alexander Hamilton in his "Pacificus" essays defend
ing the constitutionality of President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation. See, e.g. ,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, PACIFICUS No. I (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE HAMILTON
PAPERS, supra note 334, at 33, 39.
340. See Yoo, War Powers, supra note 219, at 222-28; WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 271-75 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., 1980)
(1973); CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789: A STUDY
IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 34-54 (1922).
341. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 442-47 (1998); Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
342. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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filling role must be authorized by federal law.343 The Constitution de
lineates the President's lawmaking role in Article I, rather than Article
II, because Article I contains the finely balanced method for making
federal laws. The Constitution centralizes all public lawmaking into
such a tortuous process specifically to make the exercise of legislative
authority more difficult, thereby protecting the states and the people
from unwarranted exercises of federal power.344 Hence Article I de
clares that "all Legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States," and nowhere else.
All of this detail indicates that the constitutional text resists the no
tion that an "independent, free-standing presidential law-making
authority exists insofar as the rights of American citizens are con
cerned," as Professor Monaghan has put it.345 The executive power
vested in the President by Article II, Section 1 is characterized by, as
Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 75 , "the execution of the laws and
the employment of the common strength," which, he believed, "seem
to comprise all the functions of the executive magistrate."346 Hamilton
had distinguished this power from the legislative power, "the essence"
of which "is to enact laws, or in other words to prescribe rules for the
regulation of the society. "347 In the few cases addressing this distinc
tion, the Supreme Court has continued to define the executive power
by its very lack of the power to make laws. "In the framework of our
constitution," the Court declared in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully exe
cuted refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."348 Whether one
believes in a "law-enforcement,"349 "protective power,"350 or a broader
inherent power model of the presidency,351 none of these theories rec
ognizes an executive authority to legislate upon the domestic legal
rights and duties of American citizens without congressional authori-

343. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 895-96 (1986); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie
And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405-07 (1964); Larry Kramer,
The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 287 (1992); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Common Law Powers ofFederal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 (1985); Henry
P. Monaghan, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 889, 892 (1974) (book review).
-

344. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
345. Monaghan, supra note 231, at 4.
346. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 326, at 482.
347. Id.
348. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
349. Monaghan, supra note 231, at 10.
350. Id. at 11.
351. See generally Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 44.
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zation. Allowing the President and Senate, through the treaty power,
to exercise powers allocated by the Constitution to Congress would
step over this line.
Using the statutory form to make international agreements that
regulate matters within Congress's Article I powers avoids conflict be
tween the textual grants of the executive and legislative power to dif
ferent branches of government. According to internationalists, the
President and Senate may resort to the treaty process to address any
matter, so long as it is "an agreement between two or more states or
international organizations that is intended to be legally binding and is
governed by international law. "352 °If treaties are this unlimited in sub
ject-matter, and if they also are self-executing, then the treatymakers
can regulate any area - even one that lies within the enumerated
powers of Congress. Under this approach, a self-executing treaty could
make certain actions federal crimes or establish new commercial or
environmental regulations, despite Congress's power over both mat
ters domestically. As the line between domestic and international mat
ters disintegrates, and as the United States turns to multilateral inter
national agreements to address problems that were once domestic in
scope, treaties potentially could replace statutes as a primary vehicle
for domestic regulation. For example, if an international agreement,
such as the GATI, required that the United States make adjustments
to its rules governing intellectual property or modify its regulation of
foods and drugs, internationalists would conclude that the treaty
makers could enact these changes directly under their Treaty Clause
authority. Internationalists agree with this result, even when there is
no doubt that, in the absence of a treaty, the President and Senate
could not achieve the same result without the participation of the
House.353
This approach threatens to read out of the Constitution Article I's
vesting of legislative powers in Congress alone. It invites conflict be
tween the treaty power and the legislative power, and it resolves this
clash by allowing one clause of the Constitution essentially to trump
the other. Further, the exclusivist position too easily removes the
House from its constitutional role in domestic policymaking and cre
ates an inviting loophole for an expansive use of the treaty power.
Recognizing these problems, the Restatement and leading internation
alist scholars admit that treaties cannot take direct effect as American
law if legislation is "constitutionally required."354 Both Professor
Henkin and the Restatement concede that legislation appears to be
352. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 301(1). See also Damrosch, supra note
52, at 530.
353. See, e.g. , HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 194-98; Paust, supra note
337, at 776-81.
354. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 1 1 1 (4)(c).
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necessary to implement a treaty if the international agreement calls
for a declaration of war, an appropriation of money, the raising of
taxes, or the punishment of criminal conduct.355 Neither, however,
provides any principle that distinguishes those areas that are to be re
served to statutes from the other powers that are subject to the treaty
power. The constitutional text, which treats all of these powers in Ar
ticle I, Section 8, certainly does not make any distinctions among
them.356
Indeed, if internationalists are correct in arguing that a treaty can
exercise a single Article I, Section 8 power granted to Congress, then
the treatymakers must be able to exercise all of Congress's legislative
powers. If the President and the Senate, for example, can use a treaty
to establish commercial regulations or intellectual property rules,
there is no textual reason that should prevent a treaty from declaring
war or establishing criminal punishments. Internationalist efforts to
preserve congressional control over appropriations, war declaration,
and crimes, makes even less sense in light of the absence of any consti
tutional provision vesting Congress with a power to enact general fed
eral criminal laws. As most federal criminal laws must be based upon
the Commerce Clause, the Henkin/Restatement distinction collapses,
as these authorities agree that the treatymakers can exercise the
Commerce Clause power without resort to a statute. The internation
alists fail to provide any reason rooted in the constitutional text or
structure why treaties can establish trade regulations but cannot enact
criminal laws.
A logic that would make treaties the exclusive means of making in
ternational agreements, combined with standard internationalist theo
ries of the treaty power, leads to the conclusion that the treatymakers
can exercise virtually any and all of the federal government's legisla
tive powers. This conclusion is fundamentally at odds with the Consti
tution's reservation of legislative authority to a popularly elected Con
gress. As Madison declared during the Jay Treaty debates, "if the
Treaty-power alone could perform any one act for which the authority
of Congress is required by the Constitution, it may perform every act
for which the authority of that part of the Government is required."357
Madison further argued that if by treaty "the President and Senate can
regulate Trade; they can also declare war; they can raise armies to
355. See id. at § 1 1 1 cmt. i & reporters' note 6; HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFA I RS supra note
6, at 203.
356. The one exception is the Appropriations Clause, which declares: "No Money shall
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Professor Henkin and the Restatement admit that use of the term
"by Law" indicates that appropriations can only be made by a statute, rather than by a
treaty. This reading, however, undermines their approach to the Supremacy Clause, which is
built on the idea that a treaty is the constitutional equivalent of a "Law."
,

357. Speech by James Madison on Jay's Treaty, supra note 234, at 258.
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carry on war; and they can procure money to support armies."358
Madison believed that this result demonstrated that the treaty power
could not be read so far as to enjoy legislative authority, because the
Constitution vested Article I, Section 8's powers in Congress specifi
cally to ensure that the House played a determinative role in their ex
ercise. " [A]lthough the Constitution had carefully & jealously lodged
the power of war, of armies, of the purse &c. in Congress, of which the
immediate representatives of the people, formed an integral part,''
Madison observed, an exclusivist theory of treaties meant that the:
President

& Senate by means of Treaty of Alliance with a nation at war,

might make the United States parties in the war: they might stipulate
subsidies, and even borrow money to pay them: they might furnish
Troops, to be carried to Europe, Asia or Africa: they might even under
take to keep up a standing army in time of peace, for the purpose of co
operating, on given contingences [sic) , with an Ally.359

Some internationalists wisely concede that only Congress can exer
cise certain powers, such as appropriations and taxation. The exclusion
of these areas from the general rule of self-execution makes sense
when viewed as a matter of democratic policymaking. Clearly, matters
such as declaring war, raising taxes, and imposing criminal penalties
are some of the most vital exercises of the legislative power, and they
have never been thought to lie with the judiciary or executive.360 This
principle, however, also argues against allowing the treatymakers to
transfer to themselves any of the powers vested exclusively in Con
gress under Article I, Section 8, because the Constitution itself does
not textually distinguish among those powers. As Madison said during
the Jay Treaty debates, " [t]hese powers, however different in their na
ture or importance, are on the same footing in the Constitution, and
must share the same fate."361 Only by requiring congressional
executive agreements in areas that involve Congress's powers, or by
adopting a presumption that treaties are non-self-executing, can this
conflict between Articles I and II be resolved.
3.

Congressional-Executive Agreements as Public Lawmaking

Maintaining the line between executive and legisla\ive power, be
tween treatymaking and lawmaking, better accords not just with the
358. Id.
359. Id. at 258-59. To prevent a permanent military establishment, Madison argued, the
Constitution had vested appropriations in Congress and subjected military appropriations to
a two-year limit, which intentionally coincided with the two-year cycle for House elections.
"This is a most important check & security agst. the danger of standing armies, & against the
prosecution of a war beyond its rational objects." Id. at 260.
360. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 69 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (ar
guing that the power of taxation is beyond the authority of the judicial branch).
361. Speech by James Madison on Jay's Treaty, supra note 234, at 258.
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constitutional text and structure, but also with the Constitution's sys
tem of democratic governance and popular sovereignty. In domestic
spheres of activity, the Constitution grants the power to legislate to
the federal government through the institution of Congress. The Con
stitution promotes the idea that when the government imposes rules of
conduct on private individuals, those rules ought to be made by their
most directly accountable representatives. This principle of popular
sovereignty seems to demand that Congress usually participate in the
promulgation of international agreements that require individuals to
act or not act in certain ways, just as Congress is the dominant institu
tional force in the enactment of domestic laws that have the same ef
fect. As modern treaties begin to encompass matters such as econom
ics, industrial and environmental activity, individual liberties, and
other areas that have usually been the preserve of domestic legislation,
congressional-executive agreements impose the same process on the
same subjects, regardless of whether the impulse for regulation comes
from domestic or international sources.
Congressional-executive agreements promote democratic govern
ment in the public lawmaking process as it relates to international
matters. Use of the statutory process requires the consent of the most
directly democratic part of the government, the House of Representa
tives, before the nation can regulate domestic matters through interna
tional agreements. The treaty process allows a minority of Senators,
representing perhaps even a smaller minority of the national popula
tion, to block international agreements.362 This point also has a flip
side. While perhaps unlikely, it is also possible under the treaty proc
ess for two-thirds of the Senate to force the nation to enter into a
treaty without the support of the majority of the people. According to
recent population estimates, two-thirds of the Senate can represent as
little as thirty-two percent of the population. If the sixteen most
populous states opposed a treaty, producing thirty-two Senate votes
out of one-hundred, they would represent 185.6 million of the nation's
estimated 272.7 million people, or sixty-eight percent of the popula
tion.363 To be sure, the presence of a popularly elected President pro
vides a safeguard against the chances of an anti-majoritarian treaty,
but presidential participation is not a complete protection for majority
rule, particularly once a President enters his or her second term. Es
tablishing a process in which the House's prerogatives over domestic

362. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 872.
363. According to the Bureau of the Census, in 1999 the sixteen most populous states
were (in millions of people): California: 33.l; Texas 20.0; New York 18.2; Florida 15.1;
Illinois 12.1; Pennsylvania 12.0; Ohio 1 1 .3; Michigan 9.9; New Jersey 8.1; Georgia 7.8; North
Carolina 7.7; Virginia 6.9; Massachusetts 6.2; Indiana 5.9; Washington 5.8; Missouri 5.5.
These figures are taken from Census Bureau estimates, available at http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2001 )
.
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legislation are preserved by the congressional-executive agreement
provides yet another security for popular sovereignty.
In addition, the reasons that existed in the eighteenth century for
excluding the House from the making of international agreements no
longer seem as compelling as they once were. In deciding to commit
treaties to the President and Senate, the Framers believed that the
House was too numerous and unstable to participate in the secrecy re
quired for diplomacy. Hamilton's comment in Federalist No. 75 was
typical Federalist thinking: "The fluctuating, and taking its future in
crease into the account, the multitudinous composition of that body,
forbid us to expect in it those qualities which are essential to the
proper execution of such a trust."364 Today, however, the Senate has
about fifty percent more members than the first House of Representa
tives envisioned by the Constitution, suggesting that the Senate no
longer has the small numbers that the Framers believed necessary for
successful diplomacy.365 Incumbency retention rates in the House,
which regularly reach ninety percent, also suggest that the House may
enjoy more stability, particularly in its committees and leadership,
than the Framers might have anticipated.366 Aside from the treaty pro
cess, the House today can play an equal role to the Senate in foreign
policy, with committees on international relations, national security,
and intelligence that routinely handle sensitive information.
Furthermore, the Senate never assumed the active role in foreign
policy that some Framers may have anticipated. President Washing
ton's attempt in the first year of the Republic to consult with the sit
ting Senate on a potential treaty proved unsuccessful; the Senate
proved too numerous and unwieldy to provide much help with diplo
matic negotiations.367 Rather than before-the-fact advice, the Senate's
formal role in treatymaking has become one of after-the-fact consent,
a function that does not especially demand small numbers. The Presi
dent and the executive branch are responsible for setting foreign pol
icy goals and maintaining confidentiality during the conduct of nego
tiations. Even if the Senate possessed some superiority in diplomacy
over the House, the nature of the multilateral, regulatory treaties that
make the most legislative demands do not require secrecy or speed of
action. It is those treaties that have the least domestic regulatory ef
fect, such as arms control or military alliance agreements, which de
mand the most secrecy. Requiring that international agreements with
the most domestic regulatory effect undergo approval by statute
364. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 326, at 483.
365. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (indicating that the first House of Representatives
was to have 65 members).
366. See NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS, 1997-1998, at
47-49, 64-65 (1998).
367. The episode is described in ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 66, at 55-58.
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would have little impact on the nation's ability to negotiate these types
of compacts.
Mandating that treaties serve as the exclusive method for making
international agreements, on the other hand, would generate tension
in the public lawmaking process. Just as complete interchangeability
creates textual and structural difficulties by importing certain doc
trines that applied only to statutes into the foreign policy making pro
cess, so too does treaty exclusivity disrupt the finely tuned statutory
methods for regulating domestic affairs. Allowing treaties to exercise
legislative power would shift the locus of lawmaking from the legisla
ture to the executive branch. Laws begin in Congress, where they are
introduced by Members and referred to committees that hold hearings
to investigate the issue, markup any legislation, and serve a gatekeep
ing function in controlling the flow of legislation to the floor. After re
ceiving approval by the committees, statutes must receive the approval
of both houses of Congress; differences in the bills must be worked out
by a conference between the House and Senate. If the President ve
toes the bill, both houses can still enact the legislation by two-thirds
vote. Courts enforce the statute in keeping with the intentions of Con
gress, whether expressed in the statutory text or the legislative history.
Although the President surely has a significant political role in the ini
tiation and enactment of legislation, the institutional weight behind
domestic policymaking gives Congress at least an equal, if not domi
nant, role in the passage of statutes.
Using treaties to perform the same function as statutes has two ef
fects on the public lawmaking process. First, although the Constitution
provides for a Senate "advice and consent" function, this role has be
come one of after-the-fact consent. The President, not the Senate, de
cides whether to negotiate with other countries and on what subjects.
It is the executive branch, rather than the House or Senate, which
conducts the negotiations and actually concludes the treaty. Indeed,
the Constitution forbids Congress from sending its own representa
tives in foreign negotiations because of the President's plenary power
to appoint and receive ambassadors.368 Further, the Court has read the
Constitution to vest the President with the plenary power to serve as
the "sole organ" of the nation in its foreign relations.369 As I argue
elsewhere, the President takes the primary role in enforcing treaties,
and it is often his understanding, as expressed to the Senate during the
advice and consent process, that counts in future interpretation of the

368. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President "by and with the Advice and Con
sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors"); id. art. II, § 3 (President "shall receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers").
369. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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treaty.370 The executive's dominance of the treaty process makes sense
because the President - rather than the Senate - is charged with the
bulk of the foreign affairs power, the President controls the conduct of
diplomacy, and the President serves as Commander-in-Chief. De
mands for flexibility, speed, and unity of action in foreign affairs have
almost inevitably led to the flow of power to the executive.
Second, requiring that treaties enjoy legislative power threatens to
import these pro-executive structures into the normal lawmaking pro
cess. Executive branch officials usually negotiate treaties with little
formal input from Congress. Presidents refer the negotiated agree
ment to the Senate almost as a fait accompli, in which the Senate has
little freedom to modify the substantive provisions.371 The under
standings of the agreement that will govern will often be those of the
President and his or her advisers, not those of the congressional com
mittees or individual Senators. Because the process that applies will be
that of the Treaty Clause, the President will come to exercise broader
powers over the domestic lawmaking process than would normally be
the case. Termination of treaties draws these problems into sharp re
lief. Statutes require a repealing statute to terminate their provisions.
As discussed earlier, however, most authorities conclude that treaties
may be terminated by unilateral presidential action.372 This conclusion
creates an inconsistency in the constitutional structure. If the political
branches choose to regulate domestic conduct by statute, the Presi
dent cannot terminate the rules without Congress's permission. If,
however, the political branches should regulate the same conduct by
treaty, the President can terminate the regulation at will. Treaty exclu
sivity, therefore, has the effect of expanding the President's powers as
more and more aspects of domestic life can be regulated by interna
tional agreement, rather than by statute. A doctrine whereby congres
sional-executive agreements are needed to enter into agreements that
have domestic legislative effects preserves the balance of powers
among the branches.
370. See John C. Yoo, Review Essay, Politics as Usual?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851 (forthcom

ing 2001). Presidential dominance in treaty enforcement and interpretation was heavily con
tested during the controversy over whether the ABM treaty permitted "Star Wars" research.
See, e.g., Joseph R. Biden, Jr. & John B. Ritch III, The Treaty Power: Upholding a Constitu
tional Partnership, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1529 (1989); Lawrence J. Block et al., The Senate's
Pie-in-the-Sky Treaty Interpretation: Power and the Quest for Legislative Supremacy, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1481 (1989); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, Commentary, Testing
and Development of "Exotic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation
Caper, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1956 (1986); Abraham D. Sofaer, Commentary, The ABM Treaty
and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1972 (1986).

371. Under fast track legislation, Congress cannot even modify or amend congressional
executive agreements involving trade. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United
States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143 (1992).
372. See supra note 228.
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Congressional-executive agreements represent the political
branches' best effort to preserve a distinction between treatymaking
and lawmaking. Section II demonstrated the textual and structural dif
ficulties that arise from a doctrine of complete interchangeability, in
which statutes could utterly replace treaties. This Part has shown the
similar constitutional problems created by the alternative theory of
treaty exclusivity. In conjunction with the theory of self-execution and
the growing internationalization of domestic affairs, treaty exclusivity
provokes an irreconcilable conflict between the grant of the treaty
power to the executive branch, anci the vesting of all federal legislative
power in Congress. Congressional-executive agreements provide a
way to resolve this tension by allowing Congress to retain authority
over those matters delegated to it by the Constitution, even when an
international agreement threatens to intrude upon its plenary powers.
Unlike the internationalist or transformationist theories, however, this
approach still reserves a meaningful role for treaties in the conduct of
foreign policy. If congressional-executive agreements are needed to
make international agreements in areas of Congress's Article I, Sec
tion 8 powers, the political branches still must use treaties to enter into
agreements that either lie outside of those limits or that involve areas
where the executive and legislature possess competing powers.
C.

Statutes, Treaties, and the Future of International Agreements

Conceiving of congressional-executive agreements as occupying
the sphere of international agreements that involve Congress's Article
I .powers has several implications for foreign affairs law and the mak
ing of international agreements. It predicts what types of future inter
national agreements will undergo the statutory or treaty processes. It
indicates how the political branches may address several of the diffi
culties that will arise with future international agreements. It also pro
vides an understanding of the changing choice of instruments over
time. Two developments make the choice of statute versus treaty sig
nificant. As domestic affairs become internationalized, international
agreements will come to play a more important role in domestic regu
lation. At the same time, the Supreme Court's effort to protect state
sovereignty and impose new checks on congressional power removes
more areas from the reach of the legislature. This phenomenon may
place pressure on the political branches to turn to treaties to engage in
the regulation of non-commercial activities or individual rights. Be
cause of these trends, whether the political branches adopt an interna
tional agreement by treaty or by statute will bear important conse
quences for the scope of federal jurisdiction and the substance of
national regulation.
Before turning to these issues, it is worth addressing questions
about the status of congressional-executive agreements under interna-
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tional law. Treaties as defined by the Article II, Section 2 and Article
VI of the Constitution constitute treaties for purposes of international
law. One might ask whether congressional-executive agreements, in
which Congress merely enacts an international agreement as a statute,
can rise to the same level of international obligation as a treaty, which
represents the assent of both the President and a supermajority of the
Senate. International law, however, as represented by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and customary international law,
defines an international agreement as "an agreement between two or
more states or international organizations that is intended to be legally
binding and is governed by international law."373 From this broad defi
nition, it is apparent that international law is willing to consider trea
ties, congressional-executive agreements, and even sole executive
agreements all as species of international agreements that are equally
binding on the United States. Even though congressional-executive
agreements have not undergone the same domestic process as a treaty,
there is an agreement - the President negotiates and signs a docu
ment - and it becomes domestically binding once it receives approval
from Congress.
While they may appear identical under international law, the dif
ference between statutes and treaties makes a significant difference
for domestic purposes. The constitutional differences between the two
will dictate what form the political branches must use to enter into cer
tain types of international agreements. Future trade agreements, such
as the accession of the People's Republic of China to the WTO, new
WTO rounds, or expansion of American free trade areas will continue
to undergo the statutory process because they involve Congress's
powers over foreign commerce. Agreements that rest outside Con
gress's plenary powers, such as human rights, political-military, and
arms control, will still require use of the Treaty Clause. Some areas,
such as the environment, may lie somewhere in between. Although
much domestic environmental legislation presumably passes constitu
tional muster under the Commerce Clause, the non-commercial na
ture of proposed international environmental agreements and the Su
preme Court's new restrictions upon the Commerce Clause may
require use of the treaty form. As the scope of the Commerce Clause
recedes and efforts to harmonize domestic regulation with interna
tional standards increase, the Treaty Clause may present a more reli
able source for legislative power.

373. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 301(1); see also Vienna Convention on
the Jaw of treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 1-2, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333. The treaty entered into
force on January 27, 1980. Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Conven
tion on the Law of Treaties, the executive branch has decided to follow many of its substan
tive provisions as a matter of practice.

850

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 99:757

Recent decisions on the scope of state sovereignty show how the
distinction between congressional-executive agreements and treaties
might play out. Under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs),374 which itself is part of the
WTO agreement, state parties agreed to establish minimum substan
tive protections for intellectual property and to provide for judicial
remedies, including compensatory relief, against infringers.375 Under
Seminole Tribe v. Florida,376 however, Congress may not provide a
remedy in federal court for damages against a State, and under Alden
v. Maine,377 the same is true in state court. Even when Congress has
used its Section 5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather
than its Commerce Clause power under Article I, the Court has in
validated comprehensive efforts to protect intellectual property rights
without a showing of systematic state violations of that right.378 These
decisions appear to place the United States in violation of TRIPs by
eliminating judicial remedies for violations of intellectual property
rights against a class of potential infringers.379
TRIPs could have provided a different source of power upon
which to base new federal legislation against the states to protect in
tellectual property. Indeed, Professor Peter Menell, among others, has
suggested using the treaty power to restore protections for federal in
tellectual property rights against the states.380 But the difference be
tween treaties and congressional-executive agreements may raise an
insurmountable stumbling block. Because the political branches chose
to enter into the WTO agreement as a congressional-executive agree
ment, TRIPs cannot enjoy the broader constitutional scope that ap
plies to treaties. If the President and Senate had approved TRIPs as a
treaty, they could have accessed the broader powers of Missouri v.
Holland to impose obligations free from the "invisible radiations" of
the Tenth Amendment. Since the Court has repeatedly made clear
that state sovereign immunity applies only to statutes that draw upon
Congress's Article I authority, TRIPs could have escaped Seminole
Tribe and Alden because its power would have emanated from Article
II's Treaty Clause. Efforts to establish judicial remedies for intellec
tual property by treaty also would not fall subject to the Court's in374. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 270.
375. Id. arts. 41, 44-45.
376. 517 u .s. 44 (1996).
377. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
378. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666 (1999).
379. See Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity From In
fringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1452-53
(2000).
380. See id. at 1460-64.
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creasingly difficult test for remedial statutes enacted under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. But because Congress cannot escape
these decisions when acting by statute, use of the congressional
executive agreement has the consequence of restricting the national
government's ability to implement international obligations on intel
lectual property.
Even this use of the treaty power to overcome the Court's recent
federalism decisions may not be utterly free from doubt. Professor
Curtis Bradley, for example, has argued recently that the treatymak
ers' power to create federal law ought to be subject to the same feder
alism limits that apply to Congress.381 As a formal matter, this argu
ment may not be compelling because federalism limitations may not
apply in the same manner to Articles I and II. As a matter of the
original understanding, this argument does not seem to stand on firm
ground: both the Treaty of Peace of 1783 and the Jay Treaty of 1795,
both entered into by the framing generation, regulated issues such as
access to state courts and the right to hold and dispose of property issues that would not have been within Congress's enumerated powers
as they were understood at the time. Nonetheless, Bradley's claim has
a certain structural appeal, because it harmonizes treaties within the
existing constitutional model of limited and enumerated powers and
the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence in the state sovereignty
area.
Another potential limit on the treaty power might arise from the
Eleventh Amendment itself. If one believes the standard story con
cerning the Eleventh Amendment, it was enacted in response to the
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,382 which had allowed a citizen
of the state of South Carolina to sue for damages against the state of
Georgia.383 In itself, this rule does not explain the nation's over
whelming rejection of the decision. Rather, the outcry in Congress and
among the public was so great because of the issue of the pre
revolutionary debts owed to British creditors.384 Under the Peace
Treaty of 1783, the United States had agreed that "no lawful impedi
ments" would stand in the way of British creditors seeking to recover
from American debtors.385 Nonetheless, many states refused to allow
381. See Bradley, supra note 258, at 394.
382. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
383. See, e.g., 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 91-102 (1922).
384. See Emory G. Evans, Planter Indebtedness and the Coming of the Revolution in
Virginia, 19 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 511 (1962); Emory G. Evans, Private Indebtedness
and the Revolution in Virginia, 1 776 to 1 796, 28 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 349, 359-67
(1971); Charles F. Hobson, The Recovery of British Debts in the Federal Circuit Court of
Virginia, 1 790 to 1 797, 92 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 176 (1984).
385. Definitive Treaty of Peace Between Great Britain and the United States, Sept. 3,
1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, 48 Consol. T. S. 487, 493.
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their courts to hear such claims. Some states had assumed the debts of
the individual debtors; many expected that sovereign immunity would
prevent the federal courts from adjudicating creditor suits against
these states. Chisholm generated a national controversy because it
raised the specter that British creditors, freed from state sovereign
immunity, would be able to sue states directly under a treaty-granted
cause of action.386 If this historical understanding guides interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment, then state sovereignty immunity may
prove to have an equal effect upon treaties as it does upon statutes.
CONCLUSION

This Article has sought to provide a constitutional justification for
the congressional-executive agreement. It criticizes reliance upon du
bious historical claims of a non-amendment constitutional amendment
or of a long-running pedigree of interchangeability. Rather, congres
sional-executive agreements find support in Congress's plenary Article
I, Section 8 powers to regulate interstate and international commerce,
among other powers. Unlike claims of interchangeability, this Article's
approach explains that there are continuing spheres of action for both
treaties and statutes in enacting international agreements. Treaties are
still a constitutionally required form when an international agreement
calls for actions that lie outside of Congress's constitutional powers.
Unlike claims of treaty exclusivity, however, this approach leaves am
ple room to the political branches to use congressional-executive
agreements in areas of congressional competence.
Maintaining this line between congressional-executive agreements
and treaties achieves two larger goals. First, it maintains a distinction
between the executive and legislative powers, which allows Congress
to check executive branch foreign policy that has dfrect domestic ef
fects. Second, this line comports closely with the practice of the politi
cal branches since the end of World War II. If the nation is to enjoy
the benefits of a choice of instruments to pursue its foreign policy
goals, it needs a constitutional theory to explain the co-existence of
both treaties and congressional-executive agreements. This Article has
supplied a possible theory.

386. See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 734-41 (1971); 1 WARREN, supra note
383, at 96-102. The $500 minimum requirement for diversity jurisdiction was also an effort to
exclude these suits from the federal court, because most of the debt claims fell below this
amount. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC:
THE CHIEF JUSTJCESHJPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 98 (1995).

